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Women express more emotion than men, but do they also experience
more emotion than men? Are emotions represented differently in
men and women’s brains? What are the origins of gender differences
in emotions – are we born different or is it socialization that renders
us different? What are the implications of gender differences in emotion
for general well-being, insomnia, depression, antisocial behavior,
and alexithymia? What are the most appropriate methodologies for
the empirical study of gender differences in emotional experiences?
In the current book, we answer these questions by reviewing
research on general emotional expression and experience, but also
on specific emotions and affective experiences such as shame, em-
pathy, and impulsivity. We propose a truly interdisciplinary contri-
bution to the field of gender and emotions, with works authored by
specialists in the fields of psychology, neuroscience, economics,
philosophy, and anthropology. This interdisciplinary nature closely
mirrors the origins of this book. Authors are members of The Swiss
Center for Affective Sciences, a National Center of Competence
in Research (NCCR) established by the Swiss federal government
through funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF).
Despite their diverse background, the members of the NCCR Affec-
tive Sciences all have a common, central interest: emotion and its
origins, expression, experience, neural bases, and implications for
daily life. From here, the interest in gender came naturally, as ques-
tions about the differences in the affective make-up of men and
women have always fascinated researchers in the field of emotion.
Together, we pooled the existing resources and compiled a much
needed image of gender and emotion from an interdisciplinary,
mostly empirical perspective.
Besides contributions coming from The Swiss Center for Af-
fective Sciences, we are also honored to include interventions from
several international experts in the field of emotions, who embody
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the interdisciplinary nature of this book: Agneta Fisher (social psy-
chology), Joseph Andreano and Lisa Feldman Barrett (neuroscience),
Erin Tone McLure (developmental psychology), and Marco Piccinelli
(psychiatry). The experts and the main contributors shared with us
their answers to several questions, which we grouped in Q&A Boxes
throughout the book. The questions are of interest to gender and
emotion researchers in all domains and include:
– Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from – socialization and culture or biological differences
between women and men?
– From a methodological standpoint, what would you recommend
researchers who study emotion in terms of taking into account
gender differences?
– Where do you see the field of gender and emotions going in the
next 20 years?
– What is the finding on gender differences (or lack thereof) that
surprised you the most in your own research?
– What should everybody know about gender differences in emo-
tion? What are, in your view, the most important findings in this
literature so far?
We organized this book in three parts, based on the domains in which
gender and emotions are discussed. In the first part, Well Being and
Psychopathology, we include two chapters. In Chapter 1, Chiara
Fiorentini discusses the empirical support for the claim that women
are more emotional than men and the implication of these gender
differences for general well-being, including emotional regulation
and stress reactivity. In Chapter 2, Ralph Erich Schmidt and Martial
Van der Linden discuss the implications of gender differences in
impulsivity (with a focus on urgency, lack of perseverance, and sen-
sation seeking) on men and women’s psychopatholgy. To complete
this perspective, Marco Piccinelli discusses gender differences in
depression from a psychiatric viewpoint in a Q&A Box.
The second part of the book, titled The Brain, completes the
psychopathology perspective from a neuroscientific angle. In Chap-
ter 3, Christian M. Brodbeck and Giorgia Silani discusses gender dif-
ferences in the underlying brain activation for empathy and their
Introduction
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implications for antisocial personality (the lack of empathy and con-
cern for other’s emotions) and alexythimia (the inability to identify
one’s own emotions). In Chapter 4, Tatjana Aue and Patrik Vuilleumier
provide an overview of the empirical evidence on gender differences
in neural activations for memory and perception of affective stimuli.
Joseph Andreano with Lisa Feldman Barrett add to this perspective,
further discussing the neuroscience of gender differences in emotion,
including the role of gonadal hormone levels and maleness as an
induced state of the brain. Finally, Erin Tone McLure shares her
expertise on the development of gender differences in emotion and
the utility of using neuroiamagining methods such as fMRI.
In the last part we include diverse contributions that discuss
gender and emotion in the context of social interactions. Gaëtan Cousin
and Marianne Schmid Mast focus on the nature and orginin of gender
differences in the nonverbal expression of emotions in Chapter 5.
Eva Ranehill and Anne Boschini continue in Chapter 6 from an eco-
nomics perspective, discussing gender differences in risk aversion,
social preferences, and responses to competition. In Chapter 7, Raffaele
Rodogno considers the philosophical perspective on shame as a re-
sult of oppression and domination of women by men. In Chapter 8,
Delphine Eggel focuses on women’s suffering and the expression of
suffering in the Ancient world, from an anthropological viewpoint.
The Social Interactions part is completed by a Q&A Box from Agneta
Fisher on the social psychology of gender and emotion.
This book is addressed to scientists who are interested in gender and
emotion, as it incorporates the state of the art in this field, including
both existing empirical knowledge and methodological advances
and recommendations. It is especially useful to those researchers who
want to take a well-informed interdisciplinary approach to study these
issues further. However, due to its accessible language, the book is
also addressed to the general public who may be interested in learning
about what makes men and women different in the affective realm.
This work was supported by the National Centre of Compe-
tence in Research (NCCR) Affective Sciences, financed by the Swiss
National Science Foundation (SNSF, no. 51NF40-104897), and
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Well Being and Psychopathology

1. Gender and Emotion Expression,
Experience, Physiology and Well-Being:
A Psychological Perspective
CHIARA FIORENTINI
Men and women are thought to be fundamentally different in their emotion-
ality. We review the evidence about gender differences in three emotion
components (facial expression, subjective experience, and physiological
reactions), and in emotional well-being. Several studies suggest that women
are more emotionally expressive than men, although this can be disconfirmed
in particular contexts. Women’s enhanced expressivity does not reflect more
intense experience or greater physiological responses with respect to men.
Gender differences in emotion experience and physiology are less con-
sistent and depend on the nature of the emotional stimulus, the context,
and the response format. This complex pattern of findings is best accounted
by a bio-social approach, which acknowledges both social and biological
determinants as a source of gender differences.
It is a common and pervasive belief in Western culture that women
are “more emotional than men”, in the sense of being more “in touch”
with their emotions, more responsive, sensitive, and empathic (e. g.,
Germans Gard & Kring, 2007; Grossman & Wood, 1993; LaFrance
& Banaji, 1992). Considerable research in the past decades has fo-
cused on sex differences in emotionality, but findings have been
inconsistent.
The issue is a difficult one for at least three reasons. Firstly,
“emotion” is a debated term, generally construed as a multidimen-
sional concept including several components, such as emotional
experience, expression, and physiology (LaFrance & Banaji, 1992).
According to some authors, the general statement of gender differ-
ences in “emotionality” is therefore too vague, and should be speci-
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fied by individuating actual differences between men and women in
one or more components of emotion, for instance in experience or
in expression (Germans Gard & Kring, 2007). As gender differences
in one component (e. g., expression) may, or may not, correlate with
differences in another component (e. g., experience) – due to biolo-
gical, cultural, and situational factors (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth,
1982; Kring & Gordon, 1998), it may be difficult to generalize the
observations made on only one component to others (e. g., inferring
how intensely we feel emotion by how strongly we express it).
Secondly, even when looking at just one component (e. g., ex-
perience), differences between men and women can be assessed along
different – and not necessarily correlated – dimensions, such as the
intensity, valence, frequency, or duration of the emotion experienced.
Therefore, when asking if women experience more emotion than
men, one should be clear whether he means that women experience
emotion more intensely (intensity), more frequently (frequency), or
for a longer period after the eliciting condition (duration). In addi-
tion, other methodological aspects, like the degree of intrusiveness
of the measure that is taken, can affect the results (LaFrance & Banaji,
1992).
Finally, the positive evidence of gender differences in some as-
pects of emotionality does not easily lend itself to an account of
how these differences arise. In fact, gender-specific emotion pat-
terns are often explained equally well both as a product of socializa-
tion and in terms of biologically, hard-wired differences between
men and women.
In this chapter we review the current evidence about gender
differences in three main emotion components (i. e., expression, ex-
perience, and physiology) as well as in aspects linked to emotional
well-being. We concentrate on research published mostly after the
1980s (although a few earlier studies are included) and conducted
on adult population. We start with gender differences in emotion
expression, focusing on facial expressivity as the primary data; next,
we consider research on gender and the phenomenal experience of
emotion, and then, we turn to studies that compared how men and
women react physiologically to emotional situations. In the section
on emotion and well-being, we consider how men and women dif-
CHIARA FIORENTINI
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fer in emotion regulation, coping strategies, and stress reactivity,
pointing to the implications of gender differences for situations out-
side the laboratory setting. Finally, we conclude by presenting some
theoretical explanations of gender differences in emotion.
Gender and Emotion Expression
According to most authors, “emotional expressivity” reflects the
extent to which individuals outwardly display their emotions (Kring,
Smith, & Neale, 1994), and includes the behavioural changes (e. g.,
facial, postural, verbal) that typically accompany emotion (Gross &
John, 1997). Research on gender differences has predominantly fo-
cused on the expressive component and, with few exceptions, re-
sults indicate that women are more emotionally expressive than men
(Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, van Vianen, & Manstead, 2004; for
reviews, see Ashmore, 1990; Brody & Hall, 1983; Hall, 1984). Most
studies evaluated facial expressivity, with different methods includ-
ing facial electromyography (fEMG), observational coding by trained
raters, judgments by naïve raters, and self-report (Kring & Gordon,
1998).
Gender differences were found primarily in self-reports of fa-
cial expressivity (LaFrance & Banaji, 1992), but they were confirmed
by evidence obtained with fEMG studies, ratings of communication
accuracy, and self-reports of various nonverbal behaviours such as
smiling and gesturing (e. g., Barr & Kleck, 1995, LaFrance, Hecht,
& Levy Paluck, 2003; see Kring & Gordon, 1998, for a review).
Whereas self reports of expression may be influenced by what
individuals think about themselves and by self-presentational con-
cerns, fEMG recordings are more subtle and objective measures of
expression. Facial muscle activity is measured by detecting and
amplifying the tiny electrical impulses that are generated by muscle
fibers when they contract. Electrodes are placed on the face in cor-
respondence of major muscle groups, usually the corrugator super-
cilii, which lowers the brows and produce frowns, and the zigomati-
Gender and Emotion Expression, Experience, Physiology and Well-Being
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cus major, which controls smiling. Activity of these muscles meas-
ured through fEMG is related to emotional reaction: the activation
of the zygomaticus major is positively associated to positive emo-
tional stimuli and positive mood state, whereas the activation of the
corrugator is positively associated to negative emotional stimuli and
mood state (Dimberg, 1990).
Women show stronger facial EMG reactions than men in tasks
of mental imagery of emotional situations (Schwartz, Brown, &
Ahern, 1980), and in response to auditory and visual stimuli of dif-
ferent valence (Dimberg, 1990). Dimberg and Lundquist (1990)
measured the facial muscle reactivity of a sample of male and fe-
male participants while they were shown happy and angry facial
expressions. As expected, angry faces evoked increased corrugator
activity whereas happy faces evoked increased zygomatic activity.
These effects were more pronounced for females, especially for the
response to happy faces. Moreover, differences in facial reactivity
were not accompanied by differences between men and women in
the ability of perceiving the emotional stimuli (as inferred from sub-
ject’s ratings of the facial expressions) and were not influenced by
the gender of the stimulus face.
Overall, a lot of research conducted with different methods sug-
gests that women are more expressive than men, with only few studies
failing to find sex differences in expressivity (e. g., Fridlund, 1990;
Vrana, 1993; Wagner, 1990, among the most recent). In general,
women appear to be more expressive than men with respect to most
emotions. When specific emotions were examined, women resulted
more expressive in sadness, anger, disgust, fear, surprise, anger, and
happiness-smiling as compared to men (see Kring & Gordon, 1998,
for a review of individual studies).
Two main explanations of this finding have been proposed:
1) women express more emotion because they actually experience
more emotion than men. 2) Alternatively, men and women differ in
emotional expression but these differences do not depend on differ-
ences on experienced emotion. The issue is difficult to judge be-
cause not many authors directly compared measures of experience
and measures of expression in men and women and, those who did,
reported mixed findings: some found that women were more ex-
CHIARA FIORENTINI
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pressive and also reported to experience more emotion than men
(e. g., Greenwald, Cook & Lang, 1989; Gross & Levenson, 1993),
whereas others found no sex differences in either expression or ex-
perience (Cupchik & Poulos, 1984; Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith, &
Kleck, 1976). However, some studies (Kring & Gordon, 1998;
Wagner, Buck, & Winterbotham, 1993; Zuckerman, Klorman, Lar-
rance, & Spiegel, 1981) found sex differences in expression (i. e.,
women were more expressive than men) that were not accompanied
by differences in experience.
We consider the study by Kring and Gordon (1998) in detail, as
it is one of the few that examined sex differences in emotion expres-
sion, experience, and physiology at the same time. To elicit emo-
tion, participants were shown emotional films with either positive
or negative content. While they were watching the films, partici-
pants’ facial expressions were videotaped and subsequently coded
by experts by using The Facial Expression Coding System (FACES;
Kring & Sloan, 1991) to determine the frequency, intensity and du-
ration of positive and negative expressions. During film exposure,
the authors also measured skin conductance, which is a reliable in-
dicator of autonomic nervous system activity, is easy to measure
unobtrusively, and is sensitive to changes in psychological and emo-
tion states (e. g., Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; see paragraph
on Physiological Reactions). Emotion experience was assessed
through self-reports, by asking participants to rate the extent to which
they experienced four emotions (sadness, fear, disgust, and happi-
ness) on a 4-point scale.
Compared with men, women were more expressive of both posi-
tive and negative emotions (i. e., positive expressions in response to
happy films and negative expressions in response to sad films), while
there were no differences in reports of experienced emotion. Men
and women also showed different skin conductance responses, which
were not in the direction of a higher reactivity of women as com-
pared to men, but varied according to the type of emotion film: men
had greater reactivity to fear and anger films, and women had greater
reactivity to sad and disgust films. These results suggest that sex
differences in expressivity cannot be accounted for by differences
in self-reported emotional experience or differences in skin conduct-
Gender and Emotion Expression, Experience, Physiology and Well-Being
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ance reactivity. According to the authors, their findings are consist-
ent with the view that men and women are socialized differently
with respect to emotion expression, in the sense that men learn to
mask their emotions more than women.
To test their hypothesis, Kring and Gordon (1998) performed a
second study, in which they examined whether variables like gen-
der role (a personality feature indicating how much an individual
endorse characteristics associated with either “masculinity” or “femi-
ninity”) and family expressiveness (the extent to which participants
rated their family as being emotionally expressive) can moderate
the relationship between sex and expressivity. Surprisingly, being
“feminine” was not associated with enhanced expressivity. Instead,
the individuals of both sexes classified as “androgynous” (i. e. who
displayed a high number of both feminine and masculine character-
istics) were more facially expressive and reported greater dis-
positional expressivity than participants classified as either “mascu-
line” or “feminine”. Women’s increased expressivity was actually
accounted by a higher prevalence of individuals rated as “androgy-
nous” in the female compared to the male group. According to Kring
and Gordon (1998), “androgynous” individuals, being less condi-
tioned to conform to a sex-typed role, would be more extrovert and
behaviourally flexible, and hence more emotionally expressive, than
“masculine” or “feminine” persons. The second variable, family
expressiveness did not yield significant sex differences. However,
for both men and women, reports of greater family expressiveness
correlated with reports of greater dispositional expressivity, which
suggests a role for familial socialization in the development of ex-
pressive abilities.
The finding that adhesion to a “feminine” stereotype is not linked
to increased expressiveness in women is consistent with evidence
of situations in which women are actually less expressive than men.
For instance, Friedman and Miller-Herringer (1991) studied the con-
cealing of spontaneous expressions of happiness after winning in a
competitive situation against peers, both in social and solitary condi-
tion. In general, being in a social context versus being alone strongly
influenced expressive behaviours, leading subjects to conceal their
positive emotion in front of the looser (social inhibition effect).
CHIARA FIORENTINI
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However, as compared to women, men tended to show more expres-
sive changes (i. e. to inhibit less) than women. Furthermore, espe-
cially among men, and especially in the alone condition, there was a
positive relationship between exhibition (a personality variable) and
expressions of anger (a rated variable). This additional finding sug-
gests that the sex difference in the social inhibition effect might have
been determined by the competitive nature of the situation, to which
men would respond more than women. Indeed, the expressions ac-
companying victory displayed some aggressiveness, which resembles
anger. Therefore, this explanation is also consistent with the notion
that men tend to be less expressive than women, with the exception
of expressing anger (Friedman & Miller-Herringer, 1991).
To sum up, the finding that women are more expressive than
men is fairly robust, but it can be disconfirmed in particular con-
texts. Women’s greater expressivity does not seem to reflect enhanced
emotional experience in women than in men and is not positively
correlated with greater physiological responses. Sex differences in
emotional expressivity appear to be modulated by multiple factors,
including the situation, the type of emotion expressed, the personal-
ity style of the individual, and the adhesion to a masculine /feminine
stereotype learnt through social reinforcement since very early in
life (e. g., Brody & Hall, 1993, 2000).
Gender and Emotion Experience
The subjective experience of emotion is typically assessed through
verbal self-reports, which can vary in many important ways. For
example, they can be direct, asking subjects how much emotion they
feel, or indirect (e. g., the experimenter extracts an emotion score
from a memory test for emotional information, or from the use of
emotion terms in verbal descriptions). Self-reports can either probe
specific emotions, such as anger or happiness, or instead focus on a
global disposition of “emotionality” (e. g., asking people how emo-
tional they are). Finally, the eliciting context can be included or not
Gender and Emotion Expression, Experience, Physiology and Well-Being
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in the measure, and the self report can ask about private or public
situations. All these factors may affect the results substantially
(Feldman Barrett, Lane, Sechrest, & Schwartz, 2000; see LaFrance
& Banaji, 1992 for a complete review), which as a consequence are
quite mixed.
Gender differences mostly emerge from direct self-reports fo-
cusing on emotional experience as a global disposition, with women
describing themselves as more emotionally intense than men (e. g.,
Diener, Sandvik, & Larsen, 1985; Fujita, Diener, & Sandvik, 1991;
Grossman &Wood, 1993). Instead, evidence is less consistent when
indirect measures are used, or when a specific emotion is probed,
the number of studies reporting sex differences in fear/anxiety, an-
ger, depression/sadness, guilt, and happiness being almost the same
as the number of studies that do not. Yet, when differences emerge,
they usually confirm the expectation of women experiencing these
emotions more than men (Feldman Barrett & Morganstein, 1995).
When participants have to describe their emotional experience us-
ing global, memory-based measures, females describe themselves
as more affectively intense, sensitive to their feelings, anxious, sad,
and happy than do men. Instead, when situational, momentary-based
ratings are used, either across a two-week period (Feldman Barrett,
Robin, Pietromonaco, & Eyssell, 1998) or across a 2 to 3-month
time span (Feldman Barrett & Morganstein, 1995), no gender dif-
ferences are found. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is
that cultural stereotypes have a differential impact on general and
situational reports: whereas the former relies on commonsense un-
derstanding of “what it means to be emotional” and is easily influ-
enced by gender-role stereotypes, the latter would remain tied to the
specific circumstances about which the report is asked (Feldman
Barrett et al., 1998; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992). In other words, gen-
eral self-reports allow men and women to provide descriptions which
are conform to the “emotional style” usually attributed to their re-
spective sex (i. e., women are emotional, men are not) rather than
based on their actual experiences.
However, recent studies have demonstrated that women and men
actually differ in their autobiographical memory for emotional expe-
rience, with women remembering more frequent emotional events
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than do men (Davis, 1999; Fujita et al., 1991; Seidlitz & Diener,
1998). This raises the possibility that sex differences in global, retro-
spective ratings of emotional experience reflect stable differences
between men and women in the complexity or accessibility of emo-
tion knowledge that is used to make reconstructions, rather than the
influence of cultural stereotypes. Feldman Barrett et al. (2000) di-
rectly tested the hypothesis that women display more complex emo-
tion knowledge than men when articulating about their own and
others’ emotional experience. Female and male participants from
7 different samples completed the Levels of Emotional Awareness
Scale (LEAS, Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990), a
task in which respondents generate verbal description of their own
anticipated feelings and those of another person for 20 different sce-
narios. Responses are scored for the degree of complexity (i. e., the
degree to which emotion terms are employed and integrated to de-
scribe the emotions attributed to the self and to the other person in the
scenario). As predicted, women scored higher than men, indicating
a more complex and differentiated use of language in the articulation
of emotional experiences, which was independent of verbal intelli-
gence. Two interpretations are suggested: 1) due to inherited predis-
position and/or socialization process, women have more elaborated
emotion knowledge than men; 2) both men and women have equally
complex knowledge, but women may use it more easily, because they
do it more frequently or because they have more motivation. What-
ever the specific causal factor is, the above findings suggests that sex
differences exist in retrospective ratings of emotion because women,
by attending more to emotions when they occur, thinking of them, and
sharing them with other people, may acquire a more elaborated view
of their emotional lives than do men (Feldman Barrett et al., 2000).
How can we then explain the inconsistencies in the reported
experience of specific discrete emotions? Some authors suggest that
certain emotions (e. g. anger) are more typical of males, whereas
others (e. g., sadness, fear) are more typical of females. As early as
preschool age, children seem to “know” that anger is a male charac-
teristic, whereas fear and sadness are typical of females (Birnbaum
& Croll, 1984). Exactly as broad dispositional concepts, also self-
reports of experience of specific emotions can be influenced by cul-
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tural stereotypes, and by the learning of rules about emotion expres-
sion and regulation that reinforce different behaviours in boys and
girls (Brody, 1985).
Another possibility is that women experience and report more
negative emotions because they have stronger reactions than men in
response to unpleasant events, especially those that are threatening
or traumatic (Kring & Gordon, 1998). Epidemiological data indi-
cating that women are at higher risk for affective disorders, such as
anxiety and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987) are consistent with
this hypothesis. However, this view is challenged by evidence that
women also report experiencing more happiness and joy than men
(e. g., Brody, 1996) and by the fact that differences occur more in
physiological reactions than in verbal report of the subjectively ex-
perienced emotion (Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001).
To sum up, there is little to substantiate the general claim that
women experience more frequent or more intense emotions than
men. However, men and women seem to differ in at least two aspects
of emotional experience: 1) the way they judge and describe their
“emotionality”, and 2) the structure of the autobiographical memory
for emotional episodes. Without excluding the influence of biologi-
cal determinants, the social reinforcement of different reactions and
feelings in men and women since very early in development is sug-
gested to be an important modulator of emotional experience.
Gender and Physiological indicators of emotion
Evidence of gender differences in the physiological concomitants of
emotion is complex and incomplete, and the complexity comes from
various sources. First, there are few systematic studies that directly
addressed this issue (Manstead, 1992). Second, physiological reac-
tivity is not unidimensional, and, what is more, there is no agreed
upon measure or set of measures that are unambiguously linked to
emotionality. Finally, when gender is taken into account, the pattern
of results is mixed, with some studies reporting that men are more
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reactive than women, some studies showing the opposite and some
other studies reporting either mixed findings or no gender differences
at all on physiological measures (LaFrance & Banaji, 1992).
Traditionally, the method of investigation is similar to that used
to study emotion expression: in a laboratory setting, affectively
loaded stimuli (usually pictures or video-clips) are presented to a
sample of participants and one or more physiological indicators (e. g.
skin conductance reactivity, heart rate, blood pressure, etc.) are meas-
ured during participants’ exposure to the emotional material. In some
studies, positive/negative-valenced stimuli are replaced by actual
“stressors” (i. e., stimuli chosen to cause stress to the organism, such
as elevated sound levels, over-illumination, etc.) and the physiologi-
cal measures that are taken reflect more specifically a stress-response
(see following paragraph).
Overall, findings seem to depend on the physiological indicator
that is measured. Early studies of skin conductance reactivity in re-
sponse to emotional stimuli reported greater reactions in women
than in men (Aronfreed, Messick & Diggory, 1953; Berry & Martin,
1957). A later study found men to be more reactive, by showing
larger blood pressure under stress than women (Stoney, Davis, &
Matthews, 1987). However, Stone, Dembrosky, Costa, and McDou-
gall (1990) reported that women responded with higher diastolic
blood pressure to two types of stressors, whereas men were higher
on systolic blood pressure only on one of the stressors. LaFrance
and Banaji (1992) observe that, when studies use multiple physio-
logical measures, the results are often not consistent across meas-
ures and do not yield a simple main effect of gender. For instance,
Cornelius and Averill (1983) found that, in response to a live taran-
tula, females showed a higher heart rate than men, but did not differ
from them on skin conductance. Other studies found no differences
at all between men and women in response to emotion on the physio-
logical parameters that were measured. Kleck and Strenta (1985)
reported no significant gender differences in a sample of partici-
pants who were shown images of themselves being disfigured.
The overall picture becomes even more complex when physio-
logical response is assessed together with emotion experience and/
or expressivity. Overall, gender differences in physiological reac-
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tivity do not seem to correlate with underlying differences in the
reported emotional experience. Vrana and Rollock (2002) found no
gender differences in heart rate or skin conductance levels between
men and women during an imagery task, although women reported
experiencing more intense emotion and showed more intense facial
behaviour than men. Nater and colleagues (Nater, Abruzzese, Krebs,
& Ehlert, 2006) examined sex differences in the psychological and
physiological reactions to pleasant and relaxing versus unpleasant
and arousing musical stimuli. Psychophysiological measures in-
cluded heart rate, electrodermal activity, skin temperature, salivary
cortisol, and salivary alpha-amylase (respectively, a steroid hormone
and an enzyme, both regarded as biomarkers for stress). Whereas
men and women did not differ in psychological responses, they
showed very different reactivity to musical stimuli. Women displayed
elevated responses to the arousing and unpleasant stimulus, whereas
men did not. Only the endocrine measures of saliva gave no gender
differences. These findings suggest that 1) gender differences might
be linked to the valence of the emotion elicited, and 2) they are not
entirely consistent across physiological indicators. Furthermore, they
confirm that the various emotion components do not necessarily
correlate with each other, as women, who reacted more to unpleas-
ant stimuli, did not seem to experience “more” than men.
As for the relationship between facial expression and physio-
logical reactivity, an interesting finding was reported by Buck and
colleagues (Buck, Miller, & Caul, 1974; Buck, Savin, Miller, & Caul,
1972) in the early ’70s. They found that, in response to emotional
stimuli, women were more facially expressive but showed less auto-
nomic arousal, whereas men were less expressive but conveyed more
physiologically. The intuitive explanation of this result is that sup-
pression of overt display of emotion would “cause” enhanced inter-
nal reactivity. Whereas women tend to express their emotions overtly
(they are externalizers), men are more incline to conceal them (they
are internalizers). Subsequent research has provided some support to
the externalizers/internalizers explanation of gender differences, but
the evidence was never straightforward. For instance, in the study by
Kring and Gordon (1998) introduced above, more women than men
were externalizers and more men than women are internalizers. How-
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ever, as men were not, overall, more physiologically reactive than
women, the externalizer/internalizer distinction did not appear a cru-
cial explanatory variable. Rather, the main finding was that men and
women responded differently to different types of emotional stimuli
(i. e., men were more reactive than women to the fear and anger films;
women more reactive to the sad and disgust films). This is consistent
with findings by other studies. For example, heart rate of male stu-
dents was found to increase in response to erotic stimuli, whereas
heart rate of female students increased in response to crying baby
video segments (Furedy, Fleming, Ruby, Scher, et al., 1989).
Similar results were obtained by Bradley et al. (2001), who
measured physiological parameters (skin conductance, heart rate,
and reflex modulation), facial expression, and subjective judgment
(i. e. rating of pleasantness, arousal, and dominance) in men and
women exposed to neutral and emotional stimuli. As expected, highly
arousing pictures of threat, mutilation, and erotica produced the larg-
est reactions in both sexes. Reactions differed according to stimulus
content: pictures of threat and mutilation produced an increase in
skin conductance, in the startle reflex, and in cardiac deceleration,
all regarded as indicators of defensive activation. Erotica enhanced
skin conductance while inhibiting the startle reflex, two reactions
which reflect appetitive activation. Interestingly, whereas women
exhibited greater defensive reactivity to aversive pictures, regardless
of their specific content, men showed increased appetitive activa-
tion only viewing erotica.
Recently, Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai (2007) examined gender
differences in electrodermal reactivity, self-reports of emotion and
emotional facial behaviour in European Americans and Hmong
Americans while they relived past emotional events. Women showed
greater changes in electrodermal reactivity than men overall. How-
ever, differences in self reports of emotion and in facial behaviour
depended on the emotion, with women reporting more intense emo-
tion while reliving anger and love, and smiling more while reliving
happiness and love.
In sum, evidence of sex differences in the physiological compo-
nent of emotion is quite elusive. In contrast with emotional expres-
sion, there is not a general tendency for women to be more reactive
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than men. Evidence for the opposite (i. e. men more reactive than
women) has been viewed as a way to compensate for the reduced
overt expression of emotional reactions in men. However, gender
differences in physiological reactions seem strongly linked to con-
textual factors, such as the valence of the emotional stimulus, and
the emotion-eliciting task.
Emotion and well-being: regulation, coping strategies,
and stress reactivity
In Western society cultural norms somehow prescribe that men in-
hibit their emotions more than women (Gross & John, 2003). Par-
ents report teaching their sons greater emotional control than their
daughters, and boys say that they are expected to inhibit their emo-
tional expressions more than girls (Underwood, Coie, & Hersbam,
1992). As a consequence, different emotion regulation strategies may
be preferentially adopted by each sex in order to conform to differ-
ent social expectations. Gross and John (2003) investigated indi-
vidual differences in the use of two “strategies”, reappraisal versus
suppression, to regulate emotional reactions. By focusing on the
elaboration of the emotional meaning of events for the individual,
reappraisal is thought to have a positive effect on the individual’s
well-being and social adjustment. Instead, suppression, which con-
trols only the ultimate behavioural reactions to such events, repre-
sents a less adaptive strategy, and is more correlated to depressive
symptoms, rumination, poor self-esteem and life satisfaction. As
expected by the authors, men were found to suppress more than
women. On the other hand, the mechanism of suppression seemed
to work in the same way for both sexes: no gender differences were
observed in the ease with which individuals suppress “on command”,
or in any of the behavioural, subjective, or autonomic consequences
of suppression in a negative emotion context.
Another line of research has focused on stress reactivity. As al-
ready mentioned, women appear more vulnerable than men to de-
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velop depression or anxiety during life (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet,
Hughes, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 2001). These data suggest
a higher incidence of negative affect in women than in men, pos-
sibly mediated by heightened reactions to aversive stimulation
(Watson, Clark, & Mineka, 1994). Indeed, considerable evidence
shows that women are both more psychologically and physiologi-
cally reactive to stressors than men (Matud, 2004). They show in-
creased heart rate (e. g., Kudielka, Buske-Kirschbaum, Hellhammer,
& Kirschbaum, 2004; Labouvie-Vief, Lumley, Jain, & Heinze,
2003), greater emotional responses – e. g., as inferred by their use
of emotion words – (Sells & Martin, 2001), and report more stress,
intrusive thoughts, and avoidance (Lepore, Ragan, & Jones, 2000).
However, the relationship between gender and stress reactivity is
complicated by the fact that women and men seem to be sensitive
to different type of stressors (Stroud, Salovey, & Epel, 2002) and
show somewhat different physiological responses (Stoney, 1987;
Wolf & Kimerling, 1997).
Most studies examined acute response to stress. Schmaus and
colleagues (Schmaus, Laubmeier, Boquiren, Herzer, & Zakowski,
2008) looked at gender differences in response to initial and repeated
exposure to a laboratory stressor: although gender differences were
not found after initial exposure, women showed significantly greater
heart rate and negative affect reactivity than men after the second
exposure, suggesting a process of sensitization that make them more
vulnerable to repeated stress exposure as compared to men. Women
also reported more intrusive thoughts and avoidance of the stressor,
although these did not seem to account for the gender differences in
reactivity.
Wallbott and Scherer (1991) looked at the interaction between
gender and type of stress. They found that women reacted more
strongly in the condition of high cognitive stress than in the condi-
tion of low cognitive stress, and showed only small differences in
reacting to high as compared to low emotional stress. The reverse
pattern was found for men, even if differences were much smaller
than those for women. Overall, gender of the participants was
strongly involved in mediating arousal responses in different re-
sponse modalities (i. e., subjective reports of arousal, total amount
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of facial activity, and, to a lesser extent, physiological reactions)
and with respect to different types and levels of stress.
Greater emotional complexity is thought to be associated with
greater emotional adaptation (Feldman Barrett et al., 2000). How-
ever, lower performances in emotion-related tasks for men with re-
spect to women do not necessarily reflect lower levels of emotional
adaptation, and might instead indicate differentially tuned emotion
processes. For example, men’s lower scores in emotion knowledge
(Feldman Barrett et al., 2000) may reflect a greater propensity to
represent emotional experience with action oriented terms than with
descriptive ones. This is coherent with the idea that men are more
behaviourally oriented in their emotional expressions and more likely
to manage their emotions in automatic fashion than women (Brody
& Hall, 1993). In contrast, women may use conscious, self-reflective
coping strategies that are more language based. One might even specu-
late that women’s increased risk for depression is linked to the risk
of prolonging their negative emotional experiences by using self-
reflective emotion regulation strategies (Feldman Barrett et al., 2000),
which makes even clearer how the adaptive value of specific char-
acteristics/responses strongly depends on the situational context.
How do we explain gender differences?
The bio-social approach
Gender differences have been frequently attributed to the social and
cultural context, especially as represented by gender-stereotypes
(Brody & Hall, 1993; Jansz, 2000; Shields, 2002). According to the
socio-cultural perspective, emotions can be seen as a part of the
process of socialization into the roles that men and women generally
occupy. As such, they are linked to (perceived) differences in power
and status of each sex: in order to perform the social roles successfully,
different emotions and emotion expressions are required (Fischer et
al., 2004). In contrast with the above approach, the biological perspec-
tive holds that gender differences in emotionality are fundamentally
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based on biological differences between men and women (e. g., hor-
monal influences could explain the more frequent crying in women).
As a compromise between the above perspectives, the majority
of the current theories about sex differences in emotionality share
the idea that both biological and socio-cultural factors contribute to
differential emotional experience and expression (Bradley et al.,
2001). In line with a biological view, women tend to report more
fear in threatening situations, reflecting a feeling of inability to physi-
cally protect themselves if attacked (Gordon & Riger, 1991), whereas
men report more emotional arousal than do women in presence of
erotic stimuli (Murnen & Stockton, 1997). Biological explanations
are therefore consistent with the existing evidence that different cues
tend to arouse emotion in men and women. Likewise, the fact that
gender differences are most evident in facial expressivity and glo-
bal subjective reports – more vulnerable to social learning and vol-
untary control than physiological responses or momentary emotion
experience – can be at least partly explained in terms of cultural
reinforcement (Bradley et al., 2001). Such a perspective, which em-
phasizes social roles but acknowledges the impact of sex-specific
biological characteristics in shaping social behaviour (Wood & Eagly,
2002), is called biosocial approach.
In line with this approach, Fischer et al. (2004) examined the
cross-cultural variability of gender differences in reported emotion,
in countries in which the roles occupied by men and women are
different. The authors wanted to test whether the gender-specific
pattern found in studies with Western participants, namely that men
report more powerful emotions (e. g., anger and hostile emotions)
and women report more powerless emotions (e. g., fear, sadness) is
a universal feature or rather varies according to the gender roles
present in the various countries. Traditionally, in Western countries,
men are more likely than women to provide material resources and
to assume a role in the paid economy. Instead, women are more
likely to have domestic and nurturing roles, focused on the emo-
tional care of others and giving less power and status than male
roles. A high-status male role would reinforce powerful emotions
that show one’s power and assertiveness, while discouraging power-
less emotions. Instead, a nurturing female role would discourage
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powerful emotions but encourage powerless emotions, which, by
expressing internal blame and vulnerability, help maintaining har-
mony in social relations with little overt hostility. Therefore, across
countries, the strength of this gender-specific pattern should vary
according to the social role (and status) held by men and women in
their respective countries.
Fischer et al. (2004) analyzed data from respondents from
37 countries all over the world, which had completed a question-
naire about the intensity, expression, and control, of powerful (an-
ger and disgust) and powerless (fear, sadness, shame, and guilt)
emotions. As a measure of the “gender role” played by men and
women in a society, the authors used an index, the Gender Empow-
erment Measure (GEM; United Nations Development Programme
Human Development Report 2002), which reflects the extent to
which women actively participate in the political and economic life
of a country. The higher the GEM, the more status and power women
have in a specific society. Low GEM scores are characteristic of
most African, Asian, and South American countries, which main-
tain a traditional division of labor between the sexes, whereas most
Western European and English-speaking countries, in which women
actively participate in public life, have high GEM scores.
Overall, the results showed a rather universal gender specific
pattern (i. e., women report to experience and express more power-
less emotions than men), but a few interactions with GEM were
found. There were no gender differences for powerful emotions.
However, in the case of the powerless emotions, men’s scores, but not
those of women, significantly interacted with the GEM. Men from
high-GEM countries rated their powerless emotions as less intense
than did men from low-GEM countries, suggesting that powerless
and vulnerability correspond less with the male role in Western coun-
tries than with the male role in non Western countries. With respect
to the two emotion expressions, crying revealed a uniform pattern
across countries, suggesting that this emotion expression is more
determined by biological factors than social roles. Expressions of
anger appeared more affected by social roles, with women in high-




Overall, Fischer et al. (2004) concluded that the biosocial theory
of gender differences (Wood and Eagly, 2002) is a useful frame-
work to account for the their findings, which seem to be best ex-
plained by an interplay between social factors, showing some extent
of cultural variation, and biological determinants, showing little
cultural variation. Further research is needed, for instance in order
to understand the impact of social roles onto the immediate contexts
in which emotions are elicited.
Summary and Conclusions
The present review focused on gender differences in emotion ex-
pression, experience, physiology, and well-being. The majority of
the studies reported here examined a single emotion component,
and only few (e. g., Bradley et al., 2001; Kring & Gordon, 1998)
measured expression, experience and physiology at the same time.
As a consequence, a direct comparison of sex differences in these
three aspects is almost never possible. In addition, methodological
factors, which also vary greatly across studies, were shown to affect
results substantially (LaFrance and Banaji, 1992).
The resulting picture is therefore quite complex. The expres-
sive component has been the most studied, especially with respect
to facial behaviour. Experimental measures include verbal descrip-
tions, both as external and self-reports, FACS coding, and fEMG
measures. Overall, results indicate that women are more emotion-
ally expressive than men. However, women’s more pronounced
expressivity does not systematically correspond to greater underly-
ing emotional experience in women than in men, or to enhanced
physiological responses. In fact, stable gender differences in emo-
tional experience emerge mostly from studies using self-reports and
examining the “global” disposition of the individual to experience
emotions (frequency, intensity of emotional episodes): in this kind
of study, women generally report greater emotionality than
men. Instead, differences are less consistent when specific emotions
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are examined, and when situational, momentary-based ratings are
used.
There are various possible explanations for the existence of in-
dividual differences in emotional expression that are not paralleled
by differences in experienced emotion. The most common interpre-
tation is that differences in expressive behaviour are due to sex role
stereotypes and to cultural learning. As suggested by various stud-
ies, men and women may learn, since very early age, different rules
for emotional expression: whereas boys learn to conceal their feel-
ings, girls learn to express them more freely (Brody, 1985). This
statement is however disconfirmed in some particular contexts in
which women are actually less expressive than men (e. g., Friedman
& Miller-Herringer, 1991).
With respect to physiological activity, a traditional hypothesis
is that women tend to be externalizers, whereas men tend to be
internalizers. Even though this distinction is in keeping with the
general finding of women as more expressive than men, the pat-
tern of sex differences in the physiological component of emotion
is much less stable, with little evidence that men are more physio-
logically reactive than women. One limitation is that most studies
measured only one parameter (usually, skin conductance), and those
that measured more than one gave mixed results (LaFrance & Ba-
naji, 1992). Across studies, the most consistent finding is that men
and women show different physiological reactivity to stimuli of dif-
ferent emotional content, with women being generally more reactive
than men to aversive stimuli eliciting negative affect (Bradley et
al., 2001).
In sum, the nature of the emotional stimulus and, consequently,
the type of emotion elicited, appear as crucial determinants of gen-
der differences in emotional responses in all components. Other fac-
tors, like the situational context and the influence of socio-cultural
learning may explain why differences in one component appear more
strikingly than in others. Research on gender differences in emo-
tional well-being is in line with the above suggestion. For instance,
gender differences in stress reactivity were found to depend strongly
on the type of stressors to which individuals are exposed (Wallbott
& Scherer, 1991): women react more strongly in situations of high
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cognitive stress than of low cognitive stress, and show only small
differences in reacting to high as compared to low emotional stress,
whereas men tend to exhibit the reverse pattern.
Women and men seem also to differ in the processing strate-
gies applied to emotional stimuli. An example is the memory for
emotional events. Feldman-Barrett et al. (2000) showed that women
have more elaborated and /or accessible emotion knowledge than
men, which can explain – more than or in addition to cultural stere-
otypes – why women describe themselves as “more emotional” than
men. This finding suggests that men and women are differentially
equipped to respond to emotional stimuli, with men managing their
emotions in a more automatic, action-oriented way, and women ap-
plying more descriptive, self-reflective strategies. Furthermore, it
shows that gender differences can have multiple determinants, both
biological (i. e. innate predisposition) and cultural (i. e. social learn-
ing and reinforcement), as maintained by the biosocial approach
(Wood & Eagly, 2002). A complex interplay between biological pre-
disposition and cultural shaping is confirmed by imaging studies
of gender differences in emotion processes, showing both innate
and developmental sex differences in brain regions associated to
emotion perception, memory, and experience (see Chapter 4 for a
review of these aspects). A difficult but intriguing issue is determin-
ing which differences are hard-wired in the brain rather than ac-
quired later in development, and, for those that develop later, what
is due to biological predisposition and what results from social shap-
ing. In order to answer those questions successfully, future research
on gender differences in emotion should acknowledge all the pos-
sible sources of variability in a developmental perspective and fo-
cus on the actual mechanisms that can mediate emotional responses
in particular contexts.
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Q&A Box: Chiara Fiorentini
From the methodological standpoint, what would you recommend
researchers who study emotion in terms of taking into account
gender differences?
The complex picture emerging from studies on gender differences in emotion
suggests several factors that need consideration. I will mention four of them.
First, researchers should be aware of the basic finding that gender differences in
one component (e. g. expression) do not necessarily correlate with gender differ-
ences in another component (e. g. experience). Therefore, although examining
emotion expression, experience, and physiology at the same time is obviously
difficult, it can be more informative than focusing on only one of these compo-
nents. Second, as each of these components can be evaluated along multiple
dimensions (e. g., intensity, frequency, duration of the emotion expressed/expe-
rienced), one should always be clear about which dimension would be probed by
the experiment. Third, in choosing a specific measure for a given component, one
should prefer the measure that minimizes response biases and confounds, and is
less intrusive. For instance, if the aim is to evaluate emotional facial expression,
video-recording participants’ facial behaviour while they watch emotional films,
and subsequently coding the material for the occurrence, valence, and duration of
expressions is probably a more useful strategy than asking participants them-
selves to rate their facial expressivity. Finally, researchers should carefully con-
sider the role of the context in mediating gender differences. Because contextual
factors can never be completely eliminated, and they often play an important role
in eliciting an emotional response successfully, one should always ask himself
whether a difference between men and women is due to the context (i. e., the
emotion-eliciting stimulus) or would remain stable across different situations.
Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from – socialization and culture or biological determinants?
Based on current evidence, gender differences in emotion come from the inter-
play between biological and cultural determinants, starting early in development.
Some differences are more easily accounted for by social than by biological
factors, and vice-versa. For instance, women’s tendency to be more emotionally
expressive than men can be due to cultural learning, which tends to reinforce
emotion expression in women more than in men. There are exceptions to this
rule, namely specific emotions/contexts for which cultural norms cause women
to be less expressive than men (see, for example, page 20). Furthermore, for
some expressive behaviours, like the more frequent crying in women than in
men, biological factors seem to be most important.
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As opposed to expression, actual emotion experience and physiological cor-
relates appear less affected by cultural learning, partly because they are less
under volitional control. Not surprisingly, the evidence of gender differences in
these domains is mixed.
An aspect we do not know much about is the interaction between cultural
and biological factors. For instance, the influence of socialization can be subtler
than was commonly thought. It was generally believed that women report more
intense emotion than men because of conformity to social stereotypes. Feldman
Barrett et al. (2001) instead showed that men and women actually differ in the
structure/accessibility of their emotional memory (Feldman Barret et al., 2001),
which can be due to innate predisposition, but also to the fact that they learn to
think, recall, and express their emotions in different ways early in life.
Where do you see the field of gender and emotion going in the next
20 years?
Up to now, the study of gender and emotion has explored a number of aspects
from different perspectives. The available evidence, although mixed and incom-
plete, suggests that gender differences in emotionality are more than a cultural
stereotype. I expect future research in the domain to make significant progress,
by capitalizing on what we have already learnt. For instance, we have learnt that
gender is less often responsible in a main effect (e. g., women more emotional
than men, men more reactive than women, etc.) than the ingredient of an interac-
tion, for instance with a specific type of emotional stimulus or situation. As a
consequence, we can now ask more specific questions, by considering more
carefully at which variables elicit a differential response in men and women.
Furthermore, as shown by recent imaging studies (see Chapter 4, the studies by
Canli et al., and Cahill et al.), gender differences are most likely to reflect differ-
ent processes activated by men and women in response to an emotional situa-
tion, rather than differences in the magnitude of a response. In the next years,
this idea is likely to become much more acknowledged, shifting researchers’
focus from observable behavior to the underlying processes. Finally, I believe
future research will be able to offer a more integrated perspective on gender and
emotion, by showing the implications of gender differences in emotional memory,
perception, etc., for aspects like wellbeing and psychopathology, and by sug-




2. Gender and Impulsivity:
A Psychopathological Perspective
RALPH ERICH SCHMIDT and MARTIAL VAN DER LINDEN
Given that impulsivity is a multi-dimensional construct, the question of gender
differences has to be investigated for each dimension separately. Within the
comprehensive UPPS (urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance,
sensation-seeking) approach to impulsivity as developed by Whiteside and
Lynam (2001), women score higher on urgency, whereas men tend to obtain
higher scores on lack of premeditation and sensation seeking. Urgency de-
notes a propensity to act rashly, particularly under conditions of negative affect,
and is the facet of impulsivity most strongly associated with psychopathology.
Recent research suggests that urgency may contribute to gender-specific
pathways to psychopathology, and that dysfunctional emotion regulation is
an important mediating mechanism that differentiates impulsivity-related
pathways to psychological and behavioral problems in men and women.
Impulsivity constitutes a central psychological construct that not
only appears in every major theory of personality (e. g., Evenden,
1999) but has also been associated with a wide range of problematic
behaviors and psychopathological states (e. g., Moeller et al., 2001).
Impulsivity manifests itself in “actions that appear poorly conceived,
prematurely expressed, unduly risky, or inappropriate to the situation
and often result in undesirable consequences” (Daruna & Barnes, 1993,
p. 23). As may be gathered from this description, impulsivity plays a
pivotal role in affective experiences: Impulsive behavior may be facili-
tated by certain affective states, such as anger (e. g., Abramowitz &
Berenbaum, 2007), and may in turn fuel other affective states, such
as regret, shame, and guilt (e. g., Schmidt & Van der Linden, 2009).
For instance, an impulsive individual may, in a fit of anger, utter
hurtful words to a friend and later regret the harm that was caused.
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Conflicting conceptions of impulsivity and
contradictory findings on gender differences
Regarding gender differences in impulsivity, the available evidence
presents a seemingly paradoxical picture. On the one hand, gender
differences in impulsivity have, for example, been implicated in the
comparatively higher prevalence of alcoholism (e. g., Nolen-Hoekse-
ma, 2004) or antisocial behavior and delinquency in men (e. g., Gott-
fredson & Hirschi, 1990; Moffitt, Caspi, Rutter, & Silva, 2001). On
the other hand, in a comprehensive meta-analysis on gender dif-
ferences in personality, Feingold (1994) concluded “there were es-
sentially no overall gender differences on scales of impulsiveness”
(p. 449).
How can these seemingly contradictory lines of evidence be
reconciled? A closer look at the results of Feingold’s (1994) meta-
analysis reveals that although men and women did not significantly
differ in their overall levels of impulsivity, gender differences were
sometimes found on specific operationalizations of this personality
trait. In normative samples from the U.S., for instance, men scored
higher than women on the self-control subscale of the California
Psychological Inventory (CPI/CPI-R) and lower than women on the
impulsiveness subscales of the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-
PI/NEO-PI-R) and the Personality Research Form (PRF). Essen-
tially no gender differences were found on the cautiousness subscale
of the Gordon Personality Inventory (GPI) and on the restraint sub-
scale of the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey (GZTS).
In line with Feingold’s (1994) findings, more recent studies have
indicated that men and women may differ on specific dimensions of
impulsivity without necessarily doing so on all of them, and that the
direction of the gender effect may vary. Numerous studies have, for
example, employed the latest version of the Barratt Impulsivity Scale
(BIS-11), which captures three distinct dimensions of impulsivity:
attentional impulsiveness, motor impulsiveness, and nonplanning
impulsiveness (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). A number of in-
vestigations using this instrument has found that men obtained higher
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total scores and higher subscale scores than women did (e. g.,
Compton & Kaslow, 2005; Stoltenberg, Batien, & Birgenheir, 2008).
However, in at least one study, men’s comparatively higher total
scores resulted essentially from higher scores on a single subscale,
namely, motor impulsiveness (Eisenberg et al., 2007). Moreover,
several studies have not found any significant gender difference in
impulsivity as measured by the BIS-11 (e. g., Kamarajan et al., 2008;
Rogers, Jordan, & Harrisson, 2007; Smith, Waterman, & Ward,
2006), and one study has found comparatively higher total scores
for women, which resulted from higher scores on attentional impul-
siveness and motor impulsiveness (Lejuez, Bornovalova, Reynolds,
Daughters, & Curtin 2007).
In a recent attempt to uncover basic mechanisms of impulsivity
on which the genders might differ, Cross, Copping and Campbell
(2011) conducted a meta-analysis of 277 studies that was organized
around the tripartite theoretical distinction between reward hyper-
sensitivity (strong approach motivation), punishment hyposensitiv-
ity (weak avoidance motivation), and inadequate effortful control.
Effortful control describes the “ability to choose a course of action
under conditions of conflict, to plan for the future, and to detect
errors” (Rothbart, 2007, p. 207). Behaviorally, it is defined as the
ability to inhibit a dominant response and perform a subdominant
response. According to Cross and colleagues (2011), these three
mentioned basic mechanisms of impulsivity may be illustrated by
an automotive analogy: An impulsive individual may be thought of
as a driver who has a problem with a stuck accelerator (strong ap-
proach motivation), a problem of faulty brakes (weak avoidance
motivation), or a problem of poor judgment and control in complex
situations. In their meta-analysis, Cross and colleagues (2011) found
that men showed higher sensation seeking, which may be regarded
as one dimension of reward sensitivity. In contrast, women were
consistently more punishment sensitive. Regarding effortful control,
men reported slightly more deficits on questionnaire measures, but
there were no significant gender differences in delay discounting
tasks (where impulsivity is manifested in favoring a smaller but
immediate reward over a bigger but delayed reward) or executive
function tasks (where impulsivity is manifested in an inability to
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inhibit motor responses, maintain attention, develop and execute a
plan, or switch attention to a new set of properties of the environ-
ment).
A new approach to impulsivity:
The UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale
As Cross and colleagues (2011) point out in the conclusions of their
meta-analysis, the fact that no coherent overall pattern of gender
differences in impulsivity has as yet emerged from research may
partly be explained by the proliferation of incomplete and some-
times incompatible conceptualizations and measurements of this
personality construct (for a review of conceptualizations, see
Evenden, 1999). In an attempt to overcome the inflation of ap-
proaches to impulsivity, Whiteside and Lynam (2001) administered
17 widely used impulsivity scales and the Revised NEO Personality
Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa and McCrae, 1992) to a sample of 437
undergraduate students. An exploratory factor analysis conducted
on these impulsivity scales and on four impulsivity-related facets of
the NEO-PI-R (impulsiveness, excitement seeking, self-discipline,
and deliberation) resulted in a four-factor solution. Following con-
tent analysis, these factors were labeled urgency, lack of premedita-
tion, lack of perseverance, and sensation seeking. Finally, the items
with the highest loadings on each factor were selected to create four
new scales, which together form the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale
(Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).
The first facet of UPPS impulsivity, urgency, can be defined as
the tendency to act rashly, especially under conditions of negative
affect. This facet has been shown to reflect a relative inability to
deliberately suppress automatic, dominant, or prepotent responses
(Gay, Rochat, Billieux, d’Acremont, & Van der Linden, 2008). The
second facet of impulsivity, lack of premeditation, may be charac-
terized as the tendency not to consider the consequences of an act
before engaging in that act. This facet seems to relate to deficient
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anticipation of future outcomes in decision-making processes (Be-
chara & Van der Linden, 2005). The third facet of impulsivity, lack
of perseverance, refers to an individual’s inability to remain focused
on a task, especially if the latter is boring or difficult. This facet is
linked to a relative inability to inhibit recurrent and irrelevant
thoughts or memories (Gay et al., 2008). The fourth and final facet
of impulsivity, sensation seeking, has been described as a “tendency
to enjoy and pursue activities that are exciting and openness to try-
ing new experiences” (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001, p. 686). In con-
trast to the first three dimensions, which imply executive and effortful
control capacities, sensation seeking seems to involve motivational
aspects of impulsivity, which rely on a system that exaggerates the
impact of reward and undermines the impact of punishment (Bechara
et al., 2002).
Investigations using the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale have
repeatedly revealed gender differences on three of its dimensions:
Women generally score higher on urgency (e. g., Gay et al., 2008;
Whiteside & Lynam, 2003), whereas men tend to obtain higher scores
on lack of perseverance (e. g., Schmidt, Gay, d’Acremont, & Van der
Linden, 2008; Van der Linden et al., 2006) and sensation seeking
(e. g., Billieux, Rochat, Rebetez, & Van der Linden, 2008; d’Acremont
& Van der Linden, 2005; see also Cross et al., 2011). Urgency has
proven to be the form of impulsivity most strongly associated with
psychopathology (Whiteside, Lynam, Miller, & Reynolds, 2005):
Urgency has, for example, been associated with cigarette craving
(e. g., Billieux, Van der Linden, & Ceschi, 2007), concern for dieting
(e. g., Mobbs, Ghisletta, & Van der Linden, 2008), problematic gam-
bling (e. g., Whiteside et al., 2005), obsessive-compulsive symptoms
(e. g., Zermatten & Van der Linden, 2008), depression (e. g., d’Acre-
mont & Van der Linden, 2007), insomnia (e. g., Schmidt, Gay, & Van
der Linden, 2008), borderline personality disorder features (e. g.,
Whiteside et al., 2005), and antisocial personality traits (e. g., Whiteside
& Lynam, 2003). In view of the associations between urgency and a
wide range of behavioral and psychological problems, the gender
difference on this facet of impulsivity is of particular clinical impor-
tance.
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Can gender differences in UPPS-defined impulsivity help
explain gender differences in psychopathology?
In view of these associations, the question arises as to whether gen-
der differences in the prevalence of certain types of psychopathol-
ogy can at least partly be traced back to diverging levels of urgency
in men and women. It is, for instance, well-established that women
suffer significantly more often from insomnia than men do (e. g.,
National Sleep Foundation, 2008). A recent investigation from our
laboratory has revealed that urgency-related rash behavior tends to
entail counterfactual thinking and corresponding emotions (regret,
shame, guilt) at sleep onset, thereby contributing to insomnia
(Schmidt & Van der Linden, 2009). The term “counterfactual think-
ing” refers to comparing the facts of reality with counterfactual
imaginations of what might have been (e. g., “If I had [not] done X,
I would be in a better situation now”; e. g., Epstude & Roese, 2008;
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Regret, shame, and guilt are generally
conceptualized as “counterfactual emotions” because they flow from
counterfactual thoughts about what might have been (e. g., Kahneman
& Miller, 1986). Given that women generally score higher on ur-
gency than men do (e. g., Gay et al., 2008; Whiteside & Lynam,
2003), women may be more prone to experience counterfactual
thoughts and emotions at bedtime, which may partly explain the
higher prevalence of insomnia in women – an intriguing hypothesis
that calls for investigation.
Moreover, a follow-up study to our initial investigation (Schmidt
& Van der Linden, 2009) revealed that the effect of urgency on coun-
terfactual processing and insomnia is partially mediated by the use
of a dysfunctional strategy of shame regulation, namely, self-attack-
ing (Schmidt, Gay, Gomez, Van der Linden, in preparation). Self-
attacking, also called self-blame, refers to self-directed anger or con-
tempt that typically manifests itself in inner speech (e. g., “How stupid
I am!”). The findings of our follow-up study (Schmidt et al., in prepa-
ration) are in line with the results of an earlier investigation into the
relations between urgency and depression in adolescents (d’Acre-
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mont & Van der Linden, 2007), which revealed that the effect of
urgency on depression was mediated by the use of inappropriate
emotion regulation strategies such as self-blame and rumination.
Given that women turn to self-attacking more often than men
do (Elison, Lennon, & Pulos, 2006), the data of the two mentioned
studies (d’Acremont & Van der Linden, 2007; Schmidt et al., in prepa-
ration) suggest that maladaptive shame regulation may amplify the
effect of impulsive urgency on insomnia and depression in women,
thereby potentially contributing to the higher prevalence of insom-
nia (e. g., National Sleep Foundation, 2008) and depression (e. g.,
Angst et al., 2002) in women. For instance, after insulting a friend
in a fit of anger, women may be comparatively more inclined to
engage in self-attacking when reviewing their daytime behavior in
bed (e. g., by saying to themselves: “What an idiot I am! How could
I be so inconsiderate!”), with the use of self-attacking being likely
to increase sleep-interfering feelings of shame and related counter-
factual thoughts (e. g., “If only I had shut up!”).
To summarize, the presented evidence suggests that impulsive
urgency not only contributes to symptoms of the externalizing spec-
trum (e. g., antisocial behavior) but also to those of the internalizing
spectrum (e. g., depression), and that the experience of shame and
related counterfactual emotions may play a pivotal role in determin-
ing diverging pathways from urgency to psychopathology in men
and women. In fact, shame has been shown to potentially trigger both
externalizing and internalizing symptoms, essentially depending on
the way this emotion is regulated (e.g, Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek,
2007): Inward-directed coping styles, such as self-attacking and
withdrawal, favor internalizing symptoms, whereas outward-directed
styles, such as blaming and attacking others, promote externalizing
symptoms. Given that women are comparatively more inclined to
adopt internalizing shame coping styles (Elison et al., 2006), impul-
sive urgency may more easily translate into internalizing symptoms
in women as compared with men. Gender-typical strategies of coping
with impulsivity-driven shame may thus contribute to the compara-
tively higher prevalence of externalizing symptoms in men and of
internalizing symptoms in women (for the prevalence of externaliz-
ing/internalizing syndromes, see Kramer, Krueger, & Hicks, 2007).
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Apart from urgency, lack of perseverance and sensation seek-
ing also merit attention in a gender perspective because, as already
mentioned, men tend to score higher on these facets of impulsivity
than women do. Moreover, the two facets are also associated with
psychopathological conditions. For example, lack of perseverance
has been found to be associated with depression and insomnia, al-
beit to a lesser degree than urgency is (e. g., d’Acremont & Van der
Linden, 2007; Schmidt et al., 2008), and sensation seeking has been
shown to be related to antisocial and borderline personality features
(Whiteside et al., 2005). However, even if these facets sometimes
contribute to the same disorders as urgency does, the underlying
mechanisms are clearly different. To illustrate, while both urgency
and lack of perseverance relate to insomnia (e. g., Schmidt, Gay,
Ghisletta, & Van der Linden, 2010), only the former facet is con-
nected to sleep-interfering counterfactual emotions such as shame
(Schmidt & Van der Linden, 2009). Moreover, and contrary to ur-
gency, lack of perseverance cannot account for the comparatively
higher prevalence of insomnia in women because men generally
score higher on this facet of impulsivity.
Thus, the pathways from gender differences in impulsivity to
specific forms of psychopathology have to be tracked separately for
each facet of this personality construct. For example, sensation seek-
ing seems to be specifically related to sensitivity to reward (Torrubia,
Ávila, Moltó, & Caseras, 2001). Interestingly, a recent study has
found that reward drive was associated with problem gambling in
men, but not in women (Loxton, Nguyen, Casey, & Dawe, 2008).
Future investigations will have to determine the degree to which the
sensitivity-to-reward mechanism may account for self-reported dif-
ferences in sensation seeking.
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Conclusions and Challenges for Future Research
In conclusion, three important points emerge from a review of the
literature on gender differences in impulsivity and psychopathol-
ogy. First, given that impulsivity is a multi-dimensional construct,
the question of gender differences has to be addressed for each of
these dimensions separately. For example, when adopting the multi-
faceted view of impulsivity termed UPPS (Whiteside & Lynam,
2001), it appears that men score higher on some dimensions (e. g.,
sensation seeking), whereas women score higher on others (e. g.,
urgency). Second, gender differences on specific dimensions of
impulsivity may contribute to gender-specific pathways to psycho-
pathology and gender-disparate levels of prevalence. For example,
women generally score higher on impulsive urgency and, as a con-
sequence, are more prone to experience counterfactual emotions,
which have been shown to interfere with sleep (Schmidt & Van der
Linden, 2009; Schmidt & Van der Linden, 2011). Impulsive urgency
may in this way contribute to the higher prevalence of insomnia in
women (for the gender difference in prevalence, see, e. g., Mai &
Buysse, 2008). And third, gender differences in emotion regulation
are an important part of gender-specific pathways from impulsivity
to psychopathology. For example, women are comparatively more
likely to adopt internalizing shame regulation strategies, such as self-
attacking and withdrawal (Elison et al., 2006), and the use of these
strategies has been shown to partly mediate the effect of impulsive
urgency on insomnia (Schmidt et al., 2011).
In view of these connections between impulsivity and psycho-
pathology, a more thorough elucidation of gender differences could
significantly advance our understanding of gender-typical pathways
to psychological problems. Research in this field of investigation
currently faces a number of challenges. On the methodological front,
self-report measures of impulsivity are in need of further extension
and refinement. For instance, even though the innovative approach
to impulsivity as developed by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) may
be regarded as the most comprehensive to date, recent evidence sug-
gests that it has to be complemented. There is, for example, evi-
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dence that not only negative but also positive affective states can
precipitate “urgent”, that is: rash and ill-advised behavior (for a re-
view, see Cyders & Smith, 2008), and, accordingly, an expanded
version of the original UPPS scale has been proposed that also in-
cludes a subscale of positive urgency (Cyders et al., 2007). Of note
in the present context, positive and negative urgency seem to be
differentially related to psychological problems that show gender
differences in terms of prevalence. For example, bulimic behavior,
which is more prevalent in women (e. g., Hudson, Hiripi, Pope, &
Kessler, 2007), is better predicted by negative than positive urgency
(Fischer, Smith, & Cyders, 2008; Smyth et al., 2007). Conversely,
illegal drug use, which is more prevalent in men (e. g., Sutherland &
Willner, 1998), is better predicted by positive than negative urgency
(Zapolski, Cyders, & Smith, 2009). In order to obtain a complete
picture of gender-specific pathways from impulsivity to psychopa-
thology, measures of positive urgency should therefore be included
in future research.
As for behavioral measures of impulsivity, the challenge for
future research is to develop paradigms and tasks that map onto the
dimensions of impulsivity that have emerged from self-report stud-
ies (e. g., Gay et al., 2008). A look at the existing literature reveals
that this challenge is arduous: Tasks that purportedly assess
impulsivity are often not correlated with self-report measures of this
personality construct (e. g., Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de
Wit, 2006) or differ from self-report measures in the prediction of
pathology (e. g., Stoltenberg et al., 2008). However, recent research
demonstrates that self-report and behavioral measures of impulsivity
can successfully be matched (e. g., Billieux, Gay, Rochat, & Van der
Linden, 2010; Cyders & Coskunpinar, in press). The development
of behavioral measures that map onto self-reported dimensions of
impulsivity is all the more important as gender differences have been
found on some of the existing measures. For example, a difference
on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task was found suggesting that men
are willing to continue the pursuit of a reward in the face of increas-
ing risk for a longer time than women (for a review, see Cross et al.,
2011). To obtain a complete picture of gender-specific associations
between facets of impulsivity and psychological problems, meth-
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odological approaches that integrate self-report and behavioral meas-
ures thus seem most indispensable.
Finally, regarding physiological measures of impulsivity, an
analogous challenge calls for research efforts. A number of physi-
ological correlates or markers of impulsivity have been proposed,
for example diminished functioning of the serotonergic system (e. g.,
Carver & Miller, 2006) or the noradrenergic system (e. g., Chamber-
lain & Sahakian, 2007), decreased P300 amplitude of event-related
potentials (e. g., Justus, Finn, & Steinmetz, 2001), and reduced re-
sponse in event-related oscillations (e. g., Kamarajan et al., 2008).
Of particular interest in the present context, some of these physi-
ological concomitants of impulsivity have been shown to be differ-
entially related to gender. For example, Justus and colleagues (2001)
found that a reduction in the P300 amplitude of event-related poten-
tials – purportedly a physiological marker of disinhibited behavior –
is associated with impulsivity, social deviance, and alcohol prob-
lems in men, but not in women. According to the authors of the
study, a possible explanation for this finding is that the mechanisms
underlying vulnerability for social deviance and alcoholism differ
between the two genders. Clearly, the precise relations between
physiological, behavioral, and self-report measures of the different
dimensions of impulsivity call for further investigation.
Aside from the methodological front, researchers are also faced
with considerable challenges at the etiological front. A number of
different biological and psychosocial factors have been proposed to
account for gender differences in impulsivity and impulsivity-
related disorders, but the interplay between these factors is far from
being completely understood. Among the biological factors, genet-
ics have been implicated in impulsivity (e. g., Congdon & Canli,
2008). Twin studies using various questionnaire measures of im-
pulsivity have, for example, revealed that approximately 45% of the
variance in self-reported impulsivity is accounted for by genetic fac-
tors (Hur & Bouchard, 1997; Pedersen, Plomin, McClearn, & Friberg,
1988; Seroczynski, Bergeman, & Coccaro, 1999). Genetics have
also been implicated in gender differences in impulsivity-related
pathologies. Regarding alcoholism, for instance, adoption and twin
studies indicate that genetics play a role as a risk factor, with some
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studies suggesting that this role is more important in men (for a
review, see Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004).
With regard to the psychosocial origins of gender differences in
impulsivity and impulsivity-related pathologies, there is evidence
suggesting that factors such as parenting, gender roles, and social
sanctions also play an important role (e. g., Nolen-Hoeksema & Hilt,
2006). To illustrate, Patock-Peckham and Morgan-Lopez (2006)
found that a permissive parenting style can increase levels of
impulsivity in the child, especially within the father-son and mother-
daughter dyads, thereby indirectly influencing later alcohol use and
abuse in the offspring. Providing another illustration, Chapple and
Johnson (2007) analyzed data from the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Youth (NLSY) in the U.S. (Center for Human Resource Re-
search, 2004) and found that impulsivity in boys was significantly
predicted by living in poverty, poor early motor skills, poor reading
abilities, less maternal monitoring of whom the boys were with while
outside the home, a lower attachment to their mothers, and their
mothers’ use of nonpositive, inefficient discipline. For girls, im-
pulsivity was significantly predicted by living in poverty and, mar-
ginally, by reading ability. These findings suggest that the social
structuring of impulsivity is even more important for boys than for
girls. Chapple and Johnson (2007) concluded that boys’ disorgan-
ized familial environments detrimentally impact their impulsivity,
perhaps through poorer early development of their motor skills and
reading ability. The integration of this psychosocial perspective on
gender differences in impulsivity with the earlier mentioned bio-
logical approach might be viewed as one of the major theoretical
challenges in this field of investigation.
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Q&A Box: Ralph Erich Schmidt and Martial Van der Linden
Where do gender differences in impulsivity and impulsivity-related
psychological problems come from – socialization and culture or
biological differences?
The big picture that emerges from different strands of research suggests that
gender differences in impulsivity and in impulsivity-related disorders result from
a complex interplay between biological and cultural factors. Twin studies that
used various questionnaire measures of impulsivity have, for example, found
that approximately 45% of the variance in self-reported impulsivity may be ac-
counted for by genetic factors (e. g., Congdon & Canli, 2008). Adoption and
twin studies also indicate that genetics play a role in impulsivity-related
pathologies: Regarding alcoholism, for instance, the available evidence suggests
that genetics play a role as a risk factor, with some studies suggesting that this
role is more important in men than it is in women (e. g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004).
As the percentage of variance explained by genetic factors indicates, there is
ample room for cultural factors in forging individual differences in impulsivity.
Longitudinal data indicate, for instance, that factors such as living in poverty,
poor early motor skills, poor reading abilities, low maternal attachment, and use
of inefficient sanctions by the parents may all predict higher levels of impulsivity
in children (Chapple and Johnson, 2007). Of note, the relations between, on the
one hand, low maternal attachment and parental use of inefficient sanctions,
and, on the other hand, impulsivity, were stronger for boys than for girls, sug-
gesting that adverse family environments detrimentally impact impulsivity es-
pecially in boys. Future research will have to disentangle how exactly biological
and cultural factors interact to forge gender differences in the different facets of
impulsivity, taken separately.
From a methodological standpoint, what do you recommend to
researchers who study emotion in terms of taking into account
gender differences?
To investigate the complex interactions between biological and cultural factors
in the development of gender differences in impulsivity and impulsivity-related
psychopathology, an integration of different levels of analysis is required. To
date, the impact of genetic factors has mainly been examined by means of adop-
tion and twin studies, but molecular genetics have recently opened new metho-
dological approaches. For example, whole-genome scans will allow us to dis-
cover novel gene polymorphisms associated with impulsivity in healthy and in
patient populations of both genders (e. g., Congdon & Canli, 2008). Further bio-
logical factors or physiological markers of impulsivity may be investigated by
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using measures of functional brain activity. For example, the P300 amplitude of
event-related potentials, purportedly a marker of disinhibited behavior, has been
found to be associated with impulsivity, social deviance, and alcohol problems
in men, but not in women (Justus et al., 2001). For cultural factors, their impact
can essentially be grasped with behavioral and questionnaire measures, and the
main challenge for research here is to develop experimental tasks that map onto
self-reported facets of impulsivity. For example, many existing behavioral tasks
assess inhibitory deficits in emotionally “cool” conditions, but impulsive behavior
is often observed in emotionally “hot” conditions – a distinction that is of par-
ticular importance with respect to gender differences because women may have
an advantage in affective inhibition (Cross et al., 2011). In order to track interac-
tions between biological and cultural factors over time, longitudinal studies us-
ing a combination of the previously mentioned levels of analysis seem particu-
larly promising.
What is the finding on gender differences that surprised you the
most in your own research?
There is suggestive evidence that women have an advantage over men in “hot”
forms of inhibition, which refer to control over social and affective processes
(e. g., Cross et al., 2011). Surprisingly, however, recent research also indicates
that women consistently score higher than men on a specific facet of impulsivity
termed “urgency”, which refers to a tendency to act rashly, especially under
conditions of negative affect (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). As a consequence of
their rash behavior, women are comparatively more prone to experience feelings
of regret, shame, and guilt, to engage in dysfunctional strategies of emotion
regulation, such self-attacking (Elison et al., 2006; Schmidt et al., 2011), and to
suffer from psychological problems such as insomnia and depression (d’Acremont
& Van der Linden, 2007; Schmidt & Van der Linden, 2009). The reasons that
women are more liable to experience impulsivity-driven feelings of regret, shame,
and guilt are likely multiple. Consistent evidence indicates that women are com-
paratively more punishment sensitive (e. g., Cross et al., 2011). From an evolu-
tionary viewpoint, women’s reproductive success may depend to a greater ex-
tent than men’s upon avoiding harm to their social relationships (e. g., Taylor et
al., 2000), and higher punishment sensitivity may be a mechanism that contrib-
utes to the maintenance of social relationships. The reverse side of this pro-
social motivation may be that women are more prone to experience “emotional
sanctions” when they act on impulse and thereby violate social rules or norms.
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Q&A Box: Marco Piccinelli
Based on your research, where do gender differences in depression
come from – socialization and culture or biological differences
between females and males?
Environmental, social and cultural factors play a greater role in gender differ-
ences in depression compared to genetic and biological factors.
Adverse experiences in childhood may be partly responsible for a fe-
male preponderance in depression rates, due to females being more sensitive to
their depressogenic effects and at greater risk of certain events (e. g., sexual
abuse).
The assumption that females suffer from higher rates of adverse life events
leading to depression has received inconsistent support. Actually, females tend
to rate higher the actual impact of adverse events and experience feelings of
defeat, humiliation and entrapment, in response to them possibly because of their
distinctive social circumstances.
Females are more likely to sustain role limitations within different domains
of private and social life. The resulting lack of choice or limited opportunities,
disadvantaged socioeconomic position, role overload and competing social roles
contribute to females’ increased risk of depression.
Although genetic factors retain a strong influence on liability to depression,
they do not seem to contribute to the increased risk to females by a direct mecha-
nism. On the other hand, genetic factors might indirectly increase vulnerability
to depression in one gender through temperamental features associated with low
self-esteem and cognitive vulnerability, exposure to negative life events and re-
duced social support or social integration.
Gonadal hormones influence neurotransmitter functioning and circadian
rhythms through both genomic and non-genomic effects and contribute to per-
sonality features and coping responses to stress, although their contribution to
gender differences seems smaller compared to environmental variables.
Gender differences have been reported in two neurotransmitter systems tra-
ditionally implicated in the pathophysiology of depression (namely noradrena-
lin and serotonin), but their role is still unclear. In any case, there seem to be no
gender differences in response to antidepressants.
What should everybody know about gender differences in depres-
sion?
Although several artefactual determinants (e. g., study design and measurement
procedures, thresholds for caseness, effect of recall, developmental pathways
towards depression, depression course, help-seeking and illness behaviour) may
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enhance a female preponderance in depressive disorders, evidence has been pro-
vided that gender differences in depression are genuine.
Alongside more universal biological and psychological factors which are
responsible for females’ increased risk of depression across countries, socioeco-
nomic factors, family-related characteristics, social roles and cultural norms
moderate the relationship between gender and depression and may account for
between-country differences in depression levels and the associated gender gap.
Whereas depression rates in males and females are comparable in childhood,
a dramatic rise in depression levels occurs during adolescence, especially among
females, leading to females being twice as likely to suffer from depression com-
pared to males from then on.
Efforts aimed at the integration of determinants of gender differences in de-
pression into aetio-pathogenetic models have lead to the construction of
developmentally sensitive cognitive vulnerability-transactional stress models of
depression, explaining the emergence of the gender difference in depression in
adolescence. In these models stress related to negative life events contribute to
initial elevations of general negative affect. Cognitive vulnerability factors are
then responsible for the initial negative affect progressing to depression. In turn,
depression can lead to more self-generated negative life events, thus starting the
causal chain again.
However, this is not the only direction linking negative life events, cognitive
vulnerability and depression. Gender differences in depressive symptoms may
also emerge prior to gender differences in cognitive vulnerability and negative
life events and significantly mediate the emergent gender difference in cognitive
style and exposure to negative life events (especially, interpersonal stress). More-
over, gender by itself may moderate the predictive relationships between stress
related to negative life events, vulnerability and/or the vulnerability-stress inter-
action and depression, with females showing stronger association between the
cognitive vulnerability-stress interaction and depression over time.
Where do you see the field of gender and depression going in the
next 20 years?
It goes without saying that new acquisitions in the fields of neurosciences and
psychology and the ongoing changes in social norms and cultural values may
provide new insights into gender differences in depression.
We have high expectations based on the findings stemming from genetic
mapping, functional neuroimaging, neuroendocrinology, the neural and genetic
basis of cognition, emotion and behaviour, the refinement of resilience and vul-
nerability factors, only to quote a few topics.
In general, social sciences have devoted greater attention to the effect on
females’ mental health by changes at different levels (e. g., legal context, wel-
Q&A Box: MARCO PICCINELLI
65
fare system, family arrangements, labor market, etc.), which might provide fe-
males with greater economic independence and increasing sharing of childcare
responsibilities with males and lessen their risk of economic discrimination and
job inequality as well as role overload and role conflict. The associated chal-
lenges to the traditional definition of masculinity and the higher risk of males
to develop depression have been far less investigated, pointing to the need to
fill this gap.
So far, research in gender differences in depression has conceived gender in
binary terms (males versus females) and not as a continuum along which the so-
called gender identity disorders also find a place. There is an ongoing debate
regarding the removal of gender identity disorders from classifications of men-
tal disorders. Indeed, in May 2009 France was the first country in the world to
no longer consider “transexualism” a mental disorder. If this is the case, new
challenges are posed to the study of gender differences in depression by a dif-
ferent way of looking at the development and maintenance of gender identity
through a complex process involving genetic, biological, environmental and
socio-cultural factors.




3. Gender and Social Emotions: A Review of
the Neuroscientific Literature on Empathy
and its Link to Psychopathy, Antisocial Behavior
and Alexithymia
CHRISTIAN M. BRODBECK and GIORGIA SILANI
In the current chapter, we review gender differences reported in the litera-
ture on three related topics: (1) empathy, the ability or disposition to under-
stand and share the feelings of others; (2) antisocial personality disorder
(APD), characterized prominently by a lack of empathy and concern for
other people’s feelings; and (3) alexithymia, a disorder characterized by an
inability to identify one’s own emotions, with consequent reduction of the
understanding and sharing of other’s emotions. Consistent gender dif-
ferences have been found on a behavioral level in all three areas: Women
tend to be more empathic than men, less vulnerable to APD, and less
alexithymic (i. e., better at identifying and reporting their emotions). While
research on the neurological differences underlying these gender differences
is often less conclusive, we try to provide a summary of different approaches
and results.
Empathy
Empathy is a crucial component of successful social interaction. The
term originally comes from the Old Greek “empatheia” (passion),
which is composed of “en” (in) and “pathos” (feeling) and denotes an
affective response to the directly perceived, imagined or inferred
emotional state of another being (see Batson, 2008 for a review).
According to Rogers (1959), the term empathy is defined as the
ability “to perceive the internal frame of reference of another with
accuracy and with the emotional components and meanings which
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pertain thereto as if one were the person, but without ever losing the
‘as if’ condition” (Rogers, 1959, p. 210). At a phenomenological
level, the concept of “empathy” expresses a sense of sameness, a
sharing between one’s own feelings and those expressed by another
person (Thompson, 2001), and at the same time implies a cognitive
mechanism that keeps track of the source of the emotional state, and
thus differentiates the self from the other. In our own understanding,
empathy requires the engagement of two key components. The first
component is sharing the other person’s affect. More precisely, an
empathic response requires that an individual’s (referred to as the
observer) perception or imagination of someone else’s (the target)
affective state triggers a feeling in the observer that is partially iso-
morphic to what the target is feeling. Second, and equally important,
the observer has to be aware at any point in time that the source of his
or her feelings is the target. This stresses the central importance of the
capacity for self/other distinction, which is the ability to distinguish
between mental and bodily representations related to the self or to the
other (de Vignemont and Singer, 2006, Decety and Lamm, 2006,
Singer and Lamm, 2009). Is this fundamental ability expressed and
wired differently in men and women? Recently, social psychologists
and neuroscientists have started to uncover answers to this question.
Behaviorally, higher levels of empathy in girls compared to boys
are found starting at 21 months (Hastings et al., 2000; Owen-Anderson
et al., 2008). When Knickmeyer et al. (2006) asked 4-year-olds to
describe cartoons with 2 moving triangles, females used more mental
and affective state terms, whereas males used more neutral words.
Women generally achieve higher scores on the Empathy Quotient
(EQ; “empathizing” being the drive to identify another person’s
emotions and thoughts and respond to them appropriately), men on
the Systemizing Quotient (SQ; “systemizing” being a drive to analyze
systems or construct systems) (Nettle, 2007; Wakabayashi et al., 2007,
2006). However, these differences are cancelled when taking into
account the familiarity with the partner: males and females (aged 14–
21) performed equally well when rating the emotional state of their
significant other in a videotaped discussion (Haugen et al., 2008).
Event related potentials (ERP, electrical potentials on the scalp
influenced by brain activity) have been used to track gender differences
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in the empathic response. Emotional as compared to neutral pictures
have been consistently observed to evoke a late positive potential
(LPP) over centro-posterior sites, starting around 300–400 ms
(Bradley et al., 2009). In the study of Han and colleagues ERPs were
measured during observation of pictures of hands in painful versus
neutral situations. (Chinese) women, as compared to men, showed a
stronger correlation between amplitude of an early ERP component
(140–180 ms) and ratings of subjective unpleasantness and pain at-
tributed to the model (Han et al., 2008). Similarly, Proverbio et al.
(2008) measured responses to pictures involving (a) humans in posi-
tive and negative contexts and (b) positive and negative scenes with
no humans visible. They found that the LPP was disproportionately
increased in response to pictures of suffering humans in women but
not in men, while no differences were observed in response to emo-
tional scenes. The authors interpreted these results as indicators of a
stronger empathic response in women as compared to men.
Fukushima and Hiraki (2006) recorded ERPs while subjects took
part in an economic game task with another person, where the two
participants took turns in betting money. Each win for the player
entailed a loss of the same amount for the observer and vice versa.
While both genders showed a medial-frontal negativity (MFN, be-
tween 200 and 300ms) for loss vs. gain when they were the players
themselves, only women, and not men, also showed an MFN for the
other participant’s loss vs. gain (even though that entailed a win for
themselves). In the whole sample, MFN amplitude to games played
by the other participant (but not by themselves) correlated with both
affect related to the other’s outcome and the difference (empathiz-
ing score – systemizing score). Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging during first person and vicarious experience of physical
pain, Singer and colleagues found that while men’s empathic brain
responses (defined as the amount of ‘shared network’ between self
and other) were reduced by the perceived unfairness of the partner,
women’s didn’t show this effect (Singer et al. 2006).
Besides being more empathic, women are better at recognizing
emotional cues in others. A meta-analysis by Hall (1978) indicated
that women are consistently better than men at identifying emotions
from face, body and voice tone. ERP studies have also observed a
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gender difference in the processing of emotional prosody, which
suggests that women attend to emotional prosody more than men.
When participants are asked to classify words into emotionally posi-
tive and negative stimuli according to their meaning, a mismatch
may occur between prosodic and semantic (e. g., happy, pronounced
with sad prosody) components. This interference is visible in longer
reaction times (e. g. Grimshaw, 1998; Ishii et al., 2003). ERP studies
found that such mismatch trials evoked a broad negativity in women
that was absent (Schirmer et al., 2003) or delayed (Ishii et al., 2010)
in men. In a related study (Schirmer et al., 2002), participants had to
classify written words as positive or negative after hearing a seem-
ingly unrelated sentence with neutral content, but spoken with emo-
tional prosody. When words were presented shortly after the sen-
tence (200 ms), only women showed a mismatch-related negativity,
in addition to slower RTs to words whose valence was opposite that
of the preceding sentence’s prosody. However, with a longer inter-
val (750 ms), men but not women showed a mismatch-related nega-
tivity. Together, these studies suggest that women integrate emo-
tional prosody earlier in linguistic processing than men.
In an fMRI study employing the same task (Schirmer et al., 2004)
incongruence lead to increased BOLD signal in the IFG (BA 44 and
45), bilaterally in women, but only in the right hemisphere in men.
The results have been interpreted in light of the connection between
mirror neuron system and empathy (see following section)
Empathy and the Mirror System
The initial component that precedes empathy is based on the concept
of somatic imitation, also known as “emotional contagion”, which is
the tendency to simulate automatically the expressions, vocalizations,
postures, and movements of another person and, consequently, to
synchronize emotionally with others (Hatfield, Cacioppo, Rapson,
1993). It has been suggested that, initially, unconscious imitation has
evolved as a mechanism to promote survival and conservation of the
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species, allowing the development of communication skills. The
pioneering work of Rizzolatti and coworkers (Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004, for a review) has shown that neurophysiologically we are wired
to resonate with other people’s intentions and actions. Through
electrophysiological recordings in monkeys, as well as neuroimaging
experiments on humans, it has been shown that the mere observation
of actions performed by others activates the observer’s cortical areas
involved in the planning and initialization of the same action. This
has led to claims that humans and monkeys possess a so-called mirror
neuron system, which mainly includes the inferior parietal lobe and
the inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis) and enables us to auto-
matically mirror the actions of others. Several observations suggest
that this system is stronger in females than in males. For example,
Cheng et al. (2007) measured the strength of the soleus reflex evoked
by electrical stimulation on the left leg while participants observed
videos of leg movements. In both men and women, the reflex was
stronger when they watched the videos than when they watched a
black screen, suggesting that their motor system mirrored the ob-
served actions, but the modulation was significantly stronger in women
compared to men.
Increased mirroring in women has also been observed in facial
muscles. Women more readily facially express their emotions com-
pared to men (see Sonnby-Borgstrom et al., 2008) and also more
readily mirror emotions perceived in others’ facial expressions
(Dimberg & Lundquist, 1990). To learn more about the time course
of this effect, Sonnby-Borgstrom et al. (2008) presented subjects
with emotional faces, varying exposure times between subliminal
(23 ms), borderliminal (70 ms) and supraliminal (2500 ms). They
measured both imitative response through activation of facial muscles,
and emotional contagion through self-report of positive or negative
hedonic tone after stimulus exposure. Both men and women already
reported emotional contagion after subliminal exposure, even though
they could not consciously perceive the face. While ratings for men
remained stable with longer presentation times, emotional contagion
increased for women. Interestingly, imitative facial expressions were
not found after subliminal presentation, and emerged after longer
presentations more consistently for women. Sonnby-Borgstrom et
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al. interpreted their result in terms of cultural display rules, according
to which women tend to amplify their emotional response, whereas
men tend to inhibit them.
Another way to measure activity in the motor system of the
brain is to measure suppression of the mu rhythm (e. g., Hari, 2006).
The mu rhythm is a characteristic oscillatory brain potential with
dominant frequencies around 10 and 20 Hz, which can be measured
on the scalp over the motor cortex when the subject is at rest. The
mu rhythm is suppressed when the subject moves, and rebounds
thereafter. Thus, mu suppression is used as an index of activation of
the motor system. Importantly, the mu rhythm is also suppressed
when people observe actions performed by others, probably reflecting
activation of the motor system as part of the mirror neuron system.
Cheng et al. (2008) reported that when participants watched hand
actions, women showed more mu suppression than males, but when
participants watched a moving dot, no gender differences in mu sup-
pression were found. Mu suppression during the observation of hand
actions correlated positively with the personal distress subscale of
the interpersonal reactivity index (IRI-personal distress) and nega-
tively with the systemizing quotient. Similarly, when viewing body
parts in painful as well as non-painful situations, women showed
stronger mu suppression than males did, and mu suppression only
correlated with IRI-personal distress in women (Yang et al., 2009).
Consistent with these observations, a study comparing brain
anatomy between men and women suggests that women have a
stronger mirror system (Cheng et al., 2009). Compared to men,
women had greater gray matter volume in two brain areas thought
to be part of the core of the human mirror neuron system, the pars
opercularis of the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), and the right
anterior inferior parietal lobule. Supporting the link with empathy,
gray matter volume in these two areas also correlated with self-
reported empathic disposition across all male and female participants.
Using fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging), Schulte-
Ruther et al. (2008) compared brain activity evoked by pictures of
emotional facial expressions while participants focused either on their
own emotional response or on the emotion expressed by the face. As
a baseline, participants judged the age and gender of the face. For
CHRISTIAN M. BRODBECK and GIORGIA SILANI
75
both types of emotional judgements, women activated a region in the
pars triangularis of the rIFG (just anterior to the pars opercularis)
more strongly than males. Across men and women, activity in this
region (and its homologue in the left hemisphere) during emotional
judgement correlated with self-rated empathic ability, and reported
intensity of the emotional response during the task. The authors argued
that this reflected stronger activation of the mirror neuron system.
Alexithymia
Empathy is a complex social emotion that goes beyond mere emo-
tional contagion. Moreover, it requires higher order cognitive proc-
esses such as the ability to differentiate self-related from other-re-
lated representations, as well as being aware of your own emotional
experience. Self-awareness is therefore a necessary condition to make
inferences about emotional states of others (Gallup 1982). In two
studies involving subjects with alexithymic traits (alexithymia is a
sub-clinical phenomenon marked by difficulties in identifying and
describing feelings (Nemiah, Freyberg, & Sifneos, 1976), we re-
cently tested the mechanisms underlying the ability to understand
one’s own emotions and its relationship to the ability to empathize
(Silani et al., 2008, Bird et al. 2010). Notably, we observed that de-
ficits in the understanding of one’s own feelings are associated with
hypoactivation of AI (anterior insula) both when inferring one’s own
emotional state and when empathizing with another’s emotional state.
This suggests that a lack of emotional awareness could cause a reduc-
tion of empathic behavior (defined as “embodied simulation”).
Alexithymia in healthy populations is usually assessed using self-
report questionnaires, such as the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS).
In such populations, smaller studies (n~200) often report finding no
gender differences in Alexithymia scores among adults (Bagby et al.,
1988; Parker et al., 1989) as well as adolescents (Sakkinen et al.,
2007) and the elderly (Joukamaa et al., 1996). Studies with large
samples (ns>1000) have found marginally higher levels among male
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adolescents (Joukamaa et al., 2007) and adults (Franz et al., 2008;
Honkalampi et al., 2004; Mattila et al., 2006), although in Salminen
et al.’s (1999) sample of 1285 subjects representing the general popu-
lation of Finland, men were alexithymic almost twice as often as
women were (17 % vs. 10 %). However, sex differences might be
culturally mediated, and differ for the three factors of the TAS: dif-
ficulty in identifying feelings, difficulty describing feelings and ex-
ternally oriented thinking (Dion, 1996; Moriguchi et al., 2007;
Salminen et al., 1999).
Several studies have linked the brain region called the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) to emotional awareness (see Lane, 2000)
and, conversely, the volume of this area has been found to be re-
duced in healthy people that scored high in alexithymia question-
naires (Borsci et al., 2009; Paradiso et al., 2008; but see Gundel et
al., 2004). These results are complemented by observations of gen-
der differences in the ACC. McRae et al. (2008) observed a positive
correlation between the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale
(LEAS) and ACC activity in the context of viewing highly arousing
pictures, and this correlation was significantly stronger in women
than in men. Good et al. (2001) found greater amounts of gray mat-
ter in the ACC of women than men, while Gundel et al. (2004) found
increased gray matter for females in the right but not the left ACC.
Examining gray matter volume in three medial frontal sulci, Paus et
al. (1996) found that gray matter volume of the cingulate sulcus
(which they associated with integration of emotions with cognition)
was significantly higher in women than men.
A neuropsychological model of alexithymia proposes that be-
cause emotions are localized in the right hemisphere and verbal ex-
pression depends on the left hemisphere, alexithymia is related to a
lack of connection between the two cerebral hemispheres (Dewaraja
& Sasaki, 1990; Montreuil & Pedinielli, 1995). Two studies in non-
clinical participants with high alexithymia scores reported reduced
interhemispheric transfer in males and the absence of such an effect
in females (Grabe et al., 2004; Lumley & Sielky, 2000). This might
indicate that a breakdown of interhemispheric communication is
associated with alexithymia in men, but not in women. However,
two other studies using very similar procedures failed to replicate
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this gender effect, reporting reduced interhemispheric transfer in
males as well as females (Richter et al., 2006; Romei et al., 2008).
In addition, alexithymia has been observed with agenesis of the cor-
pus callosum (the main brain structure which connects the two hemi-
spheres) in both sexes (cited in Tabibnia & Zaidel, 2005; Ernst et
al., 1999; Paul et al., 2006). This seemingly inconsistent gender ef-
fect might thus simply be related to the tendency towards a more
consistent lateralisation of functions in males as compared to fe-
males, which is sometimes (but not always) observed in studies of
emotions (Wager et al. 2003) and language (Haut & Barch, 2006).
Psychopathy / Antisocial behavior
Psychopathy (as alexithymia) offers another good model for under-
standing gender differences in the empathic brain and behavior by
understanding their failure. According to the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV-TR), antisocial person-
ality disorder (APD, also referred to as psychopathy), is character-
ized by an enduring, “pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation
of, the rights of others” (p. 701). Individuals with APD are frequently
manipulative and deceitful, lack empathy, act impulsively, and often
resort to aggression, with a disregard for the consequences for them-
selves and others.
Epidemiologic studies in different settings have typically found
a higher prevalence for all varieties of antisocial behavior and disor-
ders in males than in females by a factor of two or more (see review
by Cale & Lilienfeld, 2002; Dolan & Vollm, 2009; Eme, 2007; Ullrich
et al., 2003). The DSM IV-TR estimates the prevalence of APD in
community samples to be about 3 % in men and about 1 % in women.
Also in various problematic groups (e. g., delinquents, psychiatric
patients, substance abusers), men were found to exhibit more antiso-
cial tendencies, whereas women exhibited more mood and anxiety
problems (Grella et al., 2009; Kim & Kim, 2005; Rogers et al., 2007;
Trestman et al., 2007; Vesga-Lopez et al., 2008; Zlotnick et al., 2008).
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On a biological level, Eme (2007) argued that males are predis-
posed to be more violent /antisocial (e. g., through factors as simple
as possessing more physical strength). In addition, he reviewed evi-
dence that certain male behavioral traits depend on prenatal andro-
gen exposure. For example, an increased tendency to “rough and
tumble” play can be observed in boys as early as age 2–3 years old,
and such a tendency has clear parallels in chimpanzees. Crucially,
this tendency is also observed in girls who were exposed to high
levels of testosterone prenatally.
An additional biological factor is that men can be more vulner-
able than women to polymorphisms in genes located on the X chro-
mosome. Whereas males only have one X-chromosome, females
have two, and can thus compensate for a deficient gene with a second
copy (Eme, 2007; Good et al., 2003). A good candidate in this re-
spect is the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene (Buckholtz &
Meyer-Lindenberg, 2008; Good et al., 2003). In men, a defective
MAOA allele has been observed to cause borderline mental retarda-
tion, impulsive aggressive and antisocial behaviors, whereas (het-
erozygous) female carriers did not show behavioral abnormalities.
In addition, MAOA expression in cultured skin cells was absent for
male carriers, but in the low to moderate control range for hetero-
zygous women (Brunner et al., 1993). While this outright defect in
the MAOA gene is very rare, there is a common polymorphism be-
tween MAOA-H (higher MAOA expression) and MAOA-L (lower
MAOA expression). Eme (2007) estimated that about one-third of
human males are carriers of MAOA-L. Studies directly correlating
MAOA activity and aggression have yielded mixed results. How-
ever, there is clear evidence that in males the MAOA-L genotype
increases developmental vulnerability to adverse environmental in-
fluences with respect to the development of antisocial traits (Buckholtz
& Meyer-Lindenberg, 2008; Taylor & Kim-Cohen, 2007).
Less is known on the specific nature of gender differences in
APD. Indeed, a major criticism of research on APD is that it applies
male criteria to women. The concept of psychopathy has been de-
veloped with an almost exclusive focus on the male gender, and
concerns about its applicability to females have been raised repeat-
edly (e. g., Grann, 2000). For example, there are specific concerns
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regarding the DSM IV-TR diagnostic criterion for APD that requires
presence of childhood symptoms, which are more often absent in
antisocial women than men (Rutherford et al., 1999). It has also
been suggested that a single underlying etiology could lead to dif-
ferent expression in men and women, with APD being more com-
mon among males, and borderline personality disorder being more
common among females (see Beauchaine et al., 2009).
A further caveat is that a lot of APD research has focused on
incarcerated psychopaths, while many individuals with APD, so called
“successful” psychopaths, manage to stay out of the criminal justice
system (Gao & Raine, 2010). It is questionable to what extent results
from the incarcerated male subgroup generalize to APD in general.
For example, Gao and Raine suggest that successful psychopaths
might be out of jail precisely because they do not share incarcerated
psychopaths’ executive dysfunctions. These reservations should be
kept in mind when interpreting studies on gender differences in APD.
In addition to quantitative differences in the incidence of APD,
qualitative differences have been described between APD in males
and females. In boys, antisocial tendencies seem to be associated
more with direct aggression and violent behavior, whereas in girls
they seem to be associated with relational and indirect aggression
(Cale & Lilienfeld, 2002; Marcus, 1999; Marsee et al., 2005; Qouta
et al., 2008; Viding et al., 2009). Studies comparing female and male
psychopathic and violent offenders reported that females displayed
significantly more lying, deceitfulness, lack of control and promis-
cuous sexual behavior, while males scored higher on antisocial
behavior, especially adolescent antisocial behavior, and callousness/
lack of empathy (Grann, 2000; Strand & Belfrage, 2005; see also
Forouzan & Cooke, 2005). In addition, there is some indication that
antisocial tendencies are more stable in males than in females over
time (Helgeland et al., 2005; Rutherford et al., 1999; Schmidt et al.,
2006; Windle, 1990).
Among participants in a longitudinal study, who were recruited
from the general population and followed from an early age, in-
creased negative emotionality and impulsivity in males compared to
females explained 96 % of the sex differences in antisocial behavior
(cited by Strüber et al., 2008). Strüber et al. (2008) suggested that
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differences in a neural emotion regulation network might be the neural
basis of this gender difference: (a) While the amygdala (implicated
in the learning of emotional associations) in men is of equal or greater
volume than in women, women have been found to have larger orbito-
frontal cortex volume (OFC, implicated in emotion regulation; Gold-
stein et al., 2001; Good et al., 2001; Gur et al., 2002). (b) During a task
involving pictures with negative emotional facial expressions, women
showed higher functional amygdala-OFC connectivity than men.
Finally, some psychophysiological variables could be more
closely associated with antisocial tendencies in males than in females.
A relation between low resting heart rate and antisocial behavior was
found more consistently in males than in females (ages 16 to 18;
Crozier et al., 2008). Male, but not female, college students who
scored high on a self-report psychopathy scale lacked a stress-induced
cortisol response to the Trier Social Stress Test (O’Leary et al., 2007).
In 108 adolescents selected with high or low levels of callous-un-
emotional (CU) traits, male participants exhibiting elevated CU traits
were uniquely characterized by low resting cortisol levels relative to
male comparison groups, whereas testosterone levels did not differen-
tiate groups and no hormone effects were found for female participants
(Loney et al., 2006). Decreased ACC volume was a significantly
better predictor of aggressive and defiant behavior in boys than girls
(ages 7–17; Boes et al., 2008). Justus et al. (2001) reported that in a
sample of mostly college students, social deviance, impulsivity, and
alcohol problems were associated with reductions in the P300 ERP,
but only in male subjects (the authors reported a significant social
deviance x sex interaction in predicting the P300 amplitude.)
Conclusions
Finding gender difference requires more subjects than finding ef-
fects that are consistent across subjects. Consequently, psychological
research often ignores potential gender-related differences. Accord-
ingly, the absence of reports of gender differences in this literature
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cannot be taken as evidence of the absence of gender differences.
The results reviewed above suggest that there are consistent gender
differences in these areas and mandate the inclusion of gender in
future neuroscientific research.
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Q&A Box: Christian M. Brodbeck and Giorgia Silani
Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from – socialization and culture or biological differences
between women and men?
Reviewing the scientific literature about emotion and gender differences, it’s
quite surprising that in spite of many years of research on the topic, and evi-
dence of differences between males and females in several aspects of emotional
processing, from emotional awareness to empathy and psychopathy, it’s still
unclear where the origin of these differences comes from.
Finding a gender difference neither explains how the difference got there nor
what maintains it. There are, of course, differences in the way men and women,
as groups, approach and express emotion; and similarly there are biological dif-
ferences between sexes, that drive and regulate development and behaviors.
However, to focus only on the identification of differences is limiting, with the
risk of reproducing folk notions and stereotypes. The challenge we have in the
next years is to advance the understanding of the dynamic complexity of the
relationship between gender and emotion, accounting for what is related to the
biology, how the wiring of the systems is connected to the social realm, how it
models it and how it is modeled.
From a methodological standpoint, what would you recommend
researchers who study emotion in terms of taking into account
gender differences?
In the field of neurobiology of emotion and gender, it must be noted that the
trend so far has been to minimizing gender differences instead of understanding
them. Finding gender differences requires more subjects than finding effects
that are consistent across subjects. Consequently, neuropsychological and neu-
rophysiological research often ignores potential gender related differences. Ac-
cordingly, the absence of reports of gender differences in this literature cannot
be taken as evidence of the absence of gender differences. The results reviewed
in this chapter suggest that there are consistent gender differences in these top-
ics, and mandate the inclusion of gender in future research. Neuroimaging tech-
niques are more and more suitable in basic and clinical research. This will pos-
sibly open to the systematic exploration of this issue. Secondly, societies model
differently the expression and perception of emotion in men and women. The
definition of experimental paradigms should take this into account, in order to
provide an unbiased instrument for the detection of the neural underpinning of
emotional processing across gender.
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Where do you see the field of gender and emotions going in the
next 20 years?
I believe that the field now is ready (from a theoretical and methodological point
of view) to start a systematic investigation on the neurophysiological basis of
gender and emotion. In the past few years, social neuroscientists have challenged
the more classical cognitive approaches and brought creative ideas in order to
investigate the neuronal bases of complex social interactions and emotions, open-
ing up the possibility of understanding the mechanisms behind complex and
dynamic phenomena. The combination of such experimental paradigms (taken
from social psychology for example) with innovative neuroimaging techniques
will help the characterization of gender differences on its behavioral, biological
and sociological aspects, as well as the understanding of the distal and proximal
causes of them. I believe that the future will give us some of the answers we
have been waiting for.
Gender and Social Emotions

4. Gender and the Affective Brain:
Neuroscientific Perspectives
TATJANA AUE and PATRIK VUILLEUMIER
This chapter gives a general overview of gender differences in neural
activations reported for memory and perception of affective stimuli. Given
its prevalence in publications, we focus on visual stimulus material. Several
gender differences have been repeatedly observed; however, their cause
and consistency often remain unclear. We also broach the issues of whether
observed gender differences in brain functioning might be subject to develop-
mental factors, and how neuroscience on gender differences might advance
our understanding of affective processing and associated affective disorders.
Despite differences reported in the reviewed areas, one has to keep in mind
that research on gender effects in the affective neurosciences has just
started. Future studies that systematically investigate conditions under which
gender differentially affects brain functioning are therefore strongly warranted
and will need to take into account various factors potentially associated
with gender.
Gender and the affective brain
Gender differences in emotion perception and emotional behavior
have often been described in psychology and neuropsychology (see
also Chapters 1 & 2 of the current volume), but their exact nature
and origin still remain unclear and even controversial. In behavioral
studies, women are frequently found to exhibit greater sensitivity
for threatening (social) information and facial expressions than do
men (e. g., Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1999; McClure, 2000; Thayer
& Johnsen, 2000). Women are also generally more expressive than
are men (Kring & Gordon, 1998). In addition, males and females
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display differential risk for diverse affective and anxiety disorders (e. g.,
Davidson et al., 2002; Merikangas et al., 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema,
1990; see also Chapter 3 on empathy). Even non-affective disorders
such as schizophrenia go along with a differential impairment in
emotion processing in men and women (Scholten et al., 2005). These
observations converge to indicate that women might process affective
stimuli differently than do men – either quantitatively or qualitatively
(or both), which then impacts perception, memory, physiological
responding, and behavior.
What is at the basis of these gender differences – how can they
be explained? Can the differential sensitivity of males and females
to emotional or social cues be related to specific changes in brain
functioning or to activation of different neural networks? And if so,
what might be the origin of these differential changes? Are they
directly “caused” by gender differences, or instead induced by other
mediating factors and possibly changing with context and time? In
this chapter, we review recent research in affective neuroscience con-
cerning gender effects on emotional memory and perception, with a
focus on pictorial stimuli and facial expressions, since these are
among the most effective and most studied emotional stimuli with a
special social significance.
Research on memory
One area in which gender differences have been repeatedly observed
concerns emotional memory. The amygdala, an almond-shaped struc-
ture located in the medial temporal lobe, that is implicated in fear
and relevance detection (Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003), plays
a key role in modulating the storage of emotional information in
memory. Interestingly, it has been demonstrated that successful
memory for arousing pictures and film clips was positively related
to left amygdala activation during the encoding phase in females
but to right amygdala activation in males (Cahill et al., 2001, 2004;
Canli et al., 2002). Moreover, since the amygdalo-cortical connec-
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tions are mostly ipsilateral, it has been hypothesized that such later-
ality effects (i. e., brain functions being located either in the left or in
the right hemisphere) might also be reflected at the cortical level.
Consistent with this idea, Gasbarri et al. (2007) reported greater fron-
tal and parietal P3001 amplitudes in the right hemisphere in men
than in women when shown unpleasant scenes in the encoding phase
of a memory task. Conversely, women displayed stronger P300
amplitudes in the left hemisphere than did men. A similar pattern
was revealed by latencies of the P300 component. No such effect
was found for pleasant or neutral pictures in this study. However,
Dolcos and Cabeza (2002) observed larger left frontal than right
frontal evoked potentials for pleasant pictures in females, therefore
suggesting that arousal rather than valence might be at the source of
these effects.
Thus, male and female brains may show differential hemispheric
organization that is further modulated by task-related perceptual or
memory processes. What is more, lateralization effects have been
observed even outside the context of emotional tasks. Amygdala
connectivity in the resting state has been shown to differ between
men and women, as demonstrated by Kilpatrick et al. (2006).
Whereas the right amygdala displayed greater functional connec-
tivity2 in males than in females, the reverse was true for the left
amygdala. Areas which were more strongly functionally connected
to the right amygdala in males than in females (pulvinar, sensorimo-
tor cortices, striatal areas, cf. Cahill et al., 2001) were located exclu-
sively in the right hemisphere. Conversely, areas which were more
strongly functionally connected to the left amygdala in females than
in males (subgenual cortex, hypothalamus) were located exclusively
in the left hemisphere (cf. Cahill et al., 2004). Such differential and
1 The P300 amplitude describes a positive deflection in voltage in the electro-
encephalogram that occurs between about 300 to 600 ms after stimulus onset.
It is triggered by unexpected or infrequent, task-relevant and/or affectively-
laden stimuli.
2 Functional connectivity is determined by intercorrelated activity between two
or more different brain areas, suggesting dynamic interactions or dependencies
between these areas.
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lateralized brain connectivity pattern was interpreted in relation to
greater attention to the internal versus the external environment in
females versus males, respectively. Kilpatrick et al.’s (2006) find-
ings may accord with the idea that resting state activity relates to
processes mediating introspective states and interoceptive aware-
ness (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001), and tends to differ according to
gender (Gur et al., 1995). However, other factors might influence
such amygdala asymmetries, including primary differences in hemi-
spheric specialization, habituation, or learning (Zald, 2003).
Similar findings on hemispheric asymmetries in a memory task
have been reported by Canli and collaborators (2002). However,
lateralization was not as strict as in the Kilpatrick et al. (2006) study.
Importantly, females displayed a greater overlap of activations for
emotional experience (correlating with subjective arousal) and
activations for successful encoding (correlating with later memory
accuracy) in response to target items, suggesting that the women’s
better performance in memory tasks may originate in this similarity
of recruited brain regions. Thus, women may be characterized by
better memory for emotional scenes because their encoding is based
on living or experiencing a depicted affect, unlike men who may
employ other processing strategies, that rely on the consideration of
more abstract features of the situation such as the encoding of
the context (e. g., where did the event happen) or on attempts at ra-
tionalization.
Whereas all of the above-mentioned studies concerned affective
scenes with multiple objects or actors, Fischer and collaborators (2007)
investigated more specifically whether men and women might differ
in encoding emotional expressions in faces. The authors found that,
overall, both genders employed highly similar neural networks dur-
ing the encoding of fearful or neutral faces (right amygdala and hippo-
campus). Subtle gender differences were observed for neutral facial
expressions only. This is in accordance with the finding that gender
does not impact memory for facial expressions (Savaskan et al., 2007)
and the observation of comparable prefrontal responses during the
processing of happy, neutral, and fearful facial expressions in men
and women (Sergerie, Lepage, & Armony, 2005). Likewise, in an-
other study, females as well as males showed a right hemisphere
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advantage for storing emotional compared to unemotional facial
expressions in memory (McKeever & Dixon, 1981).
One possible explanation of the inconsistency between the re-
sults for affective scenes and those for affective facial expressions
may be that most studies on facial expressions do not take into ac-
count the gender of the target face stimuli. Accordingly, it has been
shown that not only the gender of the observer can influence brain
activity but also the gender of the target face (Aleman & Swart,
2008; Fischer et al., 2004). In women, successfully remembered fe-
male faces with a fearful expression provoked stronger activity in
the left amygdala than successfully remembered faces of fearful males
(Armony & Sergerie, 2007). In men, successfully remembered faces
of fearful males provoked stronger activity in the right amygdala
than faces of fearful females. Similar interactions between gender
of observer and gender of target face stimuli have been found to
modulate the influence of perceived gaze contact on face memory
(Vuilleumier et al., 2005).
In sum, research on memory for affective scenes has revealed
a consistent picture at least for amygdala responses, but the exact
sources of gender effects remain undetermined. One explanation of
differential lateralization of amygdala activity during the encoding
of arousing stimulus material such as unpleasant pictures proposed
that females might be confronted with qualitatively different
stressors than males (Berkley, 1997), and hence shows distinct
hemispheric adaptations or specializations of their right and left
amygdalae. From an evolutionary perspective, the internal milieu
should be more relevant to women (e. g., pregnancy and childbirth).
Conversely, male stressors might predominantly concern events in
the external environment (implicating fight-flight responses). Given
this differential stressor relevance, brain networks may have evolved
in order to accommodate such differential needs. Cultural and per-
sonal factors might also play a role in shaping such emotional learn-
ing mechanisms (e. g., by increasing the salience of the internal or
the external environment in an individual, and/or by modifying
everyday experiences).
Alternative interpretations broach the issue of gender differences
in hemispheric lateralization as being a result of different stimulus
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processing strategies that either rely more strongly on the left or
more strongly on the right hemisphere. For instance, men could pro-
cess stimuli as a whole, whereas women pay more attention to de-
tails, implying differences in global (right hemisphere) versus de-
tailed (left hemisphere) stimulus processing, respectively (Delis et
al., 1986). Women might also employ more often verbal (left hemi-
sphere) and males more often spatial (right hemisphere) processing
strategies (Phelps et al., 2001). Still another perspective accounts
for gender differences in hemispheric lateralization in relation to
potential differences in conscious (left hemisphere) versus uncon-
scious (right hemisphere) processing (Morris, Öhman & Dolan). It
remains to be clarified whether such laterality effects will be reli-
ably observed for brain regions other than the amygdala, and other
tasks in other studies, and whether these differences extend to facial
expressions.
Research on perception
Another issue investigated by gender research concerns the percep-
tion of affective stimuli. Amygdala responses have been shown to
be more lateralized in men than in women during the viewing of
affective faces (Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2001), converging with
other evidence of more asymmetric hemispheric functions in men
than women across a range of cognitive domains (e. g. language).
Moreover, the lateralization in men was moderated by the type of
facial display: happy facial expressions provoked higher right than
left amygdala activation, fearful facial expressions higher left than
right amygdala activation. Women displayed no differential right
and left amygdala activation for either happy or fearful faces. These
results accord with the observation of greater lateralization of activ-
ity in inferior frontal and orbitofrontal cortices in men than in women
during the recall of sad memories (Pardo, Pardo, & Raichle, 1993)
and suggest that there may be fundamental differences in the process-
ing and perception of facial affect in men and women.
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Lee and collaborators (2005) reported that male but not female
participants processed happy and sad emotional expressions by re-
calling factual events and objects of past emotional experiences.
Women instead focused on emotional descriptors. These differences
went along with stronger left thalamic and right insular activation in
males, the latter structure being associated with self-induced or in-
ternally generated emotions (note, however, that such an interpreta-
tion slightly controverts the conclusions drawn by Canli et al., 2002,
and others, who suggested that women instead of men rely more
strongly on introspection for the processing of emotional events).
In an earlier study, Lee et al. (2002) also demonstrated differen-
tial brain activity between men and women during the processing of
happy and sad facial displays with particularly strong differences
for sad expressions. Happy displays were associated with mostly
left-lateralized activation in both sexes (in particular bilateral fron-
tal and left parietal activation), but evoked left thalamic as well as
right occipital and temporal activations in women that were not seen
in men. By contrast, sad displays were associated with greater left
hemispheric activation in females and greater right hemispheric ac-
tivation in males, with the left parietal, left lentiform, and right oc-
cipital activations being observed only in women but not in men,
whereas bilateral frontal, right temporal, and right lentiform acti-
vations were observed in men but not in women. The authors con-
cluded from these patterns of activation that the presentation of sad
facial expressions in their study might have triggered affect-laden
autobiographical materials in male participants, whereas females
employed visuo-spatial processing strategies for both happy and sad
facial displays. Overall, lateralization was again stronger in males
than in females (see Hall et al., 2004, study 1). Although the direc-
tion of lateralization for negative faces in the latter studies is incon-
sistent with Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd (2001; see also Kesler-West
et al., 2001), it is congruent with the lateralization effects observed
in memory research (see preceding section).
Along these lines, a PET study by Hall et al. (2004, study 2)
required participants to match prosodic voices and emotional faces.
In this study, males were characterized by a left-lateralized frontal
activation, whereas females were characterized by more bilateral
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cortical responses and, most importantly, stronger limbic activation.
From these results it was concluded that males might integrate cross-
modal stimuli by using cognitive strategies whereas females rely
more strongly on direct emotional associations.
Also consistent with these imaging studies, suggesting greater
lateralization for males compared with females, are data from an ERP
study conducted by Proverbio et al. (2006b). This study revealed a
right-hemispheric dominance measured over occipito-temporal elec-
trodes with a modulation of ERP responses involving early stages
of visual processing during the viewing of affective expressions in
men. These responses were only partly visible in women. Interest-
ingly, a P4503 component in ERPs was found to be more enhanced
in response to faces for females than males during a facial affective
discrimination task (Orozco & Ehlers, 1998). Both gender and ex-
pression of the face targets modulated the P450 characteristics. There-
fore, once more, it appears to take into account not only observer
but also target gender. Finally, another ERP study by Proverbio et
al. (2006a) revealed early (thus relatively automatic) visual process-
ing differences between men and women in response to infant faces
with happy and distressed expression displays. Such an effect ac-
cords with a higher level of accuracy for decoding infant expressions
in women as compared with men (Proverbio et al., 2007).
In sum, studies on perception of affective facial expressions have
yielded various, and partly discrepant, findings concerning gender
differences. Lateralization effects for men and women in response
to specific facial displays (e. g., happy and sad facial expressions)
are inconsistent (e. g., Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2001, versus Lee
et al., 2002). Therefore, more research in this area is still needed.
Furthermore, attempts to replicate a given study are generally rare,
if not entirely absent, although the convergence between studies has
already provided some robust findings. Thus, even though the de-
gree and nature of lateralization in men (left versus right advantage)
seem highly variable across studies and emotions, a stronger asym-
3 The P450 is a positive going component in the electroencephalogram with its
peak between 300 and 600 ms after stimulus onset (sometimes also termed
P300; for further information, see footnote 1).
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metry in men than in women has been found quite consistently. This
finding may indicate that men display stronger emotion- or situa-
tion specificity in the application of processing strategies during the
viewing of facial displays than do women. However, as for the ob-
servations in relation to memory, much remains to be learned con-
cerning the origin and generality of these differences.
Which brain regions most frequently indicate
gender-related differences?
The brain region that, to date, has attracted most interest in the re-
search on gender differences in affective neuroscience is the amy-
gdala, in keeping with the central role of this region in emotion
processing across several species. In contrast, the investigation of
other regions and brain networks has just begun. Consistent with
observed differences in amygdala activity between males and fe-
males in relation to affective memory, there are important
neuroanatomical differences in amygdala volume and neuronal den-
sity between the sexes (Stefanova & Ovtscharoff, 2000), as well as
differences in opioid receptor4 binding within the amygdala
(Goldstein et al., 2001). It remains to be further investigated how
these differences relate to other functional or behavioral findings
such as the observation of stronger and more vivid memories for
emotional events in women than in men (e. g., Canli et al., 2002). In
addition, it is also highly desirable that the above-reported findings
be replicated with different tasks and by different laboratories.
Another brain structure commonly associated with gender dif-
ferences is the corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres
and has often been found to be thicker in females than males (see
Allen et al., 1991). This variation has repeatedly been attributed to
4 The opioid system refers to neuromodulation by endorphins and is implicated
in responses to pain and stress, but also learning, memory, and affective
disorders such as depression.
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more lateralized hemispheric functions in males and more inter-
hemispheric exchanges in females. However, differences in corpus
callosum size remain debated and could be partly explained by dif-
ferences in relative ratio to the total brain size. This controversy
highlights how gender-related differences may potentially relate to
other variables and their functional meaning be misattributed.
At what ages do gender differences appear?
Is there a developmental factor?
Killgore, Deborah, and Yurgelun-Todd (2001) showed that differ-
ences between male and female responses to affective faces are sub-
ject to development. With increasing age, women displayed greater
prefrontal relative to amygdala activation, whereas there was a non-
significant trend for men in the opposite direction. Such a finding
could point toward greater cognitive control in adult women than in
adult men. However, the result partly disagrees with the findings
reported by Hall et al. (2004) who found greater frontal than limbic
activity in adult men than women.
McClure et al. (2004) reported that adult women’s orbitofrontal
and amygdala activities (mainly in the right hemisphere) discrimi-
nated well between angry and fearful facial expressions in a threat-
evaluation task, whereas this was not the case for men. In the same
study, no gender differences were found for adolescents. These
younger participants displayed activation patterns similar to the adult
male participants. In sum, there is some first indication that observed
gender differences are subject to developmental changes. Neverthe-
less, the exact nature and cause of these differences need to be fur-
ther investigated. Specifically, future research is warranted to clarify
the role of sexual hormones and the effects of hormonal changes
during development as well as during the menstrual cycle in women.
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How can neuroscience studies on gender differences
advance our understanding of affective processes and
their disorders?
Gender differences in brain activation might explain part of the vari-
ance in the risk of suffering from diverse psychiatric disorders (al-
though, of course, the direction of the link is, to date, unclear). In
particular, anxiety and depressive disorders are more common in
women than men. Both of these disorders have been linked, among
others, to amygdala hyperactivation, particularly on the left side
(Drevets et al., 2002). In keeping with this pattern, females but not
males have been reported to recruit the left amygdala to success-
fully encode emotionally-arousing pictorial material (e. g., Cahill et
al., 2001, 2004; Canli et al., 2002). Thus, in females, amygdala acti-
vation could more easily surpass an internally set threshold and pro-
duce depressive symptoms. Conversely, since males do not seem to
activate the amygdala as strongly during the encoding of emotion-
ally-arousing material, they might be less prone to suffer from de-
pression.
In addition, the subgenual prefrontal cortex has also been criti-
cally associated with depression and emotion regulation (Drevets et
al., 1998), and was shown to be more functionally connected to
women’s left-lateralized amygdala network in the study of Kilpatrick
et al. (2006). In contrast, in males, a reduced modulation of amy-
gdala activity by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was suggested
by a study of Killgore et al. (2001), which might point to lower
cognitive control of emotional arousal. This might, in turn, also ex-
plain why men are characterized by greater proneness to anger and
aggressive disorders than women. Reduced cognitive control might
also relate to a lower density of gray matter in the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex in males compared with females (Schlaepfer et al.,
1995). Future studies could usefully employ new MRI techniques
such as diffusion tensor imaging to assess structural connectivity of
amygdala and frontal regions with other brain areas as a function of
individual and gender differences in emotional control.
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The problem of unpublished non-significant results
Many studies do not explicitly investigate gender differences and
simply pool data from male and female participants. Other investi-
gators may have checked for gender differences, but decided not to
report non-significant effects. In addition, there is a high risk that
non-significant results may not pass a journal review for publica-
tion because a significant result is typically judged to be more inter-
esting than a non-significant result. Hence, it is very likely that a
publication bias exists and complicates research on gender differ-
ences. Although this issue fits in with a more general concern in
scientific communication, the presence or absence of gender differ-
ences might be worth being more systematically described by pub-
lished work in the field of affective sciences.
Conclusion
The above-reported observations point to the need to pay greater
attention to participant gender in brain research. What is more, if the
stimulus material comprises facial expressions, the interaction be-
tween target and participant gender might also turn out to be of key
interest (Aleman & Swart, 2008; Armony & Sergerie, 2007; Fischer
et al., 2004). A clearer picture of what particular factors might deter-
mine gender differences, and in which contexts these might arise,
can only emerge when differences between studies are minimized
or more systematically considered. Inconsistent research results can
stem from numerous differences in factors such as (a) study popula-
tion, (b) domain or task under investigation (e. g., perception,
memory), (c) stimulus material, (d) stimulus duration, (e) specific
brain region analyzed, or (f) statistical method adopted (e. g., spe-
cific type of connectivity analysis; subtraction versus conjunction
analysis).
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In addition, so far research on gender differences has mainly
focused on negative affective states related to fear and anger. How-
ever, gender differences for pleasant stimulus material need further
investigation. Also, to date, only a single study on facial expres-
sions examined differences between contempt and disgust (Aleman
& Swart, 2008). This research revealed stronger activation in the
medial and inferior frontal gyri and in the superior temporal gyrus
to contemptuous facial expressions in men than in women. Con-
versely, women exhibited more pronounced responses to disgust
faces in several brain areas. Gender differences for complex or so-
cial emotions (e. g. shame, pride) might contribute to our understand-
ing of the basic appraisal processes underlying distinct affective states
and the emergence of distinct categories of emotions.
Future brain research needs to further clarify how personality
characteristics or variations in voluntary attention interact with gen-
der. A study by Dickie and Armony (2008), for example, suggested
that trait anxiety is positively correlated with amygdala reactivity to
unattended fearful expressions in women but not in men. Another
behavioral experiment (Inzlicht, Kaiser, & Major, 2008) demon-
strated an influence of prejudice expectations on females’ evalua-
tions of out-group faces, which was not observed in males.
Finally, an important goal should be to better establish which
part of the observed gender differences is due to genetic or biologi-
cal factors, and which part can be attributed to the psychosocial and
experiential environment. Clearly, such an investigation should not
be restricted to the amygdala and frontal cortical areas, and should
begin to integrate laboratory experimental designs with more eco-
logical approaches. In addition, while gender differences tend to be
considered as inherently dichotomous, more refined approaches are
needed that distinguish more systematically the role of other con-
textual, social, or experiential factors that may be associated with
the gender of individuals and the development of their brain.
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Q&A Box: Tatjana Aue and Patrik Vuilleumier
From a methodological standpoint, what would you recommend
researchers who study emotion in terms of taking into account
gender differences?
Gender differences observed in one task for a specific population (e. g., under-
graduate students) need to be replicated, and it is crucial to investigate whether
the results extend to other study populations (e. g., younger, older, other educa-
tion) in different cultural contexts. If gender differences cannot be generalized
across different education levels or cannot be replicated for a population of the
same age and the same education but in a different socio-economic background,
the reported results will be difficult if not impossible to interpret. Understanding
these differences will require careful consideration of many other variables that
are associated with sex factors. In particular, the role of differential social and
interpersonal experiences (or development) due to societal factors should be
more systematically taken into account.
In a similar vein, researchers studying gender differences in emotion need to
rule out that gender differences in their study are a mere artifact of the employed
task. For instance, a specific task in emotion research may require specific men-
tal capacities (e. g., arithmetics, language, spatial processing) that are themselves
unrelated to emotion processing per se, and/or linked to other social or learning
influences. Differential abilities with respect to these mental capacities may in-
troduce a bias in neurophysiological activations that is falsely taken as an indi-
cator of differential emotion processing. Therefore, a careful evaluation of gen-
der effects on these mental capacities should be performed independently, in
order to consider them as covariate in statistical analyses whenever appropriate.
Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from – socialization and culture or biological differences
between women and men?
We described that researchers in our domain observed gender differences in neu-
ral activations that can possibly be explained by the fact that women tend to more
often use verbal processing strategies than do men. In addition, according to
research on memory, women may rely more strongly than men on autobiographic
encoding that comprises the reliving of earlier emotional experiences. Men as
compared with women, on the contrary, may use autobiographic encoding strate-
gies that implicate a focus on contextual factors (such as who was present at that
time or where the event happened) rather than reflecting on their own feeling state.
At the current stage, it is difficult to say, whether the observed differences
originate in a differential socialization or in differential biological characteris-
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tics. One the one hand, upbringing of girls usually includes more elements that
encourage verbal communication and feelings as well as expressions of emo-
tions than upbringing of boys. The latter, in contrast, are generally expected to
analyze situations more rationally and to more strongly control anxious feel-
ings. On the other hand, hormonal factors can produce strong effects on limbic
structures implicated in stress responses, both at developmental stages and dur-
ing adult life. Recent research also found that even the composition of early
maternal milk during breastfeeding differs with respect to whether the baby is a
boy or a girl (Petherick, 2010); a finding that can hardly be explained by differ-
ential socialization or cultural influences on boys and girls. It may rather be a
result of the child’s genetic (or hormonal) influence on maternal milk produc-
tion that, in turn, could very well shape early responding including cognitive
processing of the child. Finally, there are alternative indications that cognitive
abilities and processing are strongly influenced by genetics (e. g., Aarts et al.,
2010). In any case, it seems that biological explanations are often favored, whereas
effects of social context tend to be relatively neglected or underestimated, al-
though these may also produce strong effects on the development of behavior
and affective processes from an early age onwards.
Aarts, E., Roelofs, A., Franke, B., Rijpkema, M., Fernandez, G., et al. (2010).
Striatal dopamine mediates the interface between motivational and cognitive
control in humans: Evidence from genetic imaging. Neuropsychopharmaco-
logy, 35, 1943–1951.
Petherick, A. (2010). Mother’s milk: A rich opportunity. Nature, 468, 5–7.
What should everybody know about gender differences in emo-
tion? What are, in your view, the most important findings in this
literature so far? – with the most important applied consequences,
maybe.
Perhaps the most important finding in the literature on gender differences in
emotion is the finding that sex hormones can have profound influences on stress
responses and fundamental emotional learning processes, such as fear condi-
tioning and extinction (Cahill 2006, Milad et al., 2006). This has crucial impli-
cations for understanding gender differences in anxiety and depression disorders.
Another important notion is that differences at one level of observation are
not necessarily found at another level (see also Chapter 1). For instance, behavioral
differences do not always go along with similar somatovisceral changes. On the
other hand, behavioral differences are often reflected in corresponding differen-
tial neural activations. It remains to be clarified, why changes at some levels of
observation do correspond better than do others. One could for instance imagine
that factors such as slight differences in baselines or statistical analyses of mediat-
ing variables are responsible for this incongruence. It is also conceivable that a
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limited selection of somatovisceral measures in a given study is not capable of
capturing meaningful differences similarly reflected at the behavioral and neural
levels.
Finally, it is also possible that some behavioral differences in emotion process-
ing are only reflected at the neural and not necessarily or not always at the
somatovisceral level. If the latter case applies, and at the same time emotions are
considered as phenomena that comprises synchronized changes in different body
parts or components (e. g., hormones, somatovisceral, neural, but also cogni-
tion, behavior, motivation), such findings will be important to study because
they will require refining our current concepts about emotions and their compo-
nents.
Cahill L. (2006). Why sex matters for neuroscience. Nat Rev Neurosci 7, 477–
484.
Milad MR, Goldstein JM, Orr SP, Wedig MM, Klibanski A, Pitman RK, Rauch
SL. (2006). Fear conditioning and extinction: influence of sex and menstrual
cycle in healthy humans. Behav Neurosci 120, 1196–1203.
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Q&A Box: Joseph Andreano and Lisa Feldman Barrett
Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from – socialization and culture or biological differences
between women and men?
In the final analysis, culture and socialization have their influences via biology so
the question is difficult to answer the way it is phrased. There are definitely some
biological differences. Structurally, brain regions involved in realizing emotion
differ between the sexes: the cingulated cortex and orbitofrontal cortex are larger,
relative to brain size, in women, and the amygdala is relatively larger in men.
 When viewing emotional material, activity in insula and cingulate is greater in
women compared to men. In men, right amygdala activity predicts memory for
emotional material; in women, it’s the left amygdala.  The stress hormone response to
emotional experience also differs between men and women.  But, of course, any or
all of these biological differences could be the result of socialization or endowment.
There are sex differences that change over the course of the female menstrual
cycle, which strengthens the argument for some effect of endowment. That being
said, there is also ample evidence of socialization effect in sex differences in emotion,
but it depends on how the question is asked.  Men and women do not differ in their
subjective reports of moment-to-moment emotional experiences in response to
specific events as they occur in everyday life using an experience-sampling proce-
dure, although women describe themselves as more emotional when they charac-
terize their experiences using memory-based self-report measures, most likely
because such measures tap stereotypes and other beliefs that are strongly gendered. 
Furthermore, women use significantly more emotional language in their autobio-
graphical narratives, an effect that is probably due partially to culture.
From a methodological standpoint, what would you recommend
researchers who study emotion in terms of taking into account
gender differences?
First, researchers should measure emotional experience on-line, rather than in retro-
spect or using general measures.  Second, it is important to examine emotion in mul-
tiple contexts, because “objective” measures of emotion like measures of peripheral
physiology or facial actions are very contextually sensitive. Some studies report that
women show larger physiological changes in evocative situations, whereas others
do not or report the opposite pattern of results.  Sometimes women smile more than
men and sometimes less.  Third, all studies of sex differences should consider variation
in gonadal hormone levels.  For example, women’s response to evocactive mate-
rial in the amygdala is greater during parts of the cycle where progesterone is
elevated compare to other phases of the menstrual cycle.  In a number of other
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regions, including OFC and anterior cingulated cortex, activity reduced during high-
estrogen phases of the cycle.  Similarly while men show a greater hormone response
to stress than women as a group, the difference is not significant when men are
compared only to women in the luteal phase of their cycles. Thus many sex differences
in emotion might be better understood as differences between men and a subset of
women of a certain gonadal status. Changes in testosterone levels in men over the
course of the day are probably also an important mediating factor in sex differences,
although the emotional consequences of these changes are less well understood.
Where do you see the field of gender and emotions going in the
next 20 years?
One thing that would improve the science of gender differences in emotion is to
refine our concept of gender and sex. Because maleness is an induced state in
the brain (all brains begin development in a ‘female’ state and ‘maleness’ is
induced by aromatized estrogen from a testosterone surge), the degree of ‘male-
ness’ in a brain will vary according to a number of developmental factors (the
uterine environment, the mother’s immune response, etc.).  Thus there is a con-
tinuum of maleness (as defined in terms of difference from the female brain),
just as there is a continuum of femaleness (again, defined in terms of difference
from the male brain) over the course of the menstrual cycle.  Studies that con-
sider the position of their participants along these continua will give us a much
more detailed picture of the influence of sex on emotion than we currently have.
Another important avenue will be to understand how context influences sex
differences in emotion.  While there are often real statistical differences in emo-
tional responding at times between men and women, there is also huge variation
within each group that is not well understood.  Some of this variation is noise
and might have to do with hormonal variation, but as we turn to more context-
sensitive experiments, we will be better able to understand sex differences rather
than look for simple group differences.
Finally, it is important to refine our understanding of what emotions are, and how
they work, to really understand where sex differences in emotion live, and where
they are just a figment of our own perceptions.  For example, while there are sex
differences in the structure of the brain, we don’t really know how these translate
into experiences of emotion or emotional behaviors.  As another example, we have
found that human perceivers tend to make more “internal” attributions about the
emotional behaviors that they observe in women, whereas they make more “external”
attributions about the emotional behaviors that they observe in men; people un-
derstand smiles, scowls, and frowns to reveal something about a person’s internal
state when the target person is female, but there is something particular about the
situational demands when the target person is male.  These data are consistent with
the idea that emotion perception is a complex perceptual process that involves
more than just simple inborn, universal mechanisms for detecting facial expressions.
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Q&A Box: Erin B. Tone
Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from – socialization and culture or biological differences
between women and men?
This is a question that has long interested me; I have yet, however, to generate or
come across data that provide a satisfying answer. Indeed, the longer I work in
the field of emotion research, the more complicated and ambiguous I find data
about sex differences (and similarities) in emotion to be. In particular, research-
ers vary dramatically in how they define and constrain the construct of emotion;
depending on which facets (e. g., expression, recognition, etc.) they highlight,
and how they measure “emotion”, sex differences vary in both occurrence and
magnitude. My own work, for example, has focused both on the development of
sex differences in the capacity to distinguish among and/or label emotional fa-
cial expressions and on neural responses to emotional faces. Findings from these
two lines of work, despite their ostensible overlap, have been challenging to
integrate. In a meta-analysis of behavioral studies (McClure, 2000), I found evi-
dence that facial expression labeling skill emerges as a function of a complex
interplay of biology and socialization, with biological factors (brain maturation,
hormonal changes, etc.) playing a larger role very early in life and socialization/
cultural factors becoming increasingly important as development progresses.
My data do not, however, provide information about how other emotion skills
and proclivities emerge; indeed my neuroimaging work with colleagues at the
U.S. National Institute of Mental Health suggest increases in sex differences in
neural responses to facial threat between adolescence and adulthood (McClure
et al., 2007). Thus, the relative contributions of biology and culture, as well as
the timelines along which their interactions unfold, may be markedly different,
depending on the facets of emotion that are under study.
What should everybody know about gender differences in emo-
tion? What are, in your view, the most important findings in this
literature so far?
Recently there has been, in the popular literature, considerable attention focused
on sex/gender differences in the experience, expression, and processing of emo-
tion. Unfortunately, a substantial segment of this literature both magnifies and
oversimplifies differences, making them seem larger, more straightforward and,
in some cases, more meaningful than they probably are. Indeed, some of the
most interesting and, in my view, important recent work on sex/gender differ-
ences in emotion suggests that men and women are broadly similar in their ca-
pacities and proclivities to process and respond to emotional cues. However,
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they appear to achieve comparable ends by different means. For example, recent
studies of the neural mechanisms underlying emotion regulation suggest that
although both males and females can (and routinely do) effectively regulate nega-
tive emotions, they apply different strategies and engage their brains differently
in the process of doing so (e. g., McRae et al., 2008; Domes et al., 2010). These
and similar findings lend weight to the idea that it may be more fruitful to focus
on differences in process between males and females than it is to search for
differences in outcome (e. g., emotion labeling accuracy, etc.).
From a methodological standpoint, what would you recommend
to researchers who study emotion in terms of taking into account
gender differences?
Recent technological advances have given researchers exciting new ways to ap-
proach the study of gender or sex differences in emotion. The increasing acces-
sibility of neuroimaging equipment and analysis tools, in particular, allows us to
examine neural manifestations and correlates of emotional experience in ways
that were inconceivable a few decades ago. These tools have already facilitated
the generation of a wide range of new insights about mechanisms underlying
behavioral and experiential sex/gender differences associated with emotion. It is
worth bearing in mind, however, that these tools can be used recklessly or slop-
pily and that it is easy to present data in ways that overlook or obscure com-
plexities and subtleties in actual patterns of functioning. In fMRI studies of emo-
tion and sex differences, for instance, researchers often focus on key “regions of
interest” (ROIs), such as the amygdala, which have already been implicated in
emotional functioning. This strategy has many merits; however, an exclusive
focus on a priori selected ROIs increases the possibility that we will overlook
other brain regions that participate in unpredicted ways in emotion processing
and that we oversimplify or misrepresent broad networks that are engaged dur-
ing emotion processing in females versus males. The use of functional connec-
tivity analyses and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) techniques, which help eluci-
date networks and pathways of brain activity, may help offset the risk of such
oversight or error. I would thus recommend to researchers who study sex/gender
differences and emotion, both those who dive into neuroimaging and those who
read and evaluate the literature, to think systemically and integratively when
considering neural mechanisms of emotional function and to approach
neuroimaging techniques cautiously and critically.
Q&A Box: ERIN B. TONE
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Social Interactions: Present and Past

5. Gender and Nonverbal Expression of Emotions
GAËTAN COUSIN and MARIANNE SCHMID MAST
Our nonverbal behavior, and in particular our facial expressions and voice
quality, can convey emotional information. Research shows that men and
women differ in their nonverbal expression of emotional states. Women are
more emotionally expressive, in general, but there are differences with re-
spect to which emotions are expressed. For instance, women express joy
and sadness more than men do, but men express anger more than women
do. Biological differences inherited from evolution may be at the origin of
some of the observed differences, but the differential socialization of girls
and boys, different display rules that prevail, and specific gender expecta-
tions can also explain those differences. Research suggests the existence
of a constant social control on the expression of emotions in that men and
women who do not conform to existing display rules must often expect nega-
tive social consequences.
Gender and Nonverbal Expression of Emotions
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of existing findings
and knowledge regarding gender differences with respect to the non-
verbal expression of emotions. The main functions of nonverbal
behavior in human interactions will be addressed, followed by a
discussion about how men and women differ in their expression of
nonverbal behavior in general, and in their nonverbal expression of
emotions in particular. Differences between men and women in their
ability to infer others’ emotions on the basis of nonverbal behavior
will also be discussed.
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What Is Nonverbal Behavior?
Nonverbal behavior can be defined as communication without words
(Knapp & Hall, 2002). Nonverbal behavior typically investigated
includes facial expressions (e. g., smiling, frowning), eye gaze, body
movements (e. g., gestures), posture, touching behavior, and vocal behav-
ior (e. g., tone of voice, speech modulation, speech duration). A distinc-
tion can be made between speech-related nonverbal behavior (e. g.
tone of voice, speaking time) and speech-unrelated nonverbal behavior
(e. g. posture, gestures, facial expression) (Knapp & Hall, 2002).
Nonverbal behavior serves many functions and can reinforce, be
substituted by, or even contradict the verbal components of conver-
sations. In ambiguous situations, nonverbal behavior is often con-
sulted as an additional source of information. Nonverbal behavior
can signal attention, reflect physical states (e. g., pain), coordinate
turn-taking in conversations, and reflect and reveal personality char-
acteristics (Knapp & Hall, 2002). As such, others’ nonverbal cues
allow us to better understand them and better interact with them.
Nonverbal behavior is at the basis of the first impressions we form
about others (Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 1995; Borkenau &
Liebler, 1992; Costanzo & Archer, 1989; Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo,
Rogers, & Archer, 1979; Schmid Mast & Hall, 2004). For instance,
we correctly recognize others’ emotions and are able to infer their
motives, intentions, and thoughts (Ickes, 2003; Rosenthal, et al.,
1979), on the basis of so-called thin slices (i. e. brief observations) of
nonverbal behavior. Also, when we observe two people interacting,
nonverbal behavior conveys information about the nature of their
social relationship (Schmid Mast & Hall, 2004; Sternberg & Smith,
1985). Last but not least, nonverbal behavior is used to express
emotions (Ekman, 1993).
Emotions are expressed through nonverbal behavior in different
channels (e. g., facial expression, voice, touch). For instance, anger
can be expressed by frowning (face) and speaking loudly (voice).
The communication of emotions through nonverbal behavior may be
intentional or unintentional, and authentic or faint (Hall, Carter, &
Horgan, 2000). What distinguishes emotional expressions (especially
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facial expressions) from other nonverbal behaviors is that emotional
expressions are usually very brief (between 1 and 10 seconds), use
involuntary muscle actions (muscles that most people cannot acti-
vate or suppress when they want), and have parallels in nonhuman
species (Oatley, Keltner, & Jenkins, 2006). Emotions can be commu-
nicated through all nonverbal behaviors, but some channels seem to
be used more often than others, like facial and vocal cues. Facial cues
include for instance smiles, grins, frowning, and gaze; vocal cues
include voice pitch, tempo, and loudness (Scherer, 1986).
How Do Women and Men Differ in Nonverbal Behavior?
We have today a broad literature that documents the differences be-
tween men and women with respect to nonverbal behavior (Hall,
2006; Hall, et al., 2000; LaFrance, Hecht, & Paluck, 2003; Vrugt &
Kerkstra, 1984). It has been documented that women smile more,
show more nodding and forward leaning, interact at closer distances,
do more gestures, show more self-touch, and have more expressive
faces. Men show more restless body movements (e. g., fidgeting),
greater bodily expansiveness, more visual dominance – defined as
the ratio of percentage of looking while speaking to the percentage
of looking while listening – (Dovidio, Ellyson, Keating, Heltman, &
Brown, 1988), and they talk more than women. With respect to speech
related nonverbal behavior, men make more speech errors, use more
pause-fillers (e. g. “er”, “ah”, “ehm”) and are more likely to interrupt
(Anderson & Leaper, 1998) their interlocutor than women.
We also find differences in women’s and men’s ability to read
others’ nonverbal behaviors. Women are better at decoding nonverbal
cues in general. Their advantage is the largest for decoding facial
cues, next largest for decoding body cues, and smaller for decoding
vocal cues (Hall, 1978). Women show more interpersonal sensitivity
(accurate perception of another person’s traits or states) and espe-
cially so when inferring others’ emotions (Hall, 1984, 2006; Hall, et
al., 2000). They are also better at remembering others’ nonverbal be-
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havior (Hall, Murphy, & Schmid Mast, 2006) and appearance (Horgan,
Schmid Mast, Hall, & Carter, 2004; Schmid Mast & Hall, 2006).
As a general observation, differences between men and women
regarding nonverbal behavior are well documented and they are sig-
nificant in magnitude compared to gender differences in other areas
of psychology (Hall, 2006). It is also important to notice that these
differences are largely in line with existing gender role stereotypes.
Women are seen as more socially oriented and caring (communal)
(Bakan, 1966; Eagly & Wood, 1999), showing more supportive inter-
personal nonverbal behavior such as nodding or smiling, and more
behaviors that manifest other-orientation, interest in and concern with
the social interaction partner such as facial expressiveness, nodding,
or closer interpersonal distance. Men’s stereotypical gender role is
more oriented toward power and self-promotion (agentic), and, in
fact, they speak more, interrupt others more frequently, talk in a louder
voice, and take more interpersonal space (i. e., body expansiveness).
How do Men and Women Differ in the Expression
of Emotions?
Between men and women, differences can be observed in the verbal
and nonverbal expression of emotions as well (Fisher, 2000; Hall,
1984). In general, women are more emotionally expressive (Fisher,
2000; Hall & Briton, 1993; Merten, 2001; Mesquita, 2002). This could
explain, at least partially, why female emotional cues are more accu-
rately judged than male emotional cues (Hall, 1984). Women seem
better at encoding emotions, while men seem better at controlling
emotional displays (Riggio, 1993). We also find differences in the
modalities by which men and women express their emotions; women
express them through facial expressions more than men do, and men
tend to express them through actions more than women do (i. e.,
through aggressive, dangerous, or distracting behavior) (Brody, 1993).
Gender differences can also be found with respect to which
emotions are expressed, verbally and nonverbally (Brody, 1997;
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Fisher, 2000). Even if there are important variations from one context
to another (Brody, 1997), women tend to express more emotions of
fear, sadness, anxiety, shame, guilt, but also joy (Hall, 1984; Merten,
2001) – in particular, women smile more often than men (Brody &
Hall, 2000; Hall, et al., 2000). Men tend to display more often emo-
tions that are related to aggression and high self-esteem, such as
anger, contempt, or pride (Fisher, 2000; Kitayama & Markus, 1995;
Shields, 2000). Some of these differences can be already observed in
childhood and adolescence: in a situation eliciting negative emotions
(losing a game or playing with a kind who cheats), boys nonverbally
express more anger than girls (through facial expressions, voice intona-
tion, and other nonverbal behaviors), while girls express more sadness
than boys (through facial expressions) (Hubbard, 1995). Adolescent
boys report to inhibit the expression of sadness (i. e., “I hide my
sadness”) more than adolescent girls (Perry-Parrish & Zeman, 2011).
Where Do these Gender Differences Come From?
There are many theories about the origins of differences between
men and women’s expression of emotions or decoding abilities. With
respect to a biological-evolutionary approach, Hall (1978) suggests
that women may be better at decoding others’ nonverbal cues be-
cause the ability to detect distress in their offspring enhanced the
chances of survival in the latter. Under a social-psychological per-
spective, gender differences may come from differences in educa-
tion that reproduce gender stereotypes. The biological-evolutionary
and the social perspectives are not mutually exclusive and biologi-
cal differences may exist between the sexes that are then reinforced
by socialization (Guerrero & Reiter, 1998). We know that across
their development, boys are encouraged to inhibit the expression of
most emotions, while girls are encouraged to inhibit the expression
only of socially unacceptable emotions (e. g., anger) (Brody, 1985).
It has been shown that parents discuss positive emotions more often
with girls than they do with boys, and that they also exhibit more
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facial expressions to girls (Brody, 1993). Many authors show that
parents even unintentionally lead boys and girls to express different
emotions (e. g., Fivush, 1989; Fuchs & Thelen, 1988; Stewart, 1990)
by, for instance, encouraging girls to be more socially oriented and
thus to smile more (e. g., Block, 1973; Cherry & Lewis, 1976). Even
if some of the research in this field is more than twenty years old,
and societal changes during the last decades could maybe lead to
different results if these studies were conducted today, these results
suggest ways by which education and socialization of boys and girls
lead to differences in the expression of emotions.
Gender role expectations and display rules (culture-specific
norms for when, how, and to whom to visibly express specific emo-
tions; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Hochschild, 1983; Levy, 1984) could
explain gender differences in the expression of emotion. Women in
Western societies expect negative social sanctions when they ex-
press negative emotions toward third persons, whereas this is not
the case for men (Stoppard & Gunn Grunchy, 1993). Interestingly,
when emotions are measured immediately after a social interaction,
men and women do not differ in their average experience; only when
retrospective accounts are given does the gender difference show
(Feldman Barrett, Robin, Pietromonaco, & Eyssell, 1998; Robinson,
Johnson, & Shields, 1998). Furthermore, the physical or imagined
presence of an audience heightens the probability that an individual
will describe his or her feelings in a gender-stereotypical way (e. g.,
Berman, 1980; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992). These elements show
that there is a constant social influence upon the way men and women
express their emotions, strengthening differences that sometimes may
not exist, or that are not so large at the level of personal experience.
Gender role expectations seem to explain some gender differ-
ences because negative consequences are to be expected in men and
women who do not conform to those expectations. For instance, it
has been shown that for women in powerful positions it is important
to adopt a gender-congruent interpersonal style, in order to be evalu-
ated positively. Eagly and Karau (Eagly & Karau, 2002) have shown
that women who adopted a masculine style (e. g. more dominant)
were perceived less favorably than men who adopted the same style.
In the clinical context, patients are more satisfied with female phy-
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sicians who adopt a gender-congruent role, thus gaze more, lean
forward more, and speak in a softer voice (Schmid Mast, Hall,
Klöckner, & Choi, 2008) Furthermore, same nonverbal behaviors
(e. g., not smiling or not gazing) are judged as more dominant when
expressed by a female physician rather than a male physician and
lead to lower patient satisfaction, probably because dominance con-
tradicts female role expectations (Schmid Mast, Hall, Klöckner
Cronauer, & Cousin, 2010).
The same phenomenon appears in the nonverbal expression of
emotions that are congruent or incongruent with gender role expec-
tations. Women are seen as more prone to happiness, sadness, and
fear than men, and men as more prone to anger, contempt, and dis-
gust than women (Brody & Hall, 1993; Shields, 1987). Those who
violate these gender expectations regarding the expression of emo-
tions must sometimes expect negative consequences in the form of
social exclusion or negative evaluations (Fiske & Stevens, 1993).
For instance, research shows that boys who express sadness have
lower peer acceptance, while girls’ expression of sadness is not re-
lated to their peer acceptance (Perry-Parrish & Zeman, 2011). Male
managers whose nonverbal behavior (i. e., voice, demeanor, and
gestures) expresses anger when hearing of a problem are perceived
as more competent than male managers whose nonverbal behavior
is neutral, while female managers whose nonverbal behavior ex-
presses anger are perceived as less competent than female managers
whose nonverbal behavior was neutral; also, male managers are
perceived as less competent when nonverbally expressing sadness,
while this is not the case for female leaders (Lewis, 2000). Since
anger is generally associated with men and sadness with women
(Shields, 1987), emotional expressions that are gender-congruent
seem to lead to more positive evaluations than emotional expressions
that are gender-incongruent. Also, regarding the ability to accurately
perceive emotions in others, research shows that female managers,
but not male managers, who decode others’ emotions more accu-
rately are evaluated more positively by their supervisor (Byron,
2007). This testifies to the fact that expectations regarding men and
women’s nonverbal expression of emotions and skills in decoding
emotional cues have potential consequences on their social life.
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Conclusion
Gender differences in the nonverbal expression of emotions are docu-
mented in the literature, which show for instance that men tend to
inhibit the expression of sadness, and that women tend to inhibit the
expression of anger. Moreover, people hold precise gender role ex-
pectations regarding the expression of emotions. Gender-congruent
emotional displays lead to more positive evaluations of men and
women, which could encourage men and women to express their
emotions according to gender expectations, in order not to be so-
cially excluded or evaluated negatively.
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Q&A Box: Gaetan Cousin and Marianne Schmid Mast
Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from – socialization and culture or biological differences
between women and men?
Past research suggests that both phenomena are at stake. Biological differences
may exist, and come from evolutionary processes, but socialization may rein-
force these differences. There may be biological differences between boys and
girls in how prone they are to experience and express emotions, but also know
that boys are encouraged to inhibit all kinds of emotions (and especially sad-
ness), while girls are encouraged to inhibit only certain emotions (like anger).
Our research focused more on gender display rules in nonverbal behavior, and
thus adopts a social perspective. We thus see gender differences in the expres-
sion of emotions as social constructions.
What is the finding on gender differences (or lack of, thereof) that
surprised you the most in your own research?
What surprised us the most was the fact that people seem to judge women more
severely than men when in comes to certain nonverbal behaviors or interper-
sonal skills. In one of our studies, we demonstrated that the very same behaviors
were judged as more dominant in female physicians than in male physicians,
and had a more detrimental effect on patient satisfaction when expressed by
female physicians rather than male physicians. In a parallel way, Byron (2007)
showed that the ability to infer other’s emotions played a role in a supervisor’s
ratings of female managers’ competence, but not in the ratings of male managers’
competence. This shows that even when men and women behave similarly, the
criteria people use for judging their behavior are different.
What should everybody know about gender differences in emo-
tion? What are, in your view, the most important findings in this
literature so far? – with the most important applied consequences,
maybe.
In our view, the most important findings are about the existence of different
display rules for expressing emotions for men and women, and about the differ-
ent consequences men and women have to expect when expressing certain emo-
tions. As a general observation, men are expected to be less expressive than
women. The expression of sadness, for instance, is less accepted in men than it
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is in women. However, for some emotions, it is the opposite: the expression of
anger, for instance, is less accepted in women than it is in men. These display
rules have very practical implications in that women and men who break these
rules must expect negative social consequences. For instance, boys who express
sadness have lower peer acceptance, and female managers who expresses anger
are perceived as less competent. Being conscious of these display rules and their
consequences is the first step in adapting or resisting to what could be seen as
gender discriminations in the expression of emotions.
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6. Gender Differences in Risk Aversion –
The Role of Emotions
EVA RANEHILL and ANNE BOSCHINI
Women are most often found to take on less financial risk than men. How-
ever, only small differences or no differences at all, are found in some sub-
groups of the general population, most notably managers and professionals.
This may be partly explained by knowledge disparities between genders
pertaining to financial literacy or to gender differences in confidence. Empiri-
cal studies also suggest that women perceive risks as greater than men and
that women judge the consequences of negative outcomes as more severe
when it comes to financial gambles as well as other types of risky situations
(with the exception of social risk taking). The relatively greater tendency by
women to react by fear and by men to react by anger to uncertainty may also
cause the genders to make different risk assessments.1 Similarly a small
body of research suggests that gender differences in risk taking are influ-
enced by gender inequality and male and female relative status. Having a
higher social status as a group, men also exert a higher control and may thus
perceive risks as more manageable.
1. Introduction
Women’s economic and political opportunities have long been more
restricted than men’s. This situation has gradually improved, but
economically important and unexplained gender gaps still exist in
society. For example, large gender gaps that persist over time are
found pertaining to professional and economic outcomes. The last
1 Little is known about the causes of these differences themselves, however
biological factors such as hormonal influences may account for some of the
variation between genders.
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decades have seen a significant stagnation in the pace at which the
gender wage gap closes, despite continuous advances in female edu-
cational attainment (Blau & Kahn, 2006; Fortin, 2008; O’Neill,
2003). Female educational attainment has caught up, and in many
countries surpassed, that of male, but men still occupy the majority
of leading positions in society (Arulampalam, Booth, & Bryan 2007;
Bertrand & Hallock 2001; OECD Family Database 2011). Lately it
has been proposed that this discrepancy may be at least partly due to
gender differences in psychological traits and economic preferences
(Bertrand, 2010; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund
2011). In this literature, the most robust gender differences are found
in four areas: preferences for risk, competition, negotiation, and to
some extent other regarding preferences (see Bertrand 2010; Croson
& Gneezy, 2009; Eckel & Grossman 2008a, 2008b; Niederleand &
Vesterlund 2010 for overviews). Generalizing across studies, men
are found to be more risk seeking and competitive, to initiate nego-
tiation more often, and to be more concerned about efficiency as
opposed to equality than women. Gender differences in the labor
market would then arise independent of formal, or informal, dis-
crimination if, for example, leading positions imply fierce competi-
tion and a variable and risky payment, and this causes women to be
relatively less inclined to aim for these positions than men. A small,
but growing, body of research has also associated these preferences
with the gender gap in labor market outcomes (See for example
Dohmen et al., 2011; Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde,
2007; Flory, Leibbrandt, & List, 2010; Fortin, 2008).
This chapter aims at reviewing the existing experimental litera-
ture on gender differences in preferences in one of these areas, eco-
nomic risk behavior, while drawing on research in economics and
other fields to try to tease out part of the answer to why this gen-
der gap is observed. In addition to the explanations of the observed
gender gap more commonly proposed in economics, we will pay
particular attention to the importance of emotions as a potential
mechanism driving gender differences in risk behavior.2 Since the
2 Many other mechanisms may cause gender differences in economic behavior,
and emotions may themselves be the result of other underlying factors. For
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behavioral revolution in economics in the 1980s, important progress
has been made to incorporate emotions into an economic frame-
work by a number of scholars (see for example Loewenstein, 2000,
or Rick & Loewenstein, 2008 for an introduction to this literature).
Still, in spite of the rise in the number of studies investigating emo-
tions as a motivator for behavior (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Weber
& Johnson, 2009), the role of emotions in economic choices is in
need of further research.
Standard economic theory assumes that individuals have stable
preferences over outcomes and choose actions so as to maximize
their utility. However, more recent studies indicate that preferences
at least to some extent are endogenous, and that varying emotional
states may induce different economic choices. For example, Ariely
and Loewenstein (2006) and Wilson and Daly (2003) study how
preferences are influenced by sexual motivation and find that this
has implications for moral behavior as well as risky behavior and
patience. The importance of emotions for economic choices has also
been put forward by for example Bowles and Gintis (2003) and Frank
(2004) who argue that emotions can be viewed as “commitment
devices” in that they trigger the expected (social) behavior. This
implies that individuals adhere to a social norm not only because
they fear punishment by others in society, but also because norms
are internalized, and violating a norm causes negative emotions such
as shame, guilt and regret.
Thus, to the extent that women and men exhibit different emo-
tional response to context, actions or outcomes, emotions may be
an important explanatory factor to gender differences in economic
preferences that has received little interest thus far. This may be
example, a growing literature investigates the genetic and hormonal influence,
as well as the interplay between genetic and environmental factors, on gender
differences in mood and behavior. Although we consider this research very
promising, it will not be covered in this chapter. In addition, insights from
developmental psychology may provide important clues to the mechanisms
behind the gender gap observed among adultsby shedding light on the develop-
ment of the gender gap among children and adolescents. In this chapter we
will just briefly touch upon some economic studies on children and adoles-
cents as a comparison to the literature using adult participants.
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particularly relevant for gender differences in contexts where norms
are gender specific and emotions are likely to trigger different
behavioral response among men and women. This idea has for ex-
ample been introduced in economics through the concept of iden-
tity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2
below reviews the existing literature on gender differences in risk
behavior. Section 3 discusses the potential explanations for this. The
chapter then ends with a summary in section 4.
2. Gender differences in risk aversion
Most economic decisions involve risk in some way and financial
risk behavior has received a lot of interest in behavioral economics.
In its most stylized form, attitudes to risk are studied in the labora-
tory, and are typically measured through a series of real or hypo-
thetical binary choices that systematically vary the risk (the varia-
tion in payoff). For example, individuals may decide between two
small stake gambles, where each gamble presents two possible
payoffs realized with known probabilities. One of the two gambles
may have a larger expected payoff, but simultaneously present a
larger risk through a larger variation in the final payoff possibilities.
In a similar way, participants may also decide between a small stake
gamble with known probabilities and a safe option where the pro-
posed sum is realized with certainty. The average individual is risk
averse, meaning that in the latter case, for example, most individu-
als prefer a safe option in comparison to a gamble with a similar
expected value, but with a larger variation in payoffs. The higher
the certainty equivalent, i. e. the higher the safe amount is that an
individual views as equally desirable as a specific gamble, the less
risk averse that individual is considered to be.
The large experimental literature on gender differences in risk
behavior has recently been reviewed in Eckel and Grossman (2008a)
and Croson and Gneezy (2009). Together they find a large majority
137Gender Differences in Risk Aversion – The Role of Emotions
of studies indicating that men have a higher propensity to make risky
choices than women, both in incentivized and hypothetical tasks.
For example, Levin, Snyder, and Chapman (1988) asked students
about their hypothetical willingness to take each out of 18 different
gambles. They find that men, on average, respond positively to a
larger share of gambles than women. Similarly, Eckel and Grossman
(2002, 2008c) find that men enter into a larger share of incentivized
gambles, both in the gain and loss domain, in comparison to women.
In a more recent paper, Charness and Gneezy (2012) compare male
and female investment decisions in 15 different studies using the
same investment game. In this game, participants receive a sum of
money and are asked to choose how much of it they wish to invest
in a risky option. The risky option yields a dividend larger than 1
with probability p. With probability 1-p, the money invested is lost.
Any money not invested is kept by the decision-maker. Among the
included studies, ten use students as participants, whereas the re-
maining five report the behavior of a sample of experienced bridge
players, a sample of professional traders, a sample of villagers from
Tanzania and India, as well as two samples of villagers from China.
All of the studies, except the one using behavioral data from Tanza-
nia and India, find that men put a larger share of their initial re-
sources in the risky investment.
Although results are slightly less consistent, studies using less
restricted samples find either no gender differences in risk, or that
men are less risk averse than women. Hartog, Ferrer-I-Carbonell,
and Jonker (2002) elicit hypothetical willingness to pay for differ-
ent high stake gambles in three different surveys, each with a large
number of respondents. Women’s estimated parameter for risk aver-
sion is assessed to be 10–30 % higher than men’s. Also Dohmen et
al. (2011) find a lower risk propensity among women than men in a
large representative sample of the German population. In their study
the participants answer a hypothetical question about their general
risk propensity, and in an accompanying experiment a representa-
tive subsample of 450 individuals also make choices over real stake
gambles. Dohmen et al. (2011) find that self-assessed general risk
propensity predicts actual risk-taking among the individuals in the
sub-sample, and that the gender difference in self-reported risk pro-
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pensity corresponds to about a quarter of a standard deviation. How-
ever, two recent studies looking at gender differences in risk behavior
in a representative sample of 233 Danes (Harrison, Lau, & Rutstrom,
2007), and a representative sample of 1003 Swedes (unpublished
data, Boschini, Dreber, von Essen, Muren, and Ranehill, 2012 ) find
no gender differences. Both Denmark and Sweden score high on
gender equality, but whether this or other reasons lies behind the
observed results remains an open question.
The gender gap in risk behavior further seems robust across ages
(in Western cultures).3 In a sample of 661 Austrian children and
teenagers aged 10–18, Sutter, Kocher, Glätzle-Rüetzler, and Traut-
mann (2013) find that girls are more risk averse than boys. A similar
result is found among Swedish children and youths aged 9–12 and
16–18 years old as well as Colombian children aged 9–12 years old
(Cárdenas, Dreber, von Essen, & Ranehill 2012; Dreber, von Essen
& Ranehill, forthcoming), Dutch youths aged 15–16 (Borghans,
Golsteyn, Heckman, & Meijers 2009), Chinese youths in middle and
high school, on average 15 and 18 years old (Zhang, 2010), as well
as British youths aged 15 years (Booth & Nolen, 2009).
To the best of our knowledge, no study finds that women are
more risk taking than men, but a small number of studies in addition
to those already mentioned find no gender differences, or that the
degree of gender differences in risk aversion varies between con-
texts and groups.4 For example, Holt and Laury (2002) investigate
risk attitudes in binary choices of gambles of different risk. In a low
3 As few studies use non-Western participants, generalizations should be made
cautiously.
4 For additional examples of studies that do not find a gender difference in risk
taking, see Harbaugh et al. (2002), which present 234 individuals ranging from
5–64 years with a choice between real gambles and a safe option. In a similar
study, Levin and Hart (2003) also find no gender differences in risk preferences
in a sample of 5–8 year olds. Contrary to Harbaugh et al. (2002) they find a
gender difference in risk propensity in the loss domain, i.e. when gambles are
framed as losses and not as gains, where boys take more risky choices to avoid
losses than girls. However, gender differences seem less clear in the loss do-
main (see for example Schubert et al. 1999 for a study that finds women to show
a higher risk propensity in the loss domain). Also Almås et al. (2012) find no
gender differences in a sample of 14–15 year old Norwegian youths.
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payoff treatment they find that men have a higher risk propensity.
However, in a high payoff condition, gender differences in risky
choices are no longer present. The size of the gender gap also seems
to vary by environment andculture. In the study by Booth and Nolen
(2009), the authors compare participants from single-sex schools
with participants from mixed-sex schools, and find that girls in sin-
gle-sex schools take on as much risk as boys in mixed or single-sex
schools. Girls from mixed-sex schools, however, are more risk averse
than boys. Further, girls in all girls groups are more risk taking than
girls in mixed groups. These results are also corroborated in a later
study by Booth, Cardona, Sosa, and Nolen (2011). In a controlled
experiment, first year college students were randomly assigned to
all male, all female, or mixed groups. Risk preferences were meas-
ured at the onset of the study, as well as after eight weeks. Although
women made less risky choices at both occasions, women in all
female groups made significantly more risky choices at the latter
stage than women in mixed groups, suggesting that environment
does influence gender differences in behavior. A larger gender gap
is also found among Colombian than among Swedish children in
Cárdenas et al. (2011). A fact that the authors hypothesize arises due
to the larger discrepancy in gender roles and position in the
Columbian society than in the Swedish. Similar results are reported
by Gong and Yang (2012), comparing the gender gap in risk taking
among members of the matrilineal Mosuo and the patriarchal Yi
societies in China. They find that although women in both cultures
are more risk averse than men, the gender gap is smaller among the
Mosuo; a result indicating that gender stereotypes and gender equality
may influence the gender gap in risk behavior.
Results on risk behavior from laboratory experiments have been
questioned on the basis that many studies report evidence from
gambles over relatively small stakes, and that gender differences
found may not generalize to decisions of greater importance. How-
ever, studies on larger stake decisions generally confirm that gender
differences carry over to this domain. According to data, women tend
to make more conservative stock market investments and pension
savings choices than men (see for example Bajtelsmith & Van Derhei,
1997; Bernasek & Shwiff, 2001; Hinz, McCarthy, & Turner, 1997;
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Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Neelakantan, 2010; Sundén & Surette,
1998). This result seems to hold both for married and single women
and remains also when the household financial decision-making
process is taken into account (Bernasek & Shwiff, 2001).5 The same
tendency is also found for the vast majority of choices and environ-
ments documented in earlier surveys in psychology (Byrnes, Miller
& Schafer, 1999). A possible exception to this general result is when
risk preferences are measured outside of the lab in subpopulations
such as professionals and managers. In these populations, gender
differences in risk behavior are found to be attenuated or non-existent
(Atkinson, Baird, & Frye 2003; Birley 1989; Johnson & Powell,
1994; Master & Meier, 1988). It is an open issue whether this is due
to self-selection, adaptive behavior or other factors.
A few explanations to the observed gender differences in finan-
cial risk propensity have been proposed in the literature, most nota-
bly gender differences in financial literacy, confidence, or the emo-
tional response to risky situations. These are discussed below.
3. Why do women take less risk than men?
3.1 Financial literacy
Financial literacy is correlated with economic behavior such as own-
ing stocks or saving for retirement, and women have been found to
be less knowledgeable than men regarding financial issues (Lusardi
and Mitchell 2008, 2011; van Rooij, Lusardi & Alessi 2011). The
discrepancy in financial risk behavior between the genders has also
been found to diminish as financial literacy is taken into account. For
5 With respect to the economic consequences of gendered behavior, studies come
to different conclusions. Barber and Odean (2001) and Agnew et al. (2003)
find that the actual return on the investments made by men and women ap-
pears to be the same. However, Neelakantan (2010) estimate that the gender
difference in risk tolerance accounts for about 10 % of the gender difference in
accumulated wealth.
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example, Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List (2002) study the gender difference
in investment choices among mutual fund investors and find that
gender differences among mutual fund investors are significantly
attenuated when controlling for financial knowledge. A related result
is found in Almenberg and Dreber (2012) in a study examining the
link between financial literacy and stock market participation in a
representative sample of the Swedish population. Controlling for
financial literacy, gender differences in stock market participation
disappears, even though gender differences in reported risk taking
remains. However, while differences in financial knowledge may
explain part of the observed gender gap in for example stock market
participation, it seems more difficult to explain the observed gender
difference pertaining to simple choices over different risky options
with known probabilities so often found in experimental studies.
3.2 Overconfidence
Gender differences in risk propensity have also been discussed in
the light of gender differences in overconfidence (see e. g. Bertrand,
2010; Croson & Gneezy, 2009). In this literature, overconfidence
has been measured in different ways, for example as the difference
between actual and self-assessed performance, as well as by meas-
uring perceptions of knowledge accuracy. In the latter case, indi-
viduals are asked to provide a confidence interval in which the true
answer to a factual question, or the individual’s performance, lies.
Overconfidence is then measured as the difference between the ac-
tual error rate and the one predicted by the confidence interval. If
men are more overconfident, and systematically overestimate their
performance or knowledge relative to women, this may lead to gen-
der differences in risk taking in areas where the outcome depends,
or is perceived to depend, on own ability or judgment.6
6 See however Cesarini et al. (2006) who presents a critique against the interval
estimation task as a good measurement of overconfidence. They find that us-
ing frequencies and monetary incentives reduces overconfidence by approxi-
mately 65 %.
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The general result found in this literature is that both men and
women are overconfident, but that men tend to be more so (see
Bengtsson, Persson, & Willenhag, 2005; Deaux & Farris, 1997; Estes
& Hosseini, 1988; Lundeberg, Fox, & Punccohar, 1994; Soll &
Klayman 2004).7 Furthermore, there are indications that gender dif-
ferences are the greatest in masculine tasks and during situations of
greater uncertainty (Beyer, 1990; Beyer and Bowden, 1997; Correll,
2001; Deaux and Farris, 1997; Lundeberg et al. 1994). Pertaining to
financial risk taking, men have been found more confident than
women in the realm of investment knowledge (Bhandari & Deaves,
2006) and theoretical and empirical research has associated over-
confidence with higher risk taking and larger trading volumes (Bar-
ber and Odean, 2001; Deaves, Luders, & Lou, 2009; Glaser & We-
ber, 2007; Odean, 1998).8 However, also in this case it seems difficult
to argue that gender differences in overconfidence explain the gen-
der gap in risky choices in controlled experiments in the laboratory.
3.3 Emotions
In addition to financial knowledge and overconfidence, gender dif-
ferences in emotional reactions have lately been proposed as an ex-
planation to the observed gender gap in risk behavior. For a long
time, economists viewed choices under risk and uncertainty as a
cognitive activity. Individuals were assumed to evaluate the conse-
quences of different outcomes and associated probabilities (with or
without subjectivity and errors), and to arrive at a decision through
an expected utility framework. Later research underlines the impor-
tance of emotions as an integral part of the decision-making process
and, on the contrary, that the absence of emotional reactions may
7 Some recent papers on Swedish data slightly modify this picture by finding
that both boys and girls sometimes are underconfident, or that girls sometimes
are underconfident and boys overconfident, and that this pattern may depend
on the task on which the judgments are based. See also Cesarini et al. (2006)
who do not find a gender difference in confidence.
8 Deaves et al. (2008) find that overconfidence generates more trade, but fail to
find significant gender differences in overconfidence.
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significantly impair risky decision-making (See Damasio, 1994; and
Peters & Slovic, 2000, for some early contributions to this litera-
ture. See also Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001, for an
overview of early literature pertaining to emotions and risky decision-
making in particular). Emotions may influence decision-making
under risk in many ways. Emotional reactions may for example in-
fluence the perceived value attached to a particular outcome, or the
perceived probabilities associated with it. Previous literature sug-
gests that both processes may occur (Weber & Johnson, 2009).
Gender differences in the perception of probability
Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) assessed risk taking and the percep-
tion of risk associated with five different domains (financial, health/
safety, recreational, ethical and social). The authors found that women
stated that they were more risk averse, and reported higher perceived
risk in all domains except social risk. A similar result is found in
Harris, Jenkins, and Glaser (2006) who find that women judge nega-
tive effects as more likely to occur in relation to risky behavior per-
taining to gambling, health and recreational domains, but not the
social domain. Slovic (1999) proposes one explanation to this phe-
nomenon. Discussing the psychological aspects of risk in general,
he pointed out that social status, power and perspective may influ-
ence the perception of risk. Individual heterogeneity in risk percep-
tion may depend on the perception of risk as controllable or not.
When risk is perceived as controllable, feelings associated with the
specific risk factor are less discomforting. In relation to the result in
Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz (1994)9, who found that the lower risk
perception of white men in comparison to black women and men as
well as white women is mainly driven by a sample of 30 % well
educated and conservative males with high incomes, Slovic (1999)
proposed that white males may judge many societal and technical
9 A similar result is found in Finucane et al. (2000), who find that white males
in the US judge different hazards to pose lower risks than other groups.  See
also Olofsson and Rashid (2011) for a recent discussion of the “white male
effect”.
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risks as inferior as they “create, manage, control, and benefit from
many of the major technologies and activities”.
Gender differences in emotions attached to risky choices
and their outcomes
Previous studiesin psychologyhave also proposed that women ex-
perience stronger emotional reactions than men to outcomes in gen-
eral (Harshman & Paivio, 1987; Simon & Nath, 2004). Drawing on
this, Eriksson and Simpson  (2010) suggest that the structure of risky
situations, where the probability of a negative outcome is often much
larger than that of a positive outcome, simply leaves more scope for
negative affect to guide a decision. They therefore hypothesize that
while women experience a stronger emotional response both to a
win and a loss, only negative affect pertaining to loosing will medi-
ate decisions to join for example a lottery. In a sample of 840 indi-
viduals recruited at an online labor market, they find support for
these hypotheses; gender differences in the negative emotion asso-
ciated with a loss explains about a third of the gender differences in
entering a lottery. Positive emotions associated with a win do not
explain any share of the gender gap in behavior.
It has also been proposed that men and women experience dif-
ferent affective reactions to negative outcomes in particular. Women
report more nervousness and fear than men when anticipating nega-
tive scenarios (Brody, 1993; Fujita, Diener, & Sandvik, 1991), and
research indicates that different emotional reactions may cause men
(via anger) to under-weight risky outcomes, and women (via fear)
to over-weight risky outcomes (Grossman & Wood, 1993; Lerner,
Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). In the aftermath of Septem-
ber 11th, Lerner et al. (2003) investigated how the emotional response
to the tragic events influenced risk perceptions associated with future
attacks in a representative sample of Americans. The experiment
studied both naturally occurring and induced emotions, and found
that male Americans expressed less pessimism after September 11th
than women. Controlling for emotions (men experienced more an-
ger and women experienced more fear) explained 60–80 % of the
variance in gender differences across all risks.
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Another strand of research suggests that men and women differ
in their assessment of success and failure. Whereas men are more
likely to view a failure as the result of bad luck, and a success as a
result of their own ability, women have a higher propensity to attri-
bute failure to lack of ability and success as a result of luck (Ryckman
& Peckham, 1987; Stipek & Gralinski, 1991). Risky decisions with
an outcome related to own ability, such as for example investment
decisions, may thus imply higher personal costs and lower benefits
for women than men. Further, risky situations may have different
implications for male and female identity. Challenges have been pro-
posed to present more ego-involved situations that better corresponds
to male motivation than female (Block, 1983). In a similar argu-
mentation, Arch (1993) proposes that men see risky situations as
challenges that encourage participation, whereas women understand
them as a threat encouraging avoidance.
Gender differences in mood
Emotions unrelated to a specific judgment, or decision, have also been
shown to influence choice (Weber & Johnson, 2009). For example,
it has been found that a specific emotional state increase the fre-
quency estimates of unrelated events with a similar affective conno-
tation (see references in Lerner & Keltner, 2001). This suggests that
risky decision-making may be shaped by individual differences in
affective processing and the propensity to experience a specific emo-
tional state. Lerner and Keltner (2001) test the implication on risky
decision-making by two emotions; fear and anger. Their results cor-
roborate this reasoning; fearful people make pessimistic risk assess-
ments, whereas angry people make positive risk assessments. A simi-
lar result is found in a number of other studies. Anger has been related
to an increased tendency to feel optimistic and less vulnerable, and
to perceive situations as predictable and under individual control
(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Quigley & Tedeschi, 1998). Anxiety,
on the other hand, causes increased focus on threat-related informa-
tion and a more pessimistic interpretation of ambiguity (Bar-Heim,
Lamy, & Glickman, 2005; Gu, Ge, Jiang, & Luo, 2010) and feelings
of little control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1895). Later research confirms
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these findings in both financial and non-financial situations, show-
ing that anxious people have a lower propensity to make risky choices
compared to less anxious people (Maner et al. 2006) and that happy
and angry people have a higher propensity to make risky choices
than sad people (Au, Chan, Wang, Vertinsky, 2003; Chou, Lee, &
Ho, 2007; Gambetti & Giusberti 2012).10 To the extent that men and
women differ on the traits that enhance our perception of risk, we
would thus also expect differences in risk propensity by men and
women. It is, for example, well established that women suffer from
more anxiety, and anxiety disorders, than men (Craske, 2003).
4. Summary
In sum, a large majority of studies find that women take on less
economic risk than men, and that this effect seems robust across
incentivized and hypothetical tasks, high or low stakes, andage.
However, the gender gap in risk behavior seems the most robust in
laboratory studies using students as participants. Only small differ-
ences or no differences at all, are found in some subgroups of the
general population, most notably managers and professionals. This
may be partly explained by knowledge disparities between genders
pertaining to financial literacy or to gender differences in confidence.
Further, the size of the gender gap in risk preferences seems to vary
with culture and environment. Though more research is needed, these
results seem largely consistent with the proposition that the gender
gap in financial risk behavior decreases as gender equality increases.
Empirical studies also suggest that women perceive risks as
greater than men and judge the consequences of negative outcomes
as more severe, both when it comes to financial gambles as well as
other types of risky situations (with the exception of social risk tak-
10 In the study by Au et al. (2003) traders in financial markets who were induced
to a good mood were found to be more overconfident, and to take on more risk
than traders induced to a bad mood.
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ing). Further, it has been found that women experience stronger nega-
tive affect in response to negative outcomes. The relatively greater
tendency by women to react by fear and by men to react by anger to
uncertainty may also cause the genders to make different risk as-
sessments. This finding is related to the result that individuals who
are prone to experience negative emotions such as fear or anxiety,
are also less likely to take on risk. Finally, a small body of research
suggests that gender differences in risk taking are influenced by g
male and female relative status. Having a higher social status as a
group, men also exert a higher control and may thus perceive risks
as more manageable.
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Q&A Box: Eva Ranehill and Anne Boschini
Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from – socialization and culture or biological differences
between women and men?
As always, the answer to this question is that gender differences probably come
a little bit from both nature and nurture, and importantly, that nature and nurture
constantly influence each other. What we think is interesting at the moment is
that new ideas and technologies allow us to pin down the mechanisms influenc-
ing preferences and emotions to a higher degree than before, for example through
hormonal, genetic or neurological studies. However the nature/nurture debate is
likely to be around for quite some time.
Where do you see the field of gender and emotions going in the
next 20 years?
With a background in behavioral economics, we see two main directions for future
research, and this development is already ongoing. First, we think researchers will
look more closely at the economic importance of individual preferences (and thus
also gender differences in preferences and emotions) for market behavior, and thus,
their impact on “real” individual economic outcomes. Second, better and better
experimental paradigms using techniques from other disciplines will also be
developed to dig deeper and understand more about the mechanisms behind gender
differences that we see in economic decision-making.
What is the finding on gender differences (or lack of, thereof ) that
surprised you the most in your own research?
It is probably easier to remember and sort (and maybe to publish) results on
gender differences that report clear differences and which are easy to interpret.
However, the results of our research on gender differences in economic prefer-
ences are less consistent with common perceptions than we expected. For exam-
ple, together with the coauthors we expected gender differences to be smaller in
a more gender-neutral country such as Sweden, in comparison to, for example, a
country like Colombia. However, whereas this was the case according to some
measures, it was not true in others, and in particular not when it came to confi-
dence or to competitiveness measured through self-selection into competitive
schemes vs piece-rate schemes. Another thing that surprised us was that we can-
not confirm the established result of a gender difference in risk taking in a large
representative sample of about 1000 Swedes.
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7. Gender and Shame: A Philosophical Perspective
RAFFAELE RODOGNO
This entry aims to offer a critical summary of philosophical research at the
intersection of gender studies and the particular emotion of shame. Among
the emotions, shame attracts particular interest from philosophers interested
in gender studies who have primarily focused on the various facets of the
oppression and domination of women by men. In this context, shame is often
considered as part of the phenomenology of oppression. As a result of the
subordinated position of women in society, shame is gender-specific in at
least two important senses, which will be the object of this entry. In the first
sense, women are more shame-prone than men. This idea will be the object of
Section 2. In the other more radical sense, shame is experienced and there-
fore conceptualized rather differently by different genders due to the different
social positions they tend to occupy. This idea will be the object of Section 3.
1. Introduction
Philosophy was an early contributor to research at the intersection
between the emotions and gender studies. Already in 1949, Simone
de Beauvoir claimed that gender-specific norms on emotional expe-
rience and expression are a standard means of maintaining inequal-
ity among the sexes in many cultures. This entry aims to offer a
critical summary of philosophical research at the intersection of gen-
der studies and the particular emotion of shame. Among the emo-
tions, shame attracts particular interest from philosophers interested
in gender studies who have primarily focused on the various facets
of the oppression and domination of women by men.1
1 This sentence should not be read as meaning the oppression and domination are in
all or even most instances actively pursued by men. Also, for the purposes of this
entry, ‘woman’ and ‘man’ refer to a particular gender as much as to a particular sex.
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In this context, shame is often considered as part of the phe-
nomenology of oppression. As a result of the subordinated position
of women in society, shame is gender-specific in at least two impor-
tant senses, which will be the object of this entry. In the first sense,
women are more shame-prone than men. This idea will be the object
of Section 2. In the other more radical sense, shame is experienced
and therefore conceptualized rather differently by different genders
due to the different social positions they tend to occupy. This idea
will be the object of Section 3.
2. Gender-specificity as shame-proneness
The claim here is to the effect that women are more shame-prone
than men. Greater shame-proneness may in turn be understood in
terms of (a) higher-frequency and stronger intensity – women typi-
cally undergo more episodes of shame than men – and/or (b) a more
diversified intentionality – there are more particular objects that
occasion shame in women as there are in men.2 Whether any of
these gender-specific trends is true is an empirical question that has
enjoyed a variety of answers in the recent debate. If any of them
turned out to be true, the question of their origin, biological and/or
cultural, would need to be addressed. Let us briefly present the rel-
evant literature in psychology with regard to (a) and (b) respectively.
For quite some time after Helen Block Lewis’s influential Shame
and guilt in neurosis (1971), the evidence was expected to show more
frequent and intense episodes of shame for women. Lewis argued
that guilt and shame represent distinct modes of perceiving and ex-
periencing information about the self that are congruent with gender-
linked differences in socialization. According to her, females would
be more likely to develop a shame-prone affective style than men due
2 Lehtinen (1998, 61) believes women are more shame-prone in these two senses.
She also believes that the more extensive proneness indicates conceptual speci-
ficity; shame signifies something different to socially subordinate individuals.
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to (1) socialization experiences that promote field-dependent cogni-
tive styles in many females and (2) the fact that such cognitive ori-
entation increases girls’ susceptibility to other pressures from the
environment to conform to a traditionally feminine and passive view
of the self. Through accumulated experience, the development of
strong ego boundaries is impeded and females are taught to use in-
ternalizing mechanisms to defend the “self.” It is the repeated ten-
dency by females to internalize feelings of hostility and anxiety that
ultimately leads to the development of a shame-prone style.3
Lewis’ influential work in clinical psychology was only part of
the explanation for the expectation of a greater vulnerability of
women to shame. The literature on gender-role stereotypes and
socialization of emotion in boys and girls suggest that Western soci-
ety expects women to experience and express shame much more so
than men, in part because of women’s greater access to, and lesser
denial of, many of their painful feelings (Brody, 1997, 1999). In
addition, there is a significant overlap between the way children and
adults stereotype women more than men – self-effacing, deferent,
dependent, meek, and passive (e. g. Antill, 1987; Best & Williams,
1993) – and the way that influential psychologists such as Tangney
(1995) describe experiences of shame – feeling exposed, small,
worthless, passive, and unable. Socialization of boys and girls is
also taken to be relevant in sensitizing women to shame-prone reac-
tions. In various contexts girls are more frequently criticized by adults
for their failures, where the criticism is directed more globally at
their lack of competence as opposed to boys who are criticized less
and in a more specific or situationally focused manner. (e. g.,
Alessandri & Lewis, 1993, 1996; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; M. Lewis
1992) This is in line with H. Block Lewis’ work, who introduced a
now widely accepted distinction between shame and guilt accord-
ing to which shame consists in the subject’s negative appraisal of
the self as a whole (“I am bad”) as opposed to local negative self-
appraisal for guilt (“I have done something wrong”).
3 I have borrowed here from Ferguson and Crowley’s (1997, 21) summary of
Lewis. We must note that Lewis’ argument rests on some psychoanalytic
assumptions accepted only within psychoanalysis.
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Reviewing most of the relevant literature since Lewis (1971),
however, Ferguson and Eyre (2000) concluded that the expected
greater vulnerability to shame of women was consistently found
only in studies using scenario-based assessments of the shame con-
struct, such as the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory
(Tangney, 1990), and its successors the TOSCA (Tangney, Wagner,
& Gramzow, 1989) and the TOSCA-2 (Tangney, Ferguson, Wagner,
Crowley, & Gramzow, 1996). Researchers using a variety of other
methods inconsistently found the anticipated gender difference in
shame (Brody, 1993, 1999; Cook, 1996; Ferguson, Stegge, Miller,
& Olsen, 1999; Harder, 1990, 1995; Harder, Cutler, & Rockart, 1992;
Izard, 1977; Mills, Pedersen, & Grusec, 1989). In fact, in some cases
(e. g., on frequency measures; cf. Harder, 1995) men actually report
greater shame than women.
Ferguson and Eyre (2000) asked why only scenario-based as-
sessments of shame, but not other procedures, consistently revealed
the expected gender difference in line with Lewis (1971). They ar-
gued that an unwanted identity is the quintessential elicitor of in-
tense shame reactions, which others variously refer to as an anti-
ideal self-image or “dreaded self” (Lindsay-Hartz, de-Rivera, &
Mascolo, 1995; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Olthof et al. 2004). People
perceive themselves as possessing an unwanted identity when they
self-attribute, or when they perceive others ascribing to them, a char-
acteristic that undermines their self-ideals (e. g., Crozier, 1998).
Ferguson and Eyre then argued that many of the hypothetical situa-
tions used in the TOSCAs or SCAAIs measures possibly represent
much greater unwanted identities for women than men. Many of
these instruments present participants with hypothetical scenarios
in which, among other behaviors, the protagonist engages in fairly
assertive and sometimes downright relationally aggressive or inter-
personally insensitive/disrespectful actions. The literature generally
shows that such behaviors and attitudes are differentially appropri-
ate for men as opposed to women. Peers reject girls for being both
relationally and overtly aggressive (e. g., Crick et al. 1999). Moreo-
ver, although peers will reject boys who are consistently aggressive,
peers and adults less negatively evaluate boys’ relative to girls’ iso-
lated acts of overt aggression, misbehavior, or negativism (Zahn-
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Waxler, 2000). Mothers also actively encourage boys more than girls
to respond in kind to anger provocations with their own anger and
retaliation (Brody, 1996; Zahn-Waxler, 2000), and in addition, boys
actually expect mothers to react more warmly to them when they
express anger rather than sadness (Brody, 1996; Fuchs & Thelen,
1988). It is not surprising, then, that when responding to hypotheti-
cal scenarios that involve inappropriate behavior and attitudes for
women but not for men, women are likelier to respond with more
shame (both in frequency and intensity) than men.4
Ferguson, Eyre, and Ashbaker (2000) have confirmed this con-
clusion by devising a study in which the scripts of the scenarios were
rewritten to tap identity concerns either more common to men (situ-
ations that clearly violate known identity concerns of many men,
such as the desire to be agentic, independent or autonomous, physi-
cally strong, and emotionally stoic) or more common to women (situa-
tions that represent violations of traditionally prescribed behaviors
or attitudes in women, such as being responsible, being responsive to
others’ needs, being helpful, loyal, nurturant, or caring, as well as
being aware of their obligations and attachments to others, connected
to them, and interpersonally sensitive). As expected, the frequency
and intensity of shame is greater for men in the first type of scenarios
and in women in the second. All in all, then, and contrary to theoreti-
cal expectations, there is not enough evidence to support the claim
that women are more shame-prone than men in sense (a).
Some of the results reviewed so far are also relevant to the sec-
ond meaning of gender-specific shame-proneness: the more diversi-
fied intentionality of shame. Although it transpires from these studies
that different particular objects occasion shame in women as op-
posed to men, it has by no means been established that there are
more such objects nor that women typically undergo more episodes
of more intense shame. In neither of these two understandings, (a)
or (b), is shame gender-specific. This conclusion is not in line with
that part of feminist thinking (Bartky 1990; Lehtinen 1998; Manion
2003; Locke 2007) that takes a greater vulnerability of women to
shame for granted. The empirical evidence is however favourable to
4 I have borrowed here from Ferguson, Eyre, and Ashbaker (2000, 135–136).
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the claim that women and men, through processes of socialization,
internalize distinct identity concerns or ideals and, given the con-
nection between shame and identity, as a result the intentionality of
shame is gender-specific.
3. Shame as a gender-specific experience and concept
The claim that shame is gender-specific may take the following
stronger meaning: women and those in social circumstances similar
to them conceptualize – understand, know about, and react to – shame
differently than men do. The idea is that social position and, in par-
ticular, being in a dominant or subordinated position, differentially
affects the way individuals experience and conceptualize emotions,
including shame. Given that women and men tend respectively to
occupy subordinated and dominating positions in society, we can
expect them to have different experiences and conceptions of shame.
Lehtinen (1998) further articulates this idea by means of the follow-
ing argument. (1) The meaning of a concept such as shame is under-
stood criterially (Wittgenstein, 1967). For example, pain behaviour
is a criterion (partially defines the meaning) of pain.5 (2) Know-
ledge of the criteria of shame is formed by social identity. (3) Women,
as a subordinated group, have a significantly different social iden-
tity than men or members of the dominant group. (4) Women con-
ceptualize, understand, or know about shame differently than men.6
In particular the dominant theories of shame have been devised
by individuals whose identity was not formed by “the characteristic
5 Criteria are circumstance-dependent and empirically defeasible. Hence, while
during a theatrical representation we will not take the actor’s moaning as
signifying that he feels pain, in the appropriate circumstances, say, in the
immediate aftermath of a serious car accident, we cannot doubt that a person
who is moaning actually feels pain.
6 This is a rather impoverished version of the argument and does not do full
justice to Lehtinen’s original version. For our purposes, however, there will
be no need to include more details.
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sorts of psychological oppression on which modern hierarchies of
class, race, and gender rely so heavily.” (Bartky, 1990, 97; Lehtinen
1998, 62) Such individuals will at best experience shame as an epi-
sodic adverse assessment of self, a sudden “blip across the face of an
otherwise undisturbed consciousness” (Bartky, 1990, 96). Although
painful and unpleasant, for such individuals shame can form an oc-
casion for moral reaffirmation; it can be salutary. For the socially
subordinate individual, however, who has partly internalized the low
evaluation of herself or himself, of “people of her or his kind,” “shame
is not so much a particular feeling or emotion […] as a pervasive
affective atonement to the social environment.” (Bartky, 1990, 85).
The episodic experiences, the particular feelings of shame of the subordinate
are more seldom salutary than they are for the privileged individual […] [T]hey
are unconstructive and self-destructive; and they function as confirmations of
what the agent knew all along – that she or he was a person of lesser worth.
(Lethinen, 1998, 62).
Though salutary episodes of shame are not impossible for them,
“Pervasive, low self-esteem stemming from routinized shaming or
derogation makes it hard for them to distinguish between justified
and unjustified instances of shame.” (Lehtinen, 1998, 71, note 13)
Such pervasive and dispositional shame is left unconsidered, often not regarded
as “shame proper,” in prevalent models of shame. These models often […] take
for granted […] that the relation between shaming and shame is contingent; the
moral agent is autonomously free – has a privilege – either to internalize or to
defy the episodic dis-esteem and de-evaluation. (Lehtinen, 1998, 62)
From these passages, I shall highlight two aspects that allegedly de-
marcate gender-specific conceptualizations of shame: episodic as
opposed to dispositional shame and autonomous as opposed to hetero-
nomous shame. In particular, given the “dominant” standpoint of
shame theorists, theories of shame would typically conceptualize
shame as episodic that are free or autonomous: subjects who undergo
episodes of shame can typically resist experiencing the de-evaluation
implicit in shaming and shame if they decide to do so. The point,
however, is that subordinated women do not have such freedom:
when shamed they simply give in to shame. What is more, shame is
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for them a protracted experience as opposed to an occurring one. The
difference here is that between Erfahrung, or more general, enduring
and protracted experiences such as “life experiences,” on the one
hand, and Erlebnis and episodic or occurrent experiences such as
“inner experiences,” “mental states, events, or processes” (Lehtinen,
1998, 64–65) on the other hand. Let us say a few words on both
aspects in turn, beginning with the autonomy/heteronomy question.
Though there are those who think shame is not heteronomous in
any deep or interesting sense (Rawls, 1971; Deonna & Teroni, forth-
coming), this view is by no means the dominant view. It is rather
generally recognized by both philosophers and psychologists that
shame is a heteronomous (Lamb, 1983; Kekes, 1988; Williams, 1994;
Wolheim, 1999; Smith et al., 2002; Calhoun, 2004) emotion in the
sense that it may be elicited by negative evaluations of the self that do
not initially originate in the subject and with which the subject actu-
ally disagrees. An emotion such as fear may also include an evaluation
with which the subject disagrees. I may experience fear of this spider,
and hence at some level cognize or evaluate this spider as dangerous,
while at the same time judging the spider to be harmless. The difference
between shame and fear, however, would rest in the fact that while
many consider the fear episode just described as inappropriate, un-
fitting, or irrational, heteronomous instances of shame are not gener-
ally considered as inappropriate, irrational, or unfitting. It is because
of this particular aspect of shame that some philosophers are tempted
to disqualify it as a moral emotion (Lamb 1983; Kekes, 1988).7
Note that the debate about the heteronomous nature of shame has
been largely conducted from outside the perspective of subordinated
women and feminist theory. It would seem that many “dominant”
theorists of shame have themselves experienced and conceptualized
the alleged heteronomous nature of shame in the same way as femi-
nist thinkers. This suggests that there is no clear divide between
autonomous/heteronomous shame along gender lines (or social posi-
tion). Heteronomy is a gender-neutral alleged feature of shame. Lehti-
nen (1998) may yet insist that subordinated groups will mostly expe-
7 Not everyone claims that shame is heteronomous. See Deonna and Teroni (2008) for
an account that shows that shame when heteronomous is so only on the surface.
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rience heteronomous shame as opposed to autonomous shame. That
would be an interesting claim about gender specificity only if, at the
same time, (dominating) men experience significantly less heterono-
mous shame than women. This, however, is an empirical hypothesis
that for the moment has no answer. What is more, even if confirmed,
this type of gender specificity does not show a different conceptualiza-
tion of shame across genders but, more modestly, a different distri-
bution of shame episodes across genders, the explanation of which
may indeed be rather important from the point of view of gender
studies. The difference may be due to the fact that, as a group, women
are more likely than men to be shamed and thus on the whole more
likely to feel heteronomous shame even though they are not more
prone to feel it than other groups. Alternatively, we may perhaps
hypothesize that a greater proportion of women than men will react
with heteronomous shame when shamed because boys more than
girls are socialized to respond in kind to anger provocations with
their own anger and retaliation (Brody, 1996; Zahn-Waxler, 2000).
The conclusions drawn in the last paragraph may be thought
unwise for failing to consider the heteronomous nature of shame for
women in connection with its dispositional nature for women. The
argument just presented was conducted at the episodic level. How-
ever, the heteronomous shame of women, the objection would go,
should not be studied at the episodic level, for “shame is not so much
a particular feeling or emotion […] as a pervasive affective atonement
to the social environment.” (Bartky, 1990, 85). If this particular ‘affec-
tive atonement’ is what shame consists in for subordinate women, then
it is indeed something quite different than what it is for dominant men.
I doubt, however, that the protracted state just described can be
plausibly considered as a form of shame. Philosophers and psycholo-
gists typically understand shame as well as most other emotions
either as a short-lived emotional episode, or as a disposition (the
sense of shame), or in terms of proneness, as in “shame-proneness”.8
8 The sense of shame is that out of which a person may refrain from doing
something that she considers shameful. Any individual may have a sense of
shame without at the time same time (a) being shame-prone in the sense dis-
cussed in Section 2 or (b) undergoing an occurrence of shame.
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In none of these senses is shame the protracted type of experience
referred to above, nor a fortiori is it something “also passed on from
one generation to the next.” (Woodward, 2000, 218) It just seems that
the category of “protracted or enduring experience” does not quite
apply to emotions. As Lehtinen (1998, 65–66) acknowledges, a dis-
position to feel shame must be punctuated by shame episodes. To be
identified as such, these must include a certain phenomenology, such
as blushing and wanting to disappear. Does the protracted “pervasive
affective atonement” of shame involve such a phenomenology in an
uninterrupted way? If it does, one can safely assume that shame is
what is at issue. Yet, it is unlikely that this is what Bartky (1990) or
Lehtinen (1998) have in mind, for it is hard to imagine that women
are experiencing such protracted blushing and desire to disappear.
Of course, there is a sense in which the disposition to feel shame
with regard to matters pertaining to one’s gender is an enduring form
of shame, and as such is perfectly compatible with the episodic and
dispositional senses familiar from the literature. A person’s shame is
enduring in this sense if she undergoes recurrent episodes – perhaps
of a marked intensity – in response to the same particular object. The
reason why the episodes in question are so recurrent may or may not
have to do with the person’s specific affective style, e. g. a pronounced
shame-proneness. In the debate that concerns us, however, these
episodes are connected to the relevant social circumstances and, in
particular, to the fact that others, generally in positions of power,
repeatedly and successfully elicit shame in the subject with regard to
some particular feature she and people of her kind embody.
In short, I have been arguing that there is no gender-specific
form of shame in the sense defined in this section because heter-
onomy is a gender-neutral alleged feature of shame and because
neither shame, nor any other emotion, can be understood in terms of
the protracted experience envisaged by some theorists. To say this
much is not to deny that theorists such as Bartky and Lehtinen are
describing a real phenomenon, well worthy of our attention. As ar-
gued elsewhere (Deonna, Rodogno, Teroni 2011, Ch. 8), however,
this phenomenon is best referred to as “stigma” and/or “being stig-




In conclusion, there is not sufficient reason to think that shame is
gender-specific in either one of the two senses explored above.
Women are not more shame-prone than men, nor is the intentional-
ity of shame richer or more extended for women than it is for men. It
is clear, however, that due to various processes of socialization, the
intentionality of shame differs across the sexes and may do so in a
way that is unfair or unjust to women. It is also unclear that shame is
gender-specific with regard to its heteronomy and dispositional na-
ture. Heteronomy is generally considered a feature of shame irrespec-
tive of the gender and/or social position of those who experience it.
As for the phenomenon called “protracted shame”, it would seem
that other non-emotional expressions would be more felicitous in
referring to it.9
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Q&A Box: Raffaele Rodogno
Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from – socialization and culture or biological differences
between women and men?
My answer is circumscribed to the case of shame. The empirical evidence is
favorable to the claim that women and men, through processes of socialization,
internalize distinct identity concerns or ideals and given the connection between
shame and identity it follows that the intentionality of shame i. e., the particular
things we feel ashamed of, is to some extent gender-specific. Due to socialization
and culture there are some differences in the kinds of things that tend to elicit
shame in men and women.
What is the finding on gender differences (or lack of, thereof) that
surprised you the most in your own research?
Rigorous conceptual work and up-to-date empirical psychology together show
that the issue of gender-specificity surrounding the emotion of shame is much
more circumscribed than hitherto thought. In particular, contrary to expecta-
tions, women are not clearly more prone to episodes of shame than men, nor is
there reason to think that they experience shame in ways that are fundamentally
different from men.
What should everybody know about gender differences in emo-
tion? What are, in your view, the most important findings in this
literature so far?
Interdisciplinary work at the intersection between gender and the particular emo-
tion of shame brings to light the importance of carefully defining the terms.
Philosophers studying the gender-specificity of shame may not be studying the
same phenomenon as their colleagues from psychology. Even when these
definitional issues are straightened out, however, one trend seems to emerge:
gender-specificity is a matter of socialization and to that extent conditional to
the social position occupied by various individuals. This is clearly a momentous
conclusion with regard to its applied consequences. If, due to socialization, dif-
ferent particular objects cause shame in women as opposed to men and we have
reason to think that it would be unjust or morally bad for women to feel shame
with regard to these objects, society can intervene in order to influence the norms
of socialization in the relevant desirable or just way.
Gender and Shame: A Philosophical Perspective

8. Gender and Emotion: An Anthropological and
Historico-Religious Approach (Mesopotamia,
Egypt, Ancient Judaism, Greece, and Rome)
DELPHINE EGGEL
The present review surveys the state of research in the context of the An-
cient world with respect to the issue of gender, more particularly in connec-
tion with emotions. The purpose is to provide a brief picture of research
starting with the initial interest in the aforementioned issue, up to to the real
historiographical turn constituted by the Foucaldian work and the more gen-
eral interest in the issue that emerged in Europe the 1990s. The issue of
gender in the Ancient world relies on our use of ancient sources and docu-
ments that have come down to us and which have to be dealt with much
care and caution. Scholars have to determine with precision the vocabulary
used by the Ancients themselves when dealing with such issues as gender
and emotion, in order to render accessible their mentality or worldview, so-
cial behavior and convention. The issue at task can help us get a better
grasp of Ancient societies. Thus the analysis of suffering, as an emotion,
and the expression of suffering in Ancient sources and documents from the
Mediterranean world, can give us access to the voice of women, and allow
us to have a better picture of gender relations. The literature presented here
wishes to provide those interested in the issue at task a comprehensive
review of works which enable us to access this issue through the eyes of
the Ancients, without the bias of modern categories, and to enter in dia-
logue with them.
The initial interest in gender studies was sparked by the feminist
movement, starting in the 60s. In the academic world, however, one
may want to find the first stirrings of such an enterprise even earlier;
for instance with the ordination of the first female minister, Reverend
Antoinette Brown in 1853 (Encyclopaedia of Religion, 2005, p. 3310).
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But in the field of Classics, the first studies properly conducted
with an interest in the gender problematic were brought about in
English and American universities, the prime example being the
publication in 1990 of Before Sexuality, a collection of essays about
gender and sexuality under the direction of David Halperin, John
Winkler and Froma Zeitlin. This new way of approaching history
was notably inspired by the works of Michel Foucault, especially
his three-volumes Histoire de la sexuallité (1976–1984). As John
Winkler observes in his Constraints of Desire, Foucault described
the notion of the “self”, a distinctively modern construction from
19th and 20th century, as built around sexual characters and desires.
Winkler also notes that since ‘sexuality’ in this sense is a recent
invention, Foucault’s first volume, setting out the thesis about the
nineteenth century’s obsession with speaking about sex, had no
reference to the ancient world. The next volumes, however, reflect
his growing curiosity about how individuals came to inspect their
own states of desire as if their desire were a central problem, and
about the Greco-Roman context in which problems of desire had
not yet been seen as problems of the self  (Winkler, 1990, p. 5).
The researchers specializing in Antiquity whose works were com-
piled in the above-quoted volume of Halperin, Winkler and Zeitlin
then took up the arguments proposed by Foucault in Histoire de la
Sexualité.
In the 90s, studies such as those carried out by Paul Veyne, Eva
Cantarella or Sara Lilja represented in Europe a new point of view
about sexuality in Antiquity1. In the same vein, the research of
Caroline Walker Bynum, Steven Harrell and Paula Richman more
specifically explored the connection established between gender stud-
ies and the field of religion. They noted that “given the scope and
passionate engagement of Gender scholarship in the late twentieth
century and early twenty-first century, it is to be hoped that the task
is taken up with the same commitment to social justice and transfor-
1 For a comprehensive bibliography concerning the study of the feminine body
and its role in the emergence and construction of Christianity, cf. Peter Brown’s
research on the topic (1988), with a very good survey of the influences by the
various trends of monotheistic and pagan religious movements.
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mation that has guided the field from its beginning” (Encyclopedia
of Religion, 2005, 3314–3315). According to the words of Ursula
King in the introduction to her book entitled Religion and Gender:
“Religion cannot be understood without its history and the multi-
layered pluralism through which it has found complex social and
cultural expression” (King, 1995, p. 4). However, the danger of an
overemphasis on feminism sometimes distorts the objective vision
that a researcher must maintain. Despite their considerable attribu-
tions in the field of research on Antiquity, the studies undertaken
seem to continually require redefinitions in order to avoid losing
their logical sense. Numerous interdisciplinary studies can help to
redefine this research, some specializing in Antiquity such as ar-
chaeology, ancient history, papyrology and history of religion. But
specialists in the fields touching on neuroscience, behavioural psy-
chology, medicine and law, explore as well the different layers of
history and add another perspective to studies concerning the rela-
tions between different genders in the past.
Sandra Boehringer, who offers a brief historiography of gender
studies, analyses the pertinence of this field in the context of the
Ancient world. She brings to light the difficulty of thinking about
ancient mentality through modern categories. Indeed, talking about
“sex” when assessing gender in the Ancient world is not pertinent.
The researcher should try to learn how gender and sex work to-
gether in the eyes of the Ancients, and through which emic catego-
ries. The author thus concludes: “studying the ancient systems of
gender allows us both to better understand how people think of Greek
and Roman societies, and to understand the values around which
these societies were built” (Boehringer, Kentron 21, 2005, p. 104–
106). Through this perspective, we are now allowed to consider the
following argumentation. In the field of studies in the ancient world,
as it has been raised by Anne Bielmann, the gender problematic is
connected to the study of women`s participation in public life. This
activity is readable through male and female public actions, dispari-
ties existing in relationship to power depending on sex, the female
specificity definition when accomplishing publics tasks, the social
and family status of women involved on the public stage, and fi-
nally the influence of women on contemporaries and future generations
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(Bielmann, 2003, p. 10). In fact, the idea of defining with precision
the role of each sex/gender and not solely defining that of women in
ancient Mediterranean societies, be it in the “public” or “private”
sphere, determines the turning point in discussions and research in
this domain. However, this perspective in itself raises numerous dif-
ficulties, as we need to determine what the public domain is and
where it ends. Another difficulty arises in the constitution of our
argument. In effect, the sources we currently have at our disposal,
despite the production of other sources such as papyri, inscriptions
and coins (Bielmann, 2003, p. 12), are mainly derived from litera-
ture created and imagined from an essentially masculine point of
view. The line between rigorous research and a mistaken interpreta-
tion of these sources is easily crossed. Given this, a strict methodo-
logy, in addition to a great degree of humility, is necessary for in-
vestigations undertaken at any level.
To define the role of women, or to be more accurate to define
the impression left by women during the Antiquity, the study of
emotional expression seems to be an interesting viewpoint. The an-
thropologists who studied non-European societies were the first to
take an interest in emotion as a social reality:
They discovered in the language the imaginary and social practices this ab-
sence of division between reason and emotion, between soul and body and
at the same time an additional proof of occidental and ethno-centricity in
our old representation and moreover our subject. This explains why construc-
tivism and cognetism have become the epistemological references to study
affectivity and its social implication (Boquet et Nagy, in Ecrire l’histoire 2,
p. 18–19).
When Antiquity began to be viewed from an emotional angle, the
anthropological and historical branches developed a series of studies
analyzing the religious, social, political and even economic inter-
action between the sexes. These works deal with themes such as
marriage and family descent, among others. In Rome, for example,
the studies of Michel Corbier attempt to understand the role of im-
portant female figures in the matrimonial strategies used to gain ac-
cess to power by determining the relationships between these
women and their husbands and the role that these women had.
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2 On women and the representation of their status in ancient Mesopotamia, cf.
the many works of Ascher-Greve (1985; 1998; 2002; 2003).
3 For a more global approach on women in ancient Egypt, cf. most notably
Johnson (1997) on their depiction, Graves-Brown (2008) on their status, and
Rowlandson (1998) for a survey of their situation throughout Egyptian his-
tory.
From another perspective, on the occasion of grieving ceremo-
nies and funerals, there was a variety of public emotional manifesta-
tions. These ritualized emotions implied the participation of all
present and in particular groups of “weepers” which were found all
over the Mediterranean and the ancient Middle Eastern civilizations.
Thus, personal and individual emotion is taken over and manifested
to the point of paroxysm as a result of the ceremony (on this point,
cf the special issue of RHR 225, edited by Philippe Borgeaud). There,
in his article “Ritual expressions of sadness and weeping in ancient
Egyptian mourning,” Youri Volokhine defines emotion, or the rep-
resentation of emotion in Pharaonic Egypt as a codified representa-
tion without any room for the individual. This expression is there-
fore collective. He extends his consideration to ancient groups of
weepers as far the Mediterranean basin and describes it as: “compli-
ant to all ethnological testimony, modern or ancient [...] This exam-
ple”, he adds, “puts us in a theatralized representation, a codified
drama, exploiting behaviour” (Volokhine, in RHR 225 fasc. 2, 185–
186.) On the other hand, as Anne-Caroline Rendu suggests it in “Cri
ou silence: deuil des dieux et des héros dans la littérature mésopota-
mienne” (same special issue of RHR 225, fasc. 2, p. 199–221), we
can also take from ancient writings referring to bereavement and its
consequences that it is possible to find in Mesopotamian2 literature
a complete theme of the emotions expression, male and female. She
adds that: “gestures and attitudes reproduce themselves from one
text to another, suggesting codified emotional demonstrations. De-
spite constraints and stereotyped narrative formulas, stories respond
exactly to the image we had from a person in the grip of affliction,
and we cannot doubt it gives a testimony of the individual and inti-
mate pain in front of death”(A.-C. Rendu, p. 201–202). Through
these two viewpoints, Egyptian3 and Mesopotamian, emotion is
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clearly defined as a tool to understand the individual and the group
in ancient Middle East civilizations4.
In Greece the same picture can be reconstructed. Ritualization
is intended to contain the pathos of mourning. Nicole Loraux has
showed how this “pleasure of tears”, whose most violent expression
is female, theatens politics in its positivity, and how, rejected out-
side of the male political space, it finds a way to manifest itself in
the theatre. When the topic of motherhood is featured in the ancient
Athenian discourse, it is usually understood as the earthy mother-
hood of the fatherland, which defines the autochthonous citizen.
The “mother” is in that case the personified Athenian soil, which
tenderly and gratefully welcomes back in its bosom the children
who were born from it, and then died for it. A human mother’s pain
is not important at this level. In this respect, Nicole Loraux analyses
the difference between the discretion of Athenian tears and the “quiet
joy” shown by the Spartan mother whose son has died gloriously.
This opposition between earthly and womanly motherhood implic-
itly brings us back to the whole of the Athenian representations of
autochthony. In Athens, the Earth confiscates the maternal compo-
nent of public bereavements. Everything is done to keep the female
pain confined indoors, in the domestic sphere (P. Borgeaud, RHR
210 fasc. 3, 1993).
Alongside the question of rituals, ceremonies and representa-
tions, there emerge problems associated with the sphere of the for-
bidden. It is indeed highly interesting to question the definition of
acceptable social behavior that is to be followed, be it in a ritual,
social or judicial context. In the civilizations of Mesopotamia, Egypt,
Greece or even Rome, for example, it is fascinating to analyze the
codes of conduct imposed on either sex. Although it is evident that
the conclusions reached by the male intellect should be accepted
provisionally and seen through a well-adjusted lens, the social con-
ventions established allow us to obtain a view of day-to-day life in
these societies. Only the representation establishing guidelines for
4 For the study of women in ancient Jewish societies, cf. the authoritative books
of Brooke (1992), Frymer-Kensky (1992) and Mayer (1987).
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5 My thanks go to P. Matthey of the University of Geneva as well as to the
whole team of the Myths and Rites (Project 12) research program, directed by
P. Borgeaud of the University of Geneva, for their considerable bibliographi-
cal contributions and their general support. For the translation into English of
the original text, thanks to Anna Nydegger and Philippe Matthey. Special thanks
to Maud Panissod-Harrowsmith and Paul Harrowsmith for their suggestions
and corrections. The remaining mistakes are, of course, mine.
contemporary society remains, and from these we can determine “le
représenté.” In other words, we can determine what females did, or
did not do, through the study of what was expected of them.
In conclusion, in a world where death was an integral part of the
landscape and where individuals were continually confronted by its
presence, women and their body were the most exposed in the strug-
gle against destruction: they were used as a mean to assure the sur-
vival of the Polis and were a barrier against oblivion. Furthermore,
in the emotion area, it seems certain that “theatralization” of the
image allowed a social representation of the woman, but as a con-
cept and not as an individual. Around emotion there was also an
outlined limitation between the public and private sphere, between
the collective and individual expression. An approach that could
help us to define the women as an individual would be archaeology
for instance, observing the use of domestic space or accessories, or
studying funeral epitaphs, which can provide us with demographic
information and perhaps intimate details about the couple. Numis-
matic is also to be considered. These scattered pieces of data can
show us a picture of daily female life, or at least provide us with
some indications of life during Antiquity. Although far from being
exhaustive, the fields mentioned above in the area of emotion and in
the study of Antiquity demonstrate the evolution of different ap-
proaches to the subject. Notably, it shows us the amount of work
still left to be done in reaching a complete understanding of these
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Q&A Box: Delphine Eggel
Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from socialization and culture or biological differences be-
tween women and men?
In the ancient world, gender differences between men and women in emotion
are culturally determined. The big question in this domain concerns the sources
of information that are available to us. These sources can render a restricted
image of the daily life and civilization of the times. It is restricted, because the
masculine point of view is dominant. This image is also sometimes limited by
rare and scattered evidence. Indeed, women’s voices can be heard and discussed
only after being reconstructed. The ancient’s associations of emotions for women
stem from their gender expectations. These expectations are not necessarily the
reality, but rather a concept of how women should be. What perhaps is decisive
is that culturally, socially and behaviorally, the ideas we get about women in
antiquity are not necessarily wrong, despite the scarcity of information sources.
Women have certainly been formed by this imposed cultural vision, just like
actors who follow the text and the instructions of the director, while at the same
time internalizing them.
Where do you see the field of gender and emotions going in the
next 20 years?
Undoubtedly, the decisive turn that came from Foucault’s work was the starting
point for a new era in the historical perspective. The work of many researchers
in the field of Antiquity has currently taken very different paths both in regards
to the problems of women and in regards to gender in general. This trend is
evidenced by the appearance of historians of antiquity who specialize in the
study of gender and more specifically by the onset of emotion-related research.
From a methodological standpoint, what would you recommend
researchers who study emotion in terms of taking into account
gender differences?
Regarding the methodology, I believe it is very clear that interdisciplinary work
will be able to address this area of gender studies and emotion in a concrete way,
with the clearest vision possible. The emotion is visible in the texts, of course,
but can also find a way of expression in images and iconography, as well as in
simple archeological remains such as a blush, comb, or perfume. The traces left
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by the funeral epitaph of a husband bidding farewell to his wife are one of the
countless pieces of evidence that can be collected and analyzed. All these data
from the past should therefore be studied specifically from the point of view of
the historian of religions, archeologist, numismatist, and art historian. Within
the interdisciplinary approach, the final work will offer us a kaleidoscopic im-
age of the subject, allowing us to reconstruct a relatively precise and accurate
image. Methodologically, I believe that studying women’s emotions should not




Q&A Box: Agneta Fisher
Based on your research, where do gender differences in emotion
come from – socialization and culture or biological differences
between women and men?
No difference in emotion between men and women can be traced back to either
cultural or biological differences. Gender differences in emotion start small and
become larger as the gap between the worlds of boys and girls increase. For
example, there is a difference in temperament from birth onwards, with boys
being more physically active, and at a later age engaged in more physical, so-
called rough and tumble play. This not only characterizes some emotion expres-
sions, but also influences how parents, and later teachers deal with the emotions
of boys and girls. Boys are also responded to more with physical activity, mostly
by their fathers. Girls are more physically relaxed, which gives room for more
face-to-face interactions with adults. This may also be one of the origins of girl’s
greater ability to recognize emotions from the face: they simply have a longer
experience with looking at faces, resulting in a greater interest in what is going
on in the minds of other people.
An interesting observation is that whereas boys are more easily upset in
childhood, women end up being the emotional sex. A universal, and partly bio-
logically based sex difference is that women cry more often and in different
situations than do men. Although there are differences in frequency and inten-
sity, there is no country in the world where men cry more than women. Of course
gender differences in crying may partly be explained by different gender roles
ad associated norms, allowing women to show their sensitivity more than men.
However, other gender-role based emotional behaviors, such as physical and
verbal aggression have been changing in recent years, due to societal changes in
gender roles. The fact that changes in actual crying are less prominent, suggests
that crying is more affected by biological than cultural factors.
From a methodological standpoint, what would you recommend
researchers who study emotion in terms of taking into account
gender differences?
The first most important advice is to be specific when studying gender differ-
ences in emotion. Previous research has shown that the largest differences are
found when using global constructs, such as ‘emotionality,’ or ‘emotional ex-
pressiveness.’ This typically indicates that the researchers studied stereotypes
rather than actual differences in emotional reactions. On the other hand, stere-
otypes always play a role when interpreting mental states, expressions or
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behaviors, because emotions are not natural entities, but states that can be inter-
preted in different ways. Thus a tremble in one’s voice, together with a staring
gaze, can be easily interpreted as anger in some contexts, but it could reflect
anxiety, or a competitive attitude in other contexts. It is therefore important to
compare the same behaviors or expressions in men and women in order to draw
any conclusions about gender differences in emotion.
A second important recommendation is to always take into account the con-
text in which the emotional reaction takes place. There is, for example, abundant
research on gender differences in anger and aggression that shows either stronger
anger expressions by men or by women, or sometimes no differences at all. One
of the explanations for these inconsistencies is that those gender differences
largely depend on contexts. Apart from some very robust gender differences as
crying, most gender differences vary with social roles, intimacy, power rela-
tions, or more generally the expected social implications of one’s own emotions,
so-called social appraisals.
Where do you see the field of gender and emotions going in the
next 20 years?
Parallel with other fields in emotion psychology, there will be an increase in
research on gender differences in the activation of different areas in the brain
that are related to emotional response. This is important research and may ex-
plain some differences in emotions between men and women. One area of inter-
est is differences in executive control functions, and how these develop differ-
ently in men and women. One of the hypotheses of current and future interest is
how individuals gain control over their emotional impulses, and how they can
learn to cope with intense emotions. Brain research is an important tool to gain
more insight into this important problem.
On the other hand, I also believe that many of the interesting differences
between the emotions of men and women do not necessarily require research in
the brain, because they develop in social interactions during one’s life. Despite
the fact that in the Western world relations between the sexes have become in-
creasingly egalitarian, there are still huge differences in the social and emotional
styles that are typical for men and women. Listen to women’s talk versus men’s
talk, look at their facial expressions and bodily movements! These differences
become apparent in same-sex groups, for example in traditional work settings,
in sport settings, and more generally in friendships, and it will become more and
more important to develop tools to investigate gender differences in emotions
during specific social interactions.
Q&A Box: AGNETA FISHER
